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ABSTRACT
THE INTERNET VS. THE NATION-STATE: PREVENTION AND PROSECUTION 
CHALLENGES ON THE INTERNET IN REPUBLIC OF TURKIYE
Ersin Elibol 
Old Dominion University, 2014 
Director: Dr. David Earnest
Social, economic, and technological developments are widely accepted as 
powerful forces that affect the role, power, and functions of nation-states. Being one o f 
the most influential technological developments in the recent decades, the internet has 
come into prominence in this regard.
With the use o f the Internet, the monopoly o f media and information controlled by 
official ideologies, capitalist barons, or elites is seriously challenged. Consequently the 
power balance between individuals and authorities in the mass media and communication 
has been transformed in a significant way. Though their reliability may sometimes be 
questionable, the number and type of information resources has increased dramatically, 
and accessing information has become easier substantially. People are more 
interconnected today than ever before. They can easily find, join, or construct their 
personal, social or political networks. With a number of internet applications and social 
media, collective reactions, social movements and activities are more organized and 
effective today than ever before. That is why we have seen so much social fluctuation, 
unrest, protest, and political activism all over the world in the last few years.
Moreover new terms and phenomena like cyber-crime, cyber warfare, and cyber­
attacks have urged nation-states to be more careful about the internet and increase their 
efforts to control it. This level of social chaos in different states and increasing cyber­
crimes lead us to question the effectiveness of nation-states' controlling measures.
Focusing on one state, the Republic of Tiirkiye, this study analyzes two important 
dimensions of state control efforts, prevention and prosecution. On the prevention side, I 
explore the effectiveness o f internet access blocking. On the prosecution side, I analyze 
the effectiveness o f prosecution in internet child pornography.
The result of testing to measure the effectiveness of Internet website blocking 
reveals that there are significant gaps, complications, and dilemmas in these policies. A 
similar situation is also seen in the investigations o f internet child pornography. Analysis 
conducted of the operational investigation files reveals that in most o f the files, suspects 
could not be identified, traced or brought before judicial authorities. As seen in these two 
fields, state policing efforts o f the Internet in a country are not absolute, and the Internet 
can be a vulnerable space in which any local or foreign actor or agents like criminals, 
opposition groups, terrorists can create problems for nation-states.
Copyright, 2014, by Ersin Elibol, All Rights Reserved.
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1CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
No other invention seems to have had the same influence within so short a time at 
the global level as the Internet. Some anthropologists emphasize that “this capacity-the 
Intemet-is the most significant social development since the invention o f writing over 
five thousand years ago.”1 The Internet has become a global communication network, and 
it has been rapidly expanding since it was first introduced to the public. While there were 
about 16 million worldwide users in 1995, there were 400 million in 2001 and about 2.4 
billion users as of June 2012.2 It is estimated to reach around 3 billion by the end of 
2014.3
Today, there is almost no field in our daily lives that the Internet has not 
penetrated. It is already one of the inseparable parts of our daily social and economic 
lives. The Internet can enable us to access to our banks, official departments, libraries, 
shopping centers, media, and entertainment centers. We can manage our banking 
accounts and conveniently carry out many transactions online. We can easily connect 
libraries and databases to conduct research. For shopping, we can find many alternative 
retailers and sellers, not necessarily near our homes but from anywhere in the world. We 
can reach newspapers, TV centers, magazines, and many kinds of media corporations.
Many of the previous media and communication services and applications have
1 William Van Dusen, "The World Has Entered a N ew  Z one o f  History," Vital Speeches o f  the D a y  73, no. 
5 (2007): 219.
2 "World Internet Usage and Population Statistics," Internet W orld U sage Statistics: M iniwatts Marketing 
Group. 2013.
J International Telecommunication Union (ITU), "World Telecom m unication/ICT Indicators Database 
2014." United Nations, 2014.
2been adapted to the Internet. Although the traditional ways o f providing services like TV 
broadcasting, printing newspapers and telephone boxes still exist, the Internet has 
combined them all onto a unique platform to be a TV, a digital newspaper or a telephone 
(Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) calls). With smart phones running over 3G or 4G 
technology today, these services become mobile for individuals, and ease our lives in a 
significant way.
People who have messages, comments, news, ideologies, or any other ideas now 
have a convenient tool to amplify and share with anyone in the world. Skillful people can 
now use this global platform to present their skills and capabilities that can be digitalized. 
The mass media have started to share some of their roles with Internet-based “citizen 
journalism.” An individual has unique power on the internet today, what Friedman calls 
“uploading.”4 Without convincing any actor of the previous media order, individuals can 
upload any record o f any subject to the internet, which can change the public agenda at 
the national level, or even the international level, as seen in the case of Julian Assange 
and WikiLeaks.
It is “nonhierarchical, interactive, and global. Its usage is also growing 
exponentially.”5 Because of its diffusion power and widespread use, it relatively 
empowers individuals more than authorities. For instance, what makes police force 
powerful is the use of radio communication (walky-talky) among each patrol to 
coordinate their collective action against criminals or in their daily activities. During the 
Gezi protests in Tiirkiye started in the end of May 2013, protesters used some of internet
4 Thomas L. Friedman, The W orld Is Flat: A B r ie f  H istory o f  the Twenty-First C entury  (N ew  York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 2005).
5 Garry Rodan, "The Internet and Political Control in Singapore," P o litica l Science Q uarterly  113, no. I 
(1998).
3applications including a walky-talky program, Zello on their smart phones for instant 
communication among each-others.6
The Internet is such a dominant medium that it is open to many new media and 
communication technologies. This accessibility encourages developers to make new 
technologies Internet compatible. Castells believes that the invention of the Internet is as 
important as the invention of printing press.7 Referring to McLuhan’s analogy of the 
“Gutenberg Galaxy” for the diffusion of the printing press in the West, he believes that
Q
“we have now entered a new world o f communication: the Internet Galaxy.
The Internet is still quite young. Basic examples o f computer networking go back 
to the mid-1970s in the United States. It started to be used publicly in the beginning of 
the 1980s and became more widespread by the 1990s . Goldfoot indicates that the word 
“Internet” emerged by the mid-1980s.9 Since then, the Internet already connected the 
entire world like a digital web. Between the years o f 2000 and 2010, users o f the Internet 
have increased about 444.8 % in the world.10
This popularity has also affected academia. Compared to other media and 
communication tools like TV, newspapers, and radio, the Internet has often been the 
subject o f academic inquiry. Chadwick and Howard analyzed the numbers o f articles 
available in Thompson Reuter’s 1SI Web of Science scholarly article database published
6 Uetin Aydin, "5 Milyon T w eet’e Organize Incelemesi," H urriyet, 15 June 2013. and "Gezi Parki 
Eylemcilerinin GOzdesi 'Zello' Nedir?" Aksam, 6 June 2013.
7 Manuel Castells, The Internet Galaxy: Reflections on the Internet, Business, an d  Society, (Oxford; N ew  
York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
8 Ibid., 3.
9 Josh A. Goldfoot, "Antitrust Implications o f  Internet Administration," Virginia Law  R eview  84, no. 5 
(1998): 909-53.
10 International Telecommunication Union, ibid.
between 1995 and 2006.11 A keyword search revealed that there were fewer articles 
published in 1995 containing the word, “Internet” than the word, “TV.” That changed in 
1999, when the frequency o f articles containing the word “Internet” matched the 
frequency of the keywords “TV,” "newspapers,” and “radio.” By 2001 the number of 
articles containing the word “Internet” exceeded the total number articles containing the 
words "TV,” “newspaper,” or “radio.”12
THE PUZZLE AND RESEARCH QUESTION
The spread of the Internet and its use have introduced new opportunities and 
convenience to our daily lives. At the same time Internet use has introduced significant 
challenges and complications. Besides complications and possible victimization at the 
individual level, the primary addressee and target o f these negative effects is the only 
authority within national borders: nation-states. Authorities all over the world are 
developing their own national policies to maximize their benefits from the Internet, but at 
the same time they are trying to take measures to handle and control the externalities o f 
this new medium. It can be expected that non-democratic states tend to take strict policies 
and implement harsh legal measures to regulate the Internet, whereas democratic 
countries prefer more liberal approaches in their Internet policies. However, strict 
policies and practices can also be seen in relatively democratic countries.13
11 Andrew Chadwick and Philip N. Howard, R outledge H andbook o f  Internet Politics, (London; N ew  York: 
Routledge, 2009).
Ibid.
1 ’ At different times, som e o f  the countries known as democratic and liberal are also classified  by the RSF, 
Reporter Without Borders as enem ies o f  the internet or where the internet is under surveillance including  
Australia, Turkiye, South Korea, USA, UK, France. See for instance: Clothilde Le C oz, "Reporters without 
Borders Issues ‘Enem ies o f  the Internet’ List," M ediashift, 5 April 2010. and Reporters W ithout Borders, 
"Internet Enemies," (2 0 1 1), and Kieran Doherty, "US, UK 'Enemies o f  the Internet' for First Time," RT, 17 
March 2014.
5The challenges and complications o f the Internet can be seen in a variety o f fields 
that states have fundamental interests in controlling. This might be a national security 
issue, like a cyber-attack to a strategic department, or a terrorist organization use o f the 
Internet for different purposes. It could be a taxation issue for a global Internet company, 
e.g. Google, earning profits from local advertisement within states without paying taxes 
to the local government. It might be ensuring the rule o f law and public order also on the 
internet like in preventing any of undesired idea, ideology or content within national 
borders for different reasons.
Today, even highly developed countries, like the United States, have serious 
dilemmas regarding the Internet. Although the Internet was bom in the United States, and 
there are many well-known US-based companies in information technology, the country 
is having legal and technical difficulties regulating the Internet in accordance with the 
country's core principles. For instance, obscenity and pornography are strictly regulated 
within the country “in all communications technology.” 14 Except its sensitivity against 
child sexual abuse, which is regulated in different legislation like the Children’s Internet 
Protection Act, similar materials are now very much available and accessible in the 
United States because of these difficulties. The main technical reason is “over-blocking,” 
which means that blocking some illegal web contents may result in blocking innocent 
web content, since many websites may contain both legal and illegal content. Callanan et 
al. stress that “it seems inevitable that legal content will be blocked where blocking is 
implemented.”15 While testing a blocking method, Domain Name System (DNS)
14 Amy E. White, Virtually Obscene: The C ase f o r  an U ncensored Internet, (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & 
Co.. 2006). 19.
15 Cormac Callanan, Marco Gercke, Estelle D e Marco, and Hein Dries-Ziekenheiner, "Internet Blocking: 
Balancing Cybercrime Responses in Democratic Societies," Open Society  Institute, 2009 , 12.
6poisoning,16 which prevents access to unwanted websites, Dronseif figured out that 
almost all attempts to block websites containing hate speech made mistakes in their 
implementation in Germany. While some sites were closed down for hate speech, some 
other legal websites were blocked unintentionally.17
Perhaps the most significant challenges that the Internet imposed on nation-states 
have been experienced in the socio-political realm. Hills notes that, “History shows that 
person to person instantaneous electrical communications have altered the relations of 
states to their citizens. Such communications can be used to organize domestic opposition 
to governments. They can also cross national borders creating vulnerability and threats to 
national security. Point to point electrical communication transfers power away from 
states to non-state actors in a way that the top down technology of broadcasting does 
not."'8
In recent years, masses who were unpleased with their regime type or with the 
policies of their governments have created serious threats and vulnerability for some 
states, by also using the Internet. Together with other socio-political dynamics and 
reasons, effective use of the Internet has played a significant role in these incidents. The 
uprising called the Arab Spring started in Tunisia in the end of 2010, the incidents o f 
Occupy Wall Street protests in the USA in the year of 2011, or the riots started in London 
and spread throughout England in the same year showed us clearly that the internet was 
the kitchen o f the incidents where all the anger, hate and other negative circumstances are
lf> Domain N am e System  (D N S ) is a service that translates website nam es, which usually use alphabetical 
letters, into number sequences known as IP addresses.
17 Ian Brown, "Internet Filtering - Be Careful What You Ask For," In Freedom an d  P rejudice: A pproaches  
to  M edia and Culture, Edited by S. Kirca and L. Hanson. 2008.
18 Jill Hills, "What's N ew ? War, Censorship and Global Transmission," International Com m unication  
G azette  68, no. 3 (2006), 195.
7harmonized and given stove though uploading, reporting, jogging, tweeting and where 
the sittings around the meal table is organized through communication, information 
sharing.
Even we had seen the role o f the internet before, in the case o f Indonesia in 1998 
(the fall of Suharto regime); in the so-called Orange Revolution in Ukraine, 2004; during 
the Saffron Revolution in Burma, 2007; or in the incidents in Moldova, 2009 that some 
call the Twitter Revolution.
Kyj explains the role o f the Internet in the Orange Revolution in Ukraine:
“Despite lacking access to mass media, supporters o f democratic change compensated 
through skillful use of the Internet to recruit volunteers, raise funds, organize campaigns, 
report breaking news, and gamer the sympathy o f the global democratic community.” 19 
Analyzing political protests in Moldova, Mungiu-Pippidi and Igor emphasize how the 
Internet-engaged younger generations utilized online tools and features o f the Internet 
while organizing their political protests in 2009.20
Although it did not result in a regime change, the governments o f Burma in 2007 
and Iran in 2009 had similar challenges when people utilized the internet and internet 
applications while they were protesting their authoritarian regimes and were asking 
political change as well as freedom.21 During the Saffron Revolution in Burma, 
Chowdhury notes that, “Despite efforts by the government to control all media outlets, 
this attempted revolution demonstrated that the Internet does not lend itself easily to
19 Myroslaw J. Kyj, "Internet Use in Ukraine's Orange Revolution," Business H orizons  49 , no. I (2006), 71.
20 Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, and Igor Munteanu, "Moldova's "Twitter Revolution"," Journal o f  D em ocracy  
Journal o f  D em ocracy  20. no. 3 (2009): 136-42.
21 Evgeny M orozov, "Iran Elections: A Twitter Revolution?" W ashington Post, 17 June 2009.
8control."22 Nima believes that an independent information society that can be created by 
the use of Internet features like social media tools and blogging is the only way to bring 
political change to Iran in the long run.23
The world also noticed recently how influential the Internet was during the Arab 
Spring, particularly in Egypt, Tunis, Libya and Syria. For people on the street, the 
Internet is the only effective tool on hand to mobilize disaffected masses, to organize 
their reactions, and to amplify their voices to the world.
Analyzing the role of social media in political fluctuations that began in Tunisia 
in the beginning of 2011, John Timpane argues how Internet use has broken the state’s 
information monopoly. He cites, “One thing about information: Once it’s out, you can’t 
put it back. As Richard, associate professor of communication at La Salle University, 
puts it, ‘The sheer multiplicity of venues and sources makes it impossible for would-be 
dictators to get the genie back in the bottle. And once info is out at all, it’s easily, 
infinitely copiable.’"’24
Even against blocking efforts by these authoritarian governments, or the total 
shutdown by these regimes, new Internet technologies were introduced and started to be 
utilized in these countries. In order to circumvent government blockage o f Skype calls 
made from Syria, an activist used software from Psiphon, Inc. to call outside the country. 
The Psiphon technology was developed by a Canadian company, funded by the United 
States Department o f State, and was downloaded by thousands of people in Syria during
22 Mridul Chowdhury, The Role o f  the Internet in B u rm a’s Saffron Revolution, (The Berkman Center for 
Internet & Society at Harvard University: Berkman Center Research Publication, 2008), 8.
2> Nima Mina, Blogs, C yber-L iterature and Virtual C ulture in Iran, Garmisch-Partenkirchen: G eorge C. 
Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 2007.
24 John Timpane, "Arab World Shaken by Power o f  Twitter and Facebook,” M cC latchy - Tribune Business 
News, 2 0 11.
9a three-week period.2'  Likewise, Google and Twitter have developed Internet 
technologies for which no internet connection is required. These became a remedy to a 
total Internet blackout, allowing "voice to Tweet” (a mobile application known as Voice 
for Twitter) capabilities for Egyptians to send short message to Twitter by calling specific 
telephone numbers and speaking the messages over the mobile telephone network.26
In the end of 2010, the world experienced another example o f this debate— the 
case of WikiLeaks. On one side there is one state, a super power—the United States. On 
the other side there is the Internet, a website called WikiLeaks, and an Internet activist. 
This case also shows how the Internet can be an influential tool in the hands of an
27individual, as Friedman claims in his book The World is Flat, even to challenge a state.
This dissertation explores the interaction between nation-states and the Internet
and explores the ways in which the Internet affects state power. State power here is
operationalized as "policing.” Policing is one of the essential functions o f state authority,
and it has two important aspects: prevention and prosecution. While state authorities try
to prevent some criminal, social, or political threats before they happen, authorities also
try to trace, identify, prosecute, detain, or arrest those who involved these kinds o f illegal
» , 28activities. This study concentrates on one country, the Republic of Turkiye. For the 
preventive policing aspect, the study focuses on blocking measures. For the prosecution 
dimension, the study examines a specific crime, child pornography. This study explores 
empirical cases, data, and other reliable evidence to understand how the Internet has
25 Ivan Watson, "Cyberwar Explodes in Syria," CNN, 22 Novem ber 2011.
26 Charles Arthur, "Google and Twitter Launch Service Enabling Egyptians to Tw eet by Phone," G uardian, 
I February 2011.
27 A dimension o f  this interaction, for instance see the declaration o f  Reporters Without Borders and how  it 
condem ns the blocking, cyber-attacks and political pressure against the website and its founder: Reporters 
Without Borders, "Wikileaks Hounded?" 4 Decem ber 2010.
28 Turkiye is the Turkish name for the country referred to as Turkey in English.
10
complicated traditional policing practices.
In this frame, this study analyzes two issue areas, as an example for each policing 
aspect: i) blocking on the Internet (prevention) and ii) prosecution o f child pornography 
(prosecution).
OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION
States have many mechanisms and tools to regulate and administer this global 
medium. Drezner specifies that “the Internet has generated multiple areas o f governance, 
including the development of technical protocols, censorship, e-taxation, intellectual 
property, and privacy rights.”29 Likewise Denning indicates that “the Internet has raised 
numerous policy issues in such areas as privacy, encryption, censorship, electronic, 
commerce, international trade, intellectual property protection, taxation, Internet 
governance, cyber-crime, and information warfare.”30
Among these policy areas, the interaction between the nation-state and the 
Internet is mainly argued around three areas in political science literature: i) censorship, 
blocking, and filtering regimes (practices o f states); ii) cyber-crimes, policing, 
prosecution, and law enforcement difficulties; and iii) surveillance efforts. This study 
concerns the first two but excludes the third policy area, which is a typical state behavior: 
surveillance. For states, surveillance efforts are vitally important for their power and 
existence. Such is the case with the Internet. Many states today try to maximize their 
benefit from the Internet for surveillance and their national interests. Studying these kinds
29 D. W. Drezner, "The Global Governance o f  the Internet: Bringing the State Back In," P olitica l S cience  
Q uarterly  119, no. 3 (2004), 479.
Dorothy E. Denning, "Activism, Hacktivism, and Cyberterrorism: The Internet as a Tool for Influencing 
Foreign Policy," In N etworks an d  Netwars: The Future o f  Terror, Crim e, and M ilitancy, edited by J. 
Arquilla and D. F. Ronfeldt. 2001, 250.
11
of efforts o f states would bring a broader perspective for explaining the effects o f the 
Internet on state power. However, studying surveillance is always difficult since data and 
information in this field are widely confidential and closed to third parties.
Rather, this study focuses on access blocking, filtering practices, and cybercrime, 
specifically cybercrime investigations into the exchange o f Internet child pornography, 
which are some of the major problems of this new medium. Blocking and filtering on the 
Internet are very much interrelated with many other debates, such as the Internet and 
democracy, and the Internet, social media, social movements, and social mobilization. 
Many democratic rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of speech, and privacy 
of communication are extensively related to censorship and filtering regimes. Analyzing 
these issues, exploring effectiveness and possible challenges in these regimes, will bring 
substantial explanations and contributions to these debates mentioned above. Also, 
investigation of aspects o f a cybercrime will present how judicial proceedings against 
cybercrime are effective in solving such crimes.
CONTRIBUTION: STATE POWER IN THE INFORMATION AGE
In fact, there is already a debate in the literature about the decline in state power. 
Sometimes this decline has been argued within globalization dynamics, sometimes 
within newly emerging actors, like multi-national companies,32 or non-governmental 
organizations,33 or sometimes within other powerful forces like technology.34 As stressed
James N. Rosenau, D istant Proxim ities: Dynam ics B eyond G lobalization , (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2003). and Jan Aart Schoite. G lobalization: A C ritica l Introduction, (N ew  York: St. 
Martin's Press, 2000).
’2 Susan Strange, The Retreat o f  the S tate: The Diffusion o f  Pow er in th e World E conom y, (Cambridge 
University Press, 1996).
3 ’ Thomas Risse-Kappen, Bringing Transnational R elations Back In: Non-State Actors, D om estic  
Structures, an d  International Institutions, (Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge; N ew
12
in The Economist, '‘Almost any discussion of international relations nowadays seems to 
begin and end with the same idea: the state is in retreat.”35 Creveld classifies that states 
are weakening in four ways: a) losing warfare capability; b) weakening welfare capacity; 
c) changes brought by modem technology and communication tools; and d) difficulties 
sustaining public order.36 In the same debate, The Economist refers to two old enemies, 
which are stronger now than ever before: technology and ideology.37
Ronald Reagan stated in a speech in London Guildhall in 1989 that, “Technology 
will make it increasingly difficult for the state to control the information its people 
receive. ..The Goliath o f the totalitarianism will be brought down by the David of the
- 7 0
microchip.”'
Nye perceives this decline as a transformation in state power and describes five 
trends in this transformation: economic interdependence, transnational actors, nationalism 
in weak states, the spread of technology, and changing political issues.39 Price also 
believes that this is a kind of transformation in state functions: “Redefined state power 
and changes in modes and practices of authority are more likely than what is often called 
state decline.”40
Analyzing social networks and Internet applications such as Facebook, MySpace, 
and Twitter, The Economist notes that, “Despite its giant population, Facebook is not
York. NY: Cambridge University Press, 1995). and Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, A ctivists  
B eyond Borders: A dvocacy Networks in International P olitics, (Ithaca, N Y: Cornell University Press, 
1998).
34Joseph S. N ye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in W orld P olitics, (N ew  York, NY: Public Affairs, 
2004). and Martin V. Creveld. "The Fate o f  the State," P aram eters  (1996): 4-18.
35 "The Future o f  the State," Economist, 18 September 1997.
6 Martin V. Creveld, "The Fate o f  the State," P aram eters  (1996): 4 - 18.
'7 "The Future o f  the State," ibid.
8 Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor C. Boas, Open Networks, C lo se d  Regimes: The Im pact o f  the Internet on  
Authoritarian Rule. (W ashington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003).
3<) Nye, ibid.
40 Monroe E. Price. M edia and Sovereignty the G loba l Inform ation Revolution an d  Its C hallenge to  S ta te  
Power, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 3.
quite a sovereign state— but it is beginning to look and [to] act like one.”41 The 
newspaper implies that, "The future is another country."42 It refers the comments of 
David Post, a law professor from Temple University, who specifies some interesting 
points: "Facebook has many implications, including commercial, for individuals or 
companies. Recently, the website obligated users to utilize its proprietary money system, 
which is a typical state feature (printing national money to circulate within national 
borders). Just as states tax their citizens, Facebook also taxes its users. Interestingly, 
while they are logged in, Facebook users can access some o f different websites outside 
without logging in to these sites.” Like using a passport (or required a valid visa) while 
travelling between states, The Economist notes.43
The magazine was reporting Facebook as having over 500 million users all over 
the world, coming in third after the population of China and India in 2010. As of May 1, 
2013, registered users of Facebook are reportedly reached 1.11 billion. The number of 
existing users of another internet phenomenon, Twitter was reported as 500 million as of 
March 21, 2013.44
Some scholars, on the other hand, do not agree that the Internet threatens nation­
states to such an extent.42 While discussing the effects of the Internet on nation-states, 
Drezner indicates that "states, particularly the great powers, remain the primary actors for 
handling the social and political externalities created by globalization and the Internet.”46
41 "The Future Is Another Country." Econom ist, 22  July 2010.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 For the number o f  Facebook members, see for instance: "Number o f  Active Users at Facebook over the 
Years, ” A ssocia ted  Press, 1 May 2013. For the number o f  Twitter users, see for instance: "Twitter in 
Numbers," Telegraph, 21 March 2013.
45 Drezner, ibid. and Jack L. Goldsmith and Tim Wu, Who C ontrols th e Internet?: Illusions o f  a  B orderless  
World, (N ew  York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006). and Price, ibid.
46 Drezner, ibid., 478.
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Hill notes that, “Although some theorists have argued that the internationalization of 
communications has eroded the power o f the state, he believes that power has shifted 
away from domestic and international non-state civic opposition groups to increased state 
control.'’47
In the introduction of their book, Morris and Waisbord summarize that,
“Certainly, states currently face changing and challenging conditions. The 
remarkable global expansion o f media corporations, facilitated by liberalization 
and privatization of media systems worldwide and the development o f cable and 
satellite technologies, has reduced states' ability to exercise power and maintain 
information sovereignty. It would be unwarranted, however, to conclude that the 
state no longer matters. Reports about the death o f the state may be greatly 
exaggerated, as many contributors in this book suggest.’’48
Goldsmith and Wu accept that states face serious problems because o f the
49Internet. However, they argue that these challenges are not totally different from those 
created by previous media and communication mediums. They also indicate that “every 
great technological innovation has the potential to lower the cost o f  violating law” and 
thus “these points (challenges) are unsurprising.’00
Looking at the situation in a particular country, the Republic o f Turkiye, this 
study aims to contribute to the literature by presenting the dimensions o f this interaction 
between the state and the Internet. Especially for some countries like China and Iran, 
there are quite a number of academic studies in which the effects o f the Internet were 
subjects of inquiries.71 The experience of Tiirkiye’s internet blocking practices, as well as
47 David T. Hill and Krishna Sen, "The Internet in Indonesia's N ew  Democracy," D em ocratiza tion  7, no. 1 
(2000): 119-36.
48 Nancy Morris and S ilv io  R. Waisbord, M edia an d  G lobalization: Why the S ta te M atters , (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), ix.
49 Goldsmith and Wu, ibid.
50 Ibid, 8 1.
51 For China, see for instance Ho-Chun Li, "Digital Dem ocracy in China: Evaluating C hinese C itizens’ 
Fight for Rights via the Internet." State University o f  N ew  York at Buffalo, 2008. and Z ixiang (A lex) Tan,
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the effectiveness of prosecution of online crimes, particularly internet child pornography, 
will present to the literature the experience of a developing state and its policing 
challenges on the Internet, both in terms of prevention, i.e. Internet blocking, and 
prosecution, i.e. child pornography.
This study is not a technical analysis o f circumvention tools and programs in a lab 
environment. It is a field study where the results o f blocking measures are established and 
where the results o f circumvention tests are directly conducted. While tests and checks 
for blocked websites are performed in Turkiye, some sections were written in the United 
States.
The following second chapter presents a review o f literature, divided into four 
sections. The first review shows how the Internet in general affects nation-states by 
focusing on how Internet use and activity complicate basic state functions. Classifying 
state functions as ensuring national security, justice and public order, and economic and 
social welfare, this section explores how this medium causes significant problems and 
challenges in these three basic fields for state authorities.
The second review of the second chapter looks at access blocking techniques and 
the argument about their effectiveness, discussed in more detail in the third section, about 
circumvention. These three sections thus explore the prevention dimension o f state 
policing on the Internet. Finally, the literature review concludes in the fourth section, an 
example o f a child pornography prosecution.
The third chapter includes methodology and research design. This study examines 
two policy areas o f policing on the Internet: effectiveness o f access blocking policies on
William Foster, and Seymour E. Goodman, "China's State-Coordinated Internet Infrastructure," 
Com munications o f  the ACM, June 1999. For Iran see: Mina, ibid.
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the Internet and effectiveness o f prosecution of child pornography. This section also 
explains the methodology, how research questions are formulated, how they are 
measured, why the Republic of Turkiye is selected, why internet child pornography is 
focused on as a cybercrime, and provides some definitions o f terms used in this study.
Chapter four gives introductory’ information for the Republic o f Turkiye, the 
media and communication fields in general, and the historical background o f the Internet 
in the country.
The fifth chapter presents a general overview of Internet access blocking policies 
in Turkiye and the effectiveness o f these polices. Being one of the measurement criteria, I 
discuss the analysis o f a YouTube case as an example for over-blocking. The chapter 
includes essential part of the measurement which is the circumvention tests o f 25 blocked 
websites with three popular circumvention methods. The last part o f the chapter 
addresses other issues and arguments about the effectiveness of Internet blocking, such as 
dilemmas in legal terms, access blocking terror websites, and its results as well as the 
circumvention tendency in the country.
In the sixth chapter, prosecution o f child pornography is explored. This chapter 
relies on secondary data from a central police department in Turkiye. The department is a 
Bureau of the International Police Organization, INTERPOL, named Interpol Ankara.
The department coordinates cooperation between non-Turkish departments and Turkish 
departments in policing and judicial matters. Looking at three years 2005, 2006, and 
2007. this section analyzes how7 prosecution of Internet child pornography is effective 
both inside and outside o f Turkiye. in terms of identifying criminals and bringing them 
before judicial authorities.
The seventh section presents overall analysis of the two aspects explored, policy 
implications of this study and a must “international cooperation”. The final section 
includes weakness and limitations of the study as well as some ideas for future studies 
and the conclusion.
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW
STATE POWER AND THE INTERNET
Like many technological innovations, the Internet has brought new challenges and 
complications. How the complications caused by the Internet are significantly different 
from those caused by previous communication and media technologies is a debate in the 
related filed literature. There are numerous scholars who believe that traditional state 
mechanisms are ineffective, even useless against the Internet because o f its unique 
characteristics and features. Caimcross emphasizes that “government jurisdictions are 
geographic. The Internet knows few boundaries. The clash between the two will reduce 
what individual countries can do. Government sovereignty, already eroded by forces such 
as trade liberalization, will diminish further...One result: no longer will governments be 
able to set the tax rates or other standards they want."1 John Perry Barlow believes that, 
“By creating a seamless global economic zone, borderless and un-regulatable, the 
Internet calls into question the very idea o f the nation-state."2
Price explains that like the Internet, previous media and communication devices 
have caused similar problems and challenges for authorities. Border crossing radio waves 
including political or other kinds of undesired messages were one o f the first 
transnational problems between states, which were later minimized by mutual 
negotiations and agreements. When satellites, phones, and televisions were started to be 
used, the conflict for national governments was again the transnational nature o f the
1 Frances Cairncross, The Death o f  D istance: H ow the Com m unications Revolution Is C hanging O ur L ives , 
(Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2001).
'  D. W. Drezner, "The Global Governance o f  the Internet: Bringing the State Back In,” P olitica l Science  
Q uarterly  I 19, no. 3 (2004): 477-98.
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technology. Although states are trying to take technical measures and develop counter 
technologies to cover up their air boundaries or to stop unwanted broadcasting, we may 
still see significant technical problems and disputes between states for these previous 
media and communication fields.3
To summarize the debate, Gelbstein and Kurbalija use two frames in question: “Is 
the Internet ‘new wine in old bottles’ or is it ‘new wine in new bottles’?”4 The “old-real” 
approach -  or “new wine in old bottles” -  argues that the Internet has not introduced 
anything new to the field o f governance. The Internet is just another new device, from the 
governance perspective, no different from its predecessors: the telegraph, the telephone, 
or radio.
For example, in legal discussions, this approach argues that existing laws can be 
applied to the Internet with only minor adjustments. In the economic field, this approach 
argues that there is no difference between traditional and “e-commerce.” Consequently 
there is no need for special legal treatment of “e-commerce.”
The “new-cyber” approach— or “new wine in new bottles”— argues that the 
Internet is a fundamentally different communication system from all previous ones. The 
main premise of the “cyber” approach is that the Internet managed to de-link our social 
and political reality from the (geographically separated) world of sovereign states. 
Cyberspace is different from real space and it requires a different form o f governance. In 
the legal field, the “cyber” school of thought argues that existing laws on jurisdiction, 
cybercrime and contracts cannot be applied to the Internet and that new laws must be
’ Monroe E. Price, M edia and Sovereignty the G loba l Inform ation Revolution an d  Its C hallenge to  S ta te  
P ow er , (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002).
4 Jovan Kurbalija and Eduardo Gelbstein, Internet G overnance: Issues, Actors a n d  D iv ides , (M sida, Malta; 
Geneva; Kuala Lumpur: DiploFoundation; Global K now ledge Partnership, 2005).
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created.'
In fact, assertive claims and exaggerated rhetoric about the transformative power 
o f the Internet was more visible in the earliest years o f the Internet when officials, 
politicians, and technicians faced the first challenges to govern, legalize, and nationalize 
this global medium. According to Seth F. Kreimer, “The first wave o f  legal thinking 
about the Internet saw millennial omens in technology. The reach o f the Internet seemed 
to exceed the grasp o f governments, and this structure heralded-—or threatened— the end 
of censorship.’’6 Castells also notes that governments were not effectively able to control 
this digital medium in the first years of civilian Internet use. However, government 
authorities increased their surveillance capacity and empowered legal mechanisms during 
this time.7
The debate has many complex dimensions, and governing the Internet has brought 
both new opportunities and also new challenges. What is interesting in this interaction 
between the Internet and the nation-state is not observing how states are using traditional 
tools such as making laws on the Internet, founding institutions, licensing, and others. 
Rather, it is to observe how significant amount o f Internet traffic is out o f  states’ control; 
the extent to which policies, laws, and other regulations on the Internet are applicable and 
effective. Further, it is important to understand why some types of states may perceive 
this global medium as a threat for their regime type and prefer strict censorship policies 
on the Internet. Likewise it is important to understand why some others are having 
serious legal dilemmas to regulate the Internet without damaging basic democratic and
5 Ibid, 17-18.
6 Seth F. Kreimer, "Censorship by Proxy the First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem o f  
the Weakest Link," U niversity o f  Pennsylvania Law  R eview  115, no. 11 (2006).
' Manuel Castells, The Internet G alaxy: Reflections on the Internet, Business, a n d  Society, (Oxford; N ew  
York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
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liberal principles. This study focuses on these kinds of complications and dilemmas for 
nation-states raised by the Internet. The following section explores these challenges seen 
in three basic functions of nation-states.
Three Main State Functions and Negative Effects o f  the Internet
Jackson and Sorensen classify functions that states are expected to ensure:
o
security, individual freedoms, social order, justice and social welfare. While discussing 
the effect o f weak states in transnational terrorism, Patrick also focuses on similar 
functions of nation-states: “physical security, legitimate political institutions, economic 
management and social welfare.”9
Analytically, this section explores the effects of the Internet on nation-states based 
on these basic state functions: a) security, b) justice and public order, c) economic and 
social welfare. This classification is not a clear cut categorization to utilize for explaining 
the effects of the Internet on nation-states but this analytic approach is useful to frame 
and present this interaction between nation-states and the Internet.
National Security
Security is one of the primary concerns for nation-states and it determines state 
behaviors in a significant way. Being a globally open communication and media network, 
the Internet has raised new issue areas which tend to corrode states’ sovereignty and has
8 Robert H. Jackson and Georg Sorensen, Introduction to  International Relations: Theories a n d  
Approaches , (Oxford; N ew  York; Oxford University Press, 2007).
9 Stewart Patrick, "Weak States and Global Threats: A ssessin g the Evidence of'Spillovers' Center for 
Global Development," W orking P aper  73 (January 2006).
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created new "vulnerabilities and threats” for their national security.10 Castells emphasizes 
that we are using and sharing the same network with our adversaries, criminals, and 
terrorists.11 Thus, the Internet is structurally open to all nefarious thinking anywhere in 
the world.
Security threats through the Internet for states are analyzed in three aspects here 
in this section: i) the risk of being used as cyber-attacks like interstate military clashes; ii) 
terrorist use o f the Internet; and iii) use o f the internet to wage political threats against 
regime type and territorial integrity.
Cyber-attacks, Cyber-warfare
Cyberspace has already become a place where interstate conflicts and battles take 
place in asymmetric ways. The political conflict between Iran and the West, for instance, 
is seen to take place in cyberspace. Security experts have discovered that a virus called 
“Stuxnet.” which is widely seen in Iran, can show that this virus was especially created to 
target Iran and is looking for something special there. According to Symantec (an 
American computer security company) records, as the Guardian noted, 60% of 
computers in Iran have been affected by this virus. The virus may not spread through the 
Internet network but is believed to be diffused in the computers and closed networks 
through USB ports and flash drives.12
In 2007 Estonia was targeted for a series o f cyber-attacks. The political disputes 
and conflict between Estonia and Russia at that time made some commenters suspect
10 Jill Hills, "What’s N ew ? War, Censorship and Global Transmission," International Com m unication  
G azette  68. no. 3 (2006): 195-216.
11 Castells, ibid.
'■ Jim G iles, "Are States Unleashing the Dogs o f  Cyber War?" NSC I N ew Scientist 208, no. 2791 (2010): 
22-23. and Peter Beaumont, "Iran Nuclear Experts Race to Stop Spread o f  Stuxnet Computer Worm," 
G uardian , 25 September 2010.
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Russia was behind these attacks. But no direct link to Russia has been detected so far, nor 
could perpetrators be traced or prosecuted, except one Estonian student who received a 
fine. The computers used for this attack were spread over 100 different countries, which 
made prosecution complicated.13 Despite arguments whether to define it as cyber­
warfare, Estonia's unique experience affected NATO's decision to found its cyber center 
in Estonia, called NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (NATO 
CCDCOE) on 14 May 2008.14
Many of these kinds of cyber-attacks have been seen during an ongoing inter-state 
political conflict or a military clash. The Yugoslavian crisis showed a number o f 
examples for cyber-attacks. During the war in Kosovo, Albanian hackers attacked and 
damaged about 2,000 websites.1:1 The Los Angeles Times wrote that the Kosovo conflict 
was “turning cyberspace into an ethereal war zone where the battle for the hearts and 
minds is being waged through the use o f electronic images, online discussion group 
postings, and hacking attacks.” 16 When NATO launched air strikes on Serbian targets in 
1999, Serbian hacker groups like the Black Hand and Serbian Angel started to attack 
some websites of the United States Government websites, as well as NATO’s computer 
networks.17 Also, the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during the 
same NATO operations in Serbia in 1999 triggered attacks from Chinese hackers on 
some United States Government websites.18
Clark Boyd, "Cyber-War a Growing Threat Warn Experts," BBC W orld  Service, 17 June 2010 . and 
"Estonia Hit by 'M oscow Cyber War,"' BBC N ew s, 17 M ay 2007.
14 NATO Cooperative Cyber D efence Centre o f  Excellence, w w w .ccdcoe.org.
15 E. M. Hoctor, "Emerging Virtual Nations: Promise and Potential," N ew  M edia a n d  S ocie ty  9, no. 4  
(2007): 697-706.
16 Dorothy E. Denning, "Activism, Hacktivism , and Cyberterrorism: The Internet as a Tool for Influencing  
Foreign Policy," In N etworks an d  Netwars: The Future o f  Terror, Crim e, and M ilitancy, edited by J. 
Arquilla and D. F. Ronfeldt. 239-88, 2001.
17 Ibid.
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The cyber-attacks on the Georgian Internet infrastructure in 2008 were more 
organized and more serious than those on Estonia in 2007, according to a security 
expert.19 As in the case of Estonia, Russia was considered to be behind the attacks before 
its military forces moved into Georgia.20 According to NATO CCDCOE, cyber-attacks 
against Georgia included “defacement o f websites,” denial-of-service (DoS) or 
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, and “distribution of instructions and 
malicious software.”21 The targets were governmental departments, financial institutions, 
and media outlets.22
Despite its common use, the definition of “cyber-warfare” is not clear. Security 
officer Bruce Schneier believes that: “We don't have good definitions o f what cyber war 
is, what it looks like and how to fight it.”23 The OECD report also notes that incidents 
experienced so far in cyberspace “do not deserve the name cyber-war.”24 From this 
perspective, cyber-warfare is an exaggerated term. However, such attacks may result in 
many states and security organizations taking counter measures and developing new 
strategies against cyber-warfare. Schneier also believes that the future wars will take 
place in cyberspace. Some experts worry that these kinds of cyber-attacks will become a 
new arms race between states.25
“The United States officials already consider cyberspace to be a domain for 
warfare, similar to air, space, land, and sea.”26 Speaking at a conference in Washington
19 Stefanie Hoffman, "Russian Cyber Attacks Shut Down Georgian Websites," CR N , 12 August 2008.
20 Ibid.
21 Eneken Tikk, Kadri Kaska, Kristel Runnimeri, Mari Kert, Anna-Maria Taliharm, and Liis V ihul, "Cyber 
Attacks against Georgia: Legal Lessons Identified," N ATO  CCD COE Legal Task Team , 2008.
22 Ibid.
2 > M aggie Shiels, "Cyber War Threat Exaggerated Claim s Security Expert," BBC N ew s , 16 February 2011.
j4 Ibid.
25 M aggie Shiels, "Cyber-Sabotage and Espionage Top 2011 Security Fears," BBC N ew s, 30  Decem ber  
2010 .
26 A lex Hudson, "Is Cyber-Warfare a Genuine Threat?" B B C  N ews, 11 February 2011.
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DC, the United States Secretary o f Defense Robert Gates stressed that the United States 
faces a serious cyber threat that the United States Government needs to develop a security 
shelter, which should include private military contractors.27
NATO has started to include cyber threats in its strategic documents and develop 
certain policies to protect against attacks. Giving a speech to German Deutsche Welle 
Radio about NATO’s upcoming summit in Lisbon in 2010, NATO Secretary General 
Anders Fogh Rasmussen explained that in addition to conventional battles, NATO needs 
to be ready for the war o f the future—cyber warfare. Thus, one of the important pillars of 
NATO’s new strategy, which he calls version 3.0, will be empowering organizational 
capability against all kinds of cyber threats.28
Terrorism and the Internet
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon for nation-states, but the Internet has created 
a new matrix for terrorists and other illegal groups to utilize. Terrorists can and are using 
the Internet in different ways and for different purposes. They can directly use the 
Internet to attack a certain targets online, which is known as “cyber-terrorism.” The term 
“cyber-terrorism’’ is the convergence o f two words: cyberspace and terrorism as Denning 
notes.29 She defines “cyber-terrorism” as “politically motivated hacking operations 
intended to cause grave harm such as loss o f life or severe economic damage. An 
example would be penetrating an air traffic control system and causing two planes to 
collide.”30
27 "Siber Tehditle Kar$i Kar$iyayiz," H iirriyet, 19 N ovem ber 2010.
28 Basin Yayin ve Enformasyon Genel MUdiirlugu (BY EG M ), "Intemetin Denetimi Artik Nato'da," 
Timeturk, 22 Novem ber 2010.
29 Denning, ibid.
Ibid, 241.
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Terrorists can also utilize the Internet for propaganda; data mining; fundraising; 
recruitment and mobilization; networking; sharing information; and planning and 
coordination.31 They can use the Internet to get knowledge and information in a particular 
topic from any page hosted in any country. This may include weapons, explosives, 
chemical substances or other kinds o f tactical information. In the planning stage o f any 
terrorist attack, they may get important details from the Internet like security points, 
critical times, maps, and plans o f an area. Attackers may use the Internet as a propaganda 
tool to spread their ideology and to expand their activities. Denning indicates that in 
1998, it was reported that 12 of the 30 terrorist organizations listed by the United States 
Department of State has an Internet presence.32 By August 1999, “virtually every terrorist 
group” had a web presence, “along with a mishmash of freedom fighters, crusaders, 
propagandists, and mercenaries.”33 Internet use is the easiest and cheapest way for groups 
to maintain communication with their members, volunteers, or sympathizers.
Terrorists can use the Internet for communication purposes but not necessarily in
a regular and direct way. They are also aware that the web is not totally free o f state
control, but they develop their own techniques to perform their illegal activities. The
terrorists involved in the attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 are known to
have utilized the Internet before the attack. Weimann indicates that Mohammed Atta’s
last message to the other terrorists involved in the attacks of 11 September 2001 was:
“The semester begins in three more weeks. We’ve obtained 19 confirmations for studies
in the faculty of law, the faculty of urban planning, the faculty of fine arts, and the faculty
of engineering.” The reference to the various faculties was apparently code for the
31 Gabriel Weimann, Terror on the Internet: The N ew  Arena, the N ew Challenges, (W ashington, D.C.:
United States Institute o f  Peace Press, 2006).
2 Denning, ibid.
“ Ibid, 2 5 1.
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buildings targeted in the attacks.34 Similarly, terrorists who were involved in the London
bombing in 2005 are said to have communicated with each other by email. Instead of
sending the messages, they saved their messages as drafts in a designated account so that
the messages would be accessible to others with access to that same email account with a
possible common account and/or password.
Weimann indicates the advantages o f the Internet for illegal groups as
“a) easy access; b) little or no regulation, censorship, or other forms of 
government control; c) potentially huge audiences spread throughout the world; d) 
anonymity o f communication; e) fast flow of information; f) inexpensive 
development and maintenance o f a web presence; g) a multimedia environment 
(the ability to combine text, graphics, audio, and video and to allow users to 
download films, songs, books, posters, and so forth); and h) the ability to shape 
coverage in the traditional mass media, which increasingly use the Internet as a 
source for stories.”35
Denning believes that it is impossible to free the internet from these terror 
websites because of transnational structure of the Internet. Many websites blocked for 
terrorism-related crimes in Tiirkiye originate outside o f the country. The separatist 
Liberation Tigers o f Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka has a London-based website that the Sri 
Lankan Government has not even attempted to shut off.36
Swartz emphasized another danger on the Internet, that online access to critical 
military bases or important buildings through Google Earth “is alarming if  not 
dangerous.”37A special agent working for Russian Federal Security Service, previously 
known as KGB, says “Terrorists don't need to reconnoiter about their target. Now an 
American company is working for them.”38 Because of these concerns, Google, one of
4 Weimann, ibid.
45 Ibid, 3.
6 Denning, ibid.
57 Nikki Swartz, "Google Earth Scares Governments," The Inform ation M anagement Journal 40 , no. 2 
(2006).
38 Ibid.
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the biggest search engines on the Internet, later decided to shadow some sensitive 
buildings and complexes.
Political Effects
Political threats refer to the risks that the Internet can impose on states ranging
from a) the possibility of revolutionary replacement o f the ruling authority; b) forcing
these regimes to accept serious political demands from opposition parties, minority
groups, or to make significant changes in the political system; and c) putting governments
in a difficult position both at home or abroad. Theoretically any state can experience
these kinds of threats; however, autocratic states and dictatorial regimes are much more
vulnerable to these kinds o f social fluctuations. Since there is more a social consensus in
democratic countries thanks to free political elections, liberal political culture, and
power-sharing institutions, Internet use by the masses would not be much o f a problem
for them. Therefore, this aspect is very much a concern for autocratic states and is also
related to the debate about whether the Internet is a democratizing agent.
“More generally, Samuel Huntington emphasizes the unprecedented importance 
of demonstration effects in the Third Wave of democratization, made possible by 
changes in global communications. Media proprietor Rupert Murdoch has even 
proclaimed: ‘Advances in the technology of telecommunications have proved an 
unambiguous threat to totalitarian regimes everywhere’”39
Today most o f the countries that apply strict censorship and intense surveillance
have sensitive political concerns within their national borders. Reporters Without
Borders, an international NGO that monitors Internet freedom in the world, lists 15
countries as Internet enemies, including Bahrain, Belarus, Burma, China, Cuba, Iran,
19 Garry Rodan, "The Internet and Political Control in Singapore," P olitica l Science Q uarterly  113, no. 1 
(1998).
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North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam.40 Most o f these 
countries are considered autocratic, have a single political party, dictatorial regimes, or a 
weak democratic tradition. They try to control the Internet since they perceive it as a 
threat for their ruling authority, regime, and sovereignty. Many of them have laws that 
allow for the abrupt disconnection of the Internet. They have strict censorship and 
filtering regimes, high-level surveillance efforts, and heavy penalties for bloggers and 
online activists. As Reporters Without Borders reports, “The judicial or political 
authorities often use anti-terrorism laws to identify and monitor government opponents 
and activists expressing themselves online.”41
The Internet and democracy
It is possible to find both pessimistic and optimistic views in the literature about 
the effects of the Internet on democracy. Some optimists claim that Internet promotes 
democracy since its decentralized structure and characteristics directly or indirectly 
enhance most of democratic values such as public awareness, political participation and 
freedom of expression. Although there are some downsides in each of these advantages, 
people can now find more alternative resources to get information and news, conduct 
online research easily, find different ways to engage politically depending on personal 
interests, or anonymously post ideas, images, or records on the Internet. Ultimately, the 
Internet is perceived as “the greatest democratizer the world has ever seen.”42 Castells 
notes: “The Internet was expected to be an ideal instrument to further democracy and still
40 Reporters Without Borders, "First Online Free Expression Day Launched on Reporters without Borders 
W ebsite,” 2008.
41 Ibid.
42 Rodan, ibid.
The positive beliefs about the democratic effects o f  the Internet emerge from the 
rich heritage of literature about historical dynamics following the creation o f the printing 
press, increasing print literacy, Protestant reforms, and the emergence of constitutional 
democracies. “Communication media, literacies, and political governance have 
coevolved for millennia...Communication technologies and literacies possess a power 
that has, on many occasions, proven mightier than physical weaponry— the potential to 
amplify, leverage, transform, and shift political power by enabling people to persuade 
and inform the thoughts and beliefs of others.44 Ferrall writes about the belief that the 
democratizing power o f the Internet streams from its governing difficulty: “A Declaration 
of the Independence of Cyberspace, saw electronic communications technology as being 
inherently free and ungovernable and likely to catalyze positive social and political 
revolutions worldwide.”45
In recent years, however, more scholars have started questioning this belief and 
say that “there is more hype than real change.”46 Chowdhury believes that information 
abundance and peoples’ awareness does not guarantee political participation 47 It can 
even cause more confusion. In a study conducted for Berkman Center in Harvard 
University, Chowdhury cites that “although there is a positive correlation between 
measures of democracy and Internet diffusion in most countries, there is still no
4’ Castells, ibid.
44 Howard Rheingold, "Mobile M edia and Political C ollective Action," Chap. 17 In H andbook o f  M obile  
Com munication Studies, edited by James Everett Katz. Politics and Social Change 225-39 . (Cambridge, 
MA: Massachusetts Institute o f  Technology, 2008), 225.
45 Kenneth Farrall, "Cascading Networks: Electronic Communication and the D iffusion o f  Social 
Instability,” In International Communication A ssociation  A nnual M eeting, 2007.
45 Mridul Chowdhury, The Role o f  the Internet in Burm a's Sajfron Revolution, (The Berkman Center for 
Internet & Society at Harvard University: Berkman Center Research Publication, 2008), 12.
47 Ibid.
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convincing evidence that there is any causal relation between the two.”48
Pessimists point out two important issues, which they claim limit the 
democratizing effects of the Internet. First is the so-called “digital divide.” Second is 
states' increasing interest in surveillance and censorship policies on the Internet.
The digital divide refers to the distance between people with and without Internet 
access. This distance represents a new divergence both at the global and national level. 
The Internet has been rapidly spreading throughout the world, but this spread seems not 
to foster democracy as much as they emphasize. Castells notes that global web structure 
is significantly related with technological infrastructure, wealth and education.49 While 
the internet penetration rate in the continent o f Africa was the lowest, at 15.6%, it was the 
highest in North America, at 78.6% in 2013.50 While 78 % o f households has internet 
access at home in the developed countries, it is 31 % of households in the developing 
world.51
There is also a digital divide within states. Not everyone in any society has equal 
opportunity to access the Internet and effectively use it for his own interests. The Internet 
penetration rate for China is 40.1% (out of a population o f 1.34 billion, only 538 million 
Chinese are Internet users).52 The rate in Russia is 67.9 million Internet users out o f a 
population of 142.5 million. Internet penetration rate for Russia is % 47.7. Internet 
penetration rate for Iran is 53.3%— 42 million users out o f  a population o f 78.8 million.
In Turkiye, there are 36.4 Internet users out of a population o f 79.7. Internet penetration
48 Ibid., 12.
49 Castells, ibid.
50 "Surfing and Site Guide Internet World Stats," Internet World Stats, http://www.intem etworldstats.com  
/surfing.htm. The Internet Penetration Rate corresponds to the percentage o f  the total population o f  a given  
country or region that uses the Internet. An Internet user is a person w ho must have available access to an 
Internet connection point and a person must have the basic know ledge required to use Internet technology.
51 International Telecommunication Union (ITU ), "The World in 2014: ICT Facts and Figures," United  
Nations, 2014.
52 Ibid.
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is 45.7%.53
This situation creates new inequalities among different demographic, economic, 
and socio-political groups within states. Castells specifies that the Internet infrastructure 
is more intensive in urban areas and metropolitan regions.54 Hoctor cites that the high 
level of Internet use among intellectual elites in Bosnia and Herzegovina may indicate 
that the Internet might be is perceived as elitist. These persistent inequalities and biases 
mean that the Internet is far from fulfilling its role as a way to further democracy.55
Moreover, states tend to increase their surv eillance capabilities, censorship 
practices and adopt heavy penalties against political activities on and/or through the 
Internet. As cited in Ferrall, “a growing area of research, known as surveillance studies, 
focuses on the ways in which electronic communication technologies facilitate more 
widespread and intense monitoring of individual citizens, limiting social freedoms and 
enhancing the power o f oppressive regimes.”56 In Saudi Arabia, intense censorship has 
made the Internet more o f an intranet, a limited network in a specific area or region as 
Drezner implies.57 Rodan notes that “such technology can also be harnessed by some 
states to consolidate a climate o f fear and intimidation and create new opportunities to
c o
disseminate propaganda and information in their favor.”-
Different from both optimistic and pessimistic views, some scholars believe that 
the debate about the democratizing side o f the Internet is not discussed on the right 
ground. In other words, they accept a normative approach and offer that we should have 
moderate expectations for the Internet, not to expect a revolution, regime change, or the
iJ Ibid.
54 Castells. ibid.
55 Hoctor, ibid.
56 Farrall. ibid.
57 Drezner, ibid.
58 Rodan, ibid.
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fall of a dictatorship. We should see how these tools are gradually opening up closed 
regimes to the world or how effective use o f these communication devices enhances 
transparency, minimizes corruption, and makes the ruling regimes more responsive to 
their people and their demands.^9
Along with these democratic dynamics, it is impossible to question the effects o f 
the Internet in other political issues, like the Internet use by separatist movements, and 
where territorial integrity is a concern for a nation-state. Today, some countries are 
having internal conflicts with ethnic, religious, and other minority groups. These groups 
demand certain political rights, religious freedom, identity recognition, or regional 
autonomy. Among them are the Quebec issue in Canada, the Basque region in Spain, 
Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom, Kurdish issues in Turkiye, and others. The 
virtual space has become another important space and platform for these political groups 
to further their political goals.
While focusing on separatist movements in East Timor and Maluku, Hill and Sen 
point out that the Internet was a “deciding factor in each conflict”60 Hill argues that “the 
net enabled individuals and local groups in East Timor to draw effectively upon skills and 
resources from supporters located far away.”61 Like in Indonesia, Hoctor notes that local 
opposition groups were not alone thanks to the Internet in the Chiapas conflicts in 
Mexico.62
Domain names are another sensitive issue when these separatist minority groups 
are considered. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is
59 Marcus Franda, "Book Reviews: Regim es, Cartels, and the Remapping o f  Information Space," 
G overnance: An International Journal o f  Policy, Adm inistration, an d  Institutions 17, no. 3 (July 2004).
60 Hoctor, ibid.
61 David T. Hill, "East Timor and the Internet: Global Political Leverage in/on Indonesia," Indonesia  
Indonesia, no. 73 (2002): 25-51.
62 Hoctor, ibid.
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the private sector, non-profit United States-based corporation that issues top-level domain
names. While each country has a unique domain name allocated by ICANN, new domain
names for “cultural and linguistic communities” pressing for increased political rights
recognition can raise new problems for some states.
“In 2003, ICANN introduced a new “.cat” domain for the Catalan language.
This is the first domain introduced for a language. This precedent has 
triggered new controversies. First, many language and cultural communities 
around the world are likely to request the same right. Second, 
in some cases language and cultural communities may have aspirations 
towards nationhood. This aspect may cause potential controversies and 
conflicts with existing states. In the case o f the “.cat” domain, the Spanish 
government did not oppose this decision.”63
Justice and Public Order
Public order, public safety, and justice are essential duties that state authorities 
need to provide. Through different methods, institutions, and tools, states try to ensure 
public safety and public order. Different from previous media and communication 
devices, the Internet has created new challenges and dilemmas for states in ensuring these 
fundamental duties. As seen in social protests and revolutions in the Arab world, as well 
as in previous cases in Ukraine, Moldova, and Iran, the most significant complications of 
the Internet are in the socio-political realm.
Social Complications
Group psychology, collective action, and communication are very sensitive fields 
that no state can ignore. Hills notes that, “the fear o f  person to person communications -
6> Kurbalija and Gelbstein, ibid.
35
of the potential for the organization of opposition -  has always been there.”64 History 
shows us that technological innovations were very often influential in affecting the 
balance between the ruling authority and the ruled people. Before the Iranian Revolution 
of 1979. cassette tapes and cassette players played an important role in spreading the 
messages of Khomeini in Iran.65 Mobile phone usage and text messaging were the core 
instruments that unified the people o f Indonesia around the fall of the Suharto regime.66 
With the invention of the Internet this tension between the authority and citizens entered 
a new period. Besides interests groups, social unions, institutionalized opposition groups, 
NGOs, and unhappy citizens have found an effective means of communication for 
collective action.67
Perhaps the most significant case to recognize the effects o f the Internet was first 
seen in the case of the fall of Suharto Regime in 1998. The Internet was the essential 
communication medium for people to unify a mass movement against the regime through 
increasing awareness among the public and to organize protests against the regime.68
The Internet was again on the scene when the Ukrainian Orange Revolution was 
emerging in the end o f 2004, by ensuring effective means o f communication between the 
crowded mass opposition groups and activists.69 “Despite lacking access to mass media, 
supporters o f democratic change compensated through skillful use o f  the Internet to 
recruit volunteers, raise funds, organize campaigns, report breaking news, and gamer the
64 Hills, ibid., 196.
65 Farrall, ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Jessica T. Mathews, "Power Shift: The R ise o f  Global C ivil Society," Foreign Affairs  76, no. 1 (1997): 
50-66.
68 Hill, ibid. and David T. Hill and Krishna Sen, "The Internet in Indonesia's N ew  Dem ocracy,"  
D em ocratization  7, no. 1 (2000): 119-36.
69 Adrian Karatnycky, "Ukraine's Orange Revolution," Foreign Affairs 84, no. 2 (2005): 35-52. and Olga 
Filippova, "Anti-Orange Discourses in Ukraine's Internet: Before the Orange Split," Journal o f  Com m unist 
Studies a n d  Transition Politics  23, no. I (2007): 138-51. and Adriana Helbig, "The Cyberpolitics o f  M usic 
in Ukraine's 2004 Orange Revolution," Current M usicology, no. 82 (2006): 81.
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sympathy of the global democratic community.”70
The tension between the Internet and politics was also high during the Saffron 
Revolution in Burma in 2007. In order to cover up violence within the country, the 
military junta took some measures to stop online communication. These measures were 
partly successful but could not totally stop the leakage o f news and bloody images from 
the country. Thus, the government found the ultimate solution to shut down the Internet 
completely. The Saffron Revolution in Burma was not successful at that time, but the 
Internet played an important role in raising awareness about these orange-dressed monks 
in Burma. As Chowdhury notes “Despite efforts by the government to control all media 
outlets, this attempted revolution demonstrated that the Internet does not lend itself easily 
to control”71
Later, we witnessed the Internet shaking another country, Moldova. Analyzing 
political protests in this country in 2009, Mungiu-Pippidi and Munteanu indicate that the 
Internet was an effective tool for young protesters to communicate with each other.72 
Thanks to the internet implications like YouTube and Twitter, the young protesters could 
sustain protests for several days for a political change that some journalists and scholars 
call this political transformation a Twitter revolution.
Both social movements in Ukraine and Moldova achieved some degree o f 
success. Authorities revoked controversial national elections and replaced incumbent 
governments with new governments. Many in the West expected to see similar ends in 
Iran following the controversial national election in 2009; however, the Iranian
70 Myroslaw J. Kyj, "Internet U se in Ukraine's Orange Revolution," Business H orizons 49 , no. 1 (2006): 
71-80.
71 Chowdhury, ibid., 8.
72 Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and Igor Munteanu, "Moldova's "Twitter Revolution”," Journal o f  D em ocracy  
Journal o f  D em ocracy  20, no. 3 (2009): 136-42. and David C. Hodge, "Residential Revitalization and 
Displacement in a Growth Region," G eograph ica l R eview  71, no. 2 (1981): 188-200.
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government suppressed the protests by using excessive power. Although these 
movements in Iran could not achieve their political aims, the world witnessed how 
protesters utilized the Internet to amplify their voices. Independently from official Iranian 
media, they made personal broadcasts with their own pictures, videos, and stories.
The year 2011 became a crucial point from which to observe social booms in the 
Arab world, as well as to understand better the meaning o f the Internet in social unrest. 
People who are displeased with their governments and regime types in Tunisia, Egypt, 
the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, people who do not believe that their 
governments represent them or their values found the Internet to be the perfect tool to 
amplify their voices, share their views and political news with like minded people, and 
upload pictures and videos to certain websites to attract the outside world’s attention.
Digital activists have effectively utilized the Internet. Certain websites like 
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Daily Motion and other Internet features have had 
considerable success either in achieving regime change, triggering serious political 
reforms, or shaking old regimes in a significant way.
Social protests started in Tunis in December 2010, and President Zine El Abidine 
left the country in January 2011. Alexa.com is a global service that ranks websites. Some 
of Alexa’s website rankings for Tunis from December 2010 to January 2011 were: 1) 
Facebook, 3) YouTube, 6) Blogger, 12) Twitter, 13) Aljazeera.net, and 20) Daily Motion. 
On the same dates Egypt also experienced mass protests against President Mubarak. The 
incidents in Egypt started in January 2011 and President Mubarak resigned on 11 
February 2011. Alexa’s rankings for the country on 04 March 2011 were: 1) Facebook, 3)
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YouTube, and 7) Blogger.73
An Egyptian NGO, “6 April,” was one o f  the dynamos in the events that resulted 
in the resignation of the 30-year old reign of the Mubarak regime. Founded in 2008 to 
ensure collective action among workers, they named their movement after the date o f a 
strike that occurred on 6 April. The movement began on Facebook and later expanded to 
other social media like Twitter and Flicker. Declaring a national strike on 25 January 
2011, it was one o f the active political groups that mobilized the mass public in Egypt 
and was finally able to lead to the resignation of President Mubarak.74 The founder of 
another social media network called RNN, Ahmed Yusuf, stated that young people who 
did not dare protest the government before the founding o f such social media networks 
found a place to share their opinions with others and to act collectively. Using Facebook 
as a platform and volunteer reporters, the number of followers of the RNN network per 
day was about 300,000 at the beginning of the protests.75
A brief analysis o f a website actively utilized during mass protests in Egypt in 2011 
Below is detailed data about the website o f the 6 April movement 
(www.6april.org). The data gives us a useful insight into the intense traffic to and from 
the site on critical dates o f the social events in Egypt.76
For the site, alexa.com interprets that, based on data and records, “compared with 
the overall Internet population, the site appeals more to college graduates; its visitors also 
tend to consist o f both high- and low-income, childless men under the age of 25 who
7' Both records for Tunis and Egypt are from A iexa.com , retrieved on 4  March 2 0 1 1. A lexa.com  ranks the 
popularity o f  w ebsites based on the number o f  visitors within the last three months.
^  BBC, "Misir’da Sokaga Inenler Kimler?” Timeturk, 28  January 2011.
1:> Timu^in Mercanoglu, "Misir Devriminin Arkasindaki GUf ’Sosyal M edya1,” Timeturk, 4  February 2012.
76 "Alexa Actionable Analytics for the Web," A lexa Internet, Inc., Alexa.com .
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browse from home. Visitors to it view 2.1 unique pages each day on average, and roughly 
54% of visitors to 6april.org come from Egypt, where it has attained a traffic rank of 
1.772.”77
The popularity of the website increased dramatically by the end o f January
•JO
2011. Since alexa.com ranks websites based on their performance in the last three 
months, this date in fact reflects the real traffic that started by the end of October 2011.
Reports note that social tension in Egypt has started in the end of 2010, which 
confirms this traffic and digital activity on this website, www.6april.org, by the end of 
2010. The dramatic increase started by January 2011, which implies that online activity 
for the site actually started to increase by October 2010. The daily reach as a percentage 
increased by 330 % between January' and March 2011.
Upstream sites
Interesting data from alexa.com about 6april.org include upstream and 
downstream figures. The majority of the users for 6april.org are visiting this site after or 
before visiting Facebook and Twitter.
In fact, the Internet and social media were not the only influential communication 
and media tools during Arab Spring events. Many scholars emphasize the importance of 
traditional media outlets, including A1 Jazeera and its Middle East-centered broadcasting. 
At this point, interesting cooperation and interactions occur between traditional media 
and Internet-based social media. While each individual and Internet user is a potential 
correspondent or editor on streets from which they can upload news and recordings to a
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
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number o f different websites, traditional media can use online news and recordings to 
spread and diffuse further to its audience.79 In reverse, individual Internet users can also 
take pictures and news from traditional media to post and upload to the Internet 
applications that they are using. What is surprising in this interaction is not to see the 
influence of so-called traditional media. Rather, it is more surprising to observe how 
Internet use, particularly social media, was so effective in these social upheavals during 
the so-called Arab Spring.
Recent revolutions, social fluctuations in the Middle East, other similar cases 
mentioned in this study show that the Internet can be one o f the most critical media and 
communication platforms to inflame social unrest. The Internet or social media use itself 
does not directly lead to revolutions, mass movements, or regime changes. Socio­
political, socio-economic reasons are still necessary for these kinds o f occurrences.
Rather than an independent variable, the Internet seems to be an effective communication 
and media tool to inflame social unrest. Without social, political, and economic reasons, 
the effects of Internet use alone will be limited in social unrest.
Justice and legal challenges
Like in other areas in which states have interests, authorities tend to regulate the 
fields related to the Internet, enforce these regulations so that legalization is ensured, and 
finally prosecute any possible illegality. Use of the Internet has brought new questions 
and challenges to the fields of justice and law. These difficulties are especially seen 
during the enforcement and prosecution stages.
70 During protests on Tahrir Square in Egypt in 2011, for instance, the AI Jazeera was using video records 
on the Internet but labeling them as “unconfirmed pictures."
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A famous phrase in this debate belongs to Nicholas Negroponte, the co-founder 
and director o f MIT’s Media Lab, in which he asserts that, “the Internet cannot be 
regulated. It is not that laws aren’t relevant, it is that the nation-state is not relevant.”80 
Likewise, Grossfeld believes that “the explosion o f the Internet presents new challenges 
for both state regulators and self-regulatory organizations.”81
According to White, “the anatomy o f the Internet is unique and perhaps, 
impossible to regulate effectively.” Emphasizing the importance o f being connected to 
the entire world in a global network, Grossfeld, believes that “the old parameters were 
intended for a telephone- and paper- based environment; the Internet challenges these 
traditional notions of territoriality and sovereignty.” From this point, some scholars 
utilize the term “cyberspace sovereignty.” Wu, for instance, notes that “Proponents o f 
cyberspace sovereignty generally assert that it is impossible or futile” for governments to 
regulate the Internet.
Hollis claims that “Law cannot regulate the authors o f cyber-threats because 
anonymity is built into the very structure of the Internet.” Hollis considers that “existing 
rules on cyber-crime and cyber-war do little to deter.”85 White notes that “the anonymity 
o f the Internet is unique and, perhaps, impossible to regulate effectively.”
Legalization anomalies can be seen in Internet blocking measures either
80 Jack L. Goldsmith and Tim Wu, Who C ontrols the Internet?: Illusions o f  a B orderless W orld, (N ew  
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006).
81 B. Grossfeld, "Global Accounting: Where Internet M eets Geography," Am erican Jou rn a l o f  C om para tive  
Law  48  (2000): 261-306.
82 Am y E. White, Virtually O bscene: The C ase f o r  an U ncensored Internet, (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & 
Co., 2006), 12,
83 Grossfeld, ibid.
84 Timothy S. Wu, "Cyberspace Sovereignty? The Internet and the International System," H arvard  Journal 
o f  Law & Technology 10, no. 3 (1997).
85 D. B. Hollis, "An E-SOS for Cyberspace," H arvard  International Law Journal 52, no. 2 (2011): 373- 
432.
86 White, ibid., 12.
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implemented as prevention or for punishment purposes. In order to avoid access to illegal 
websites and web contents, different types o f blocking techniques can be implemented. 
However, as summarized by Callanan et al., during these implementations it is inevitable 
to face some complications like over-blocking and under-blocking. There is no guarantee 
of totally disabling access to these undesired websites because of a variety of
87circumvention methods and techniques available online.
One of the basic principles of universal justice is the subjectivity o f criminality
and justice. Because of a crime or illegality, only the person(s) involved and the illegal
object can be subject to criminal procedure and punishment. However, implementation of
website blocking using different techniques is open to over-blocking, which means some
88innocent websites can be blocked along with the targeted ones. This inevitable 
complication is one of the essential reasons for authorities in the United States to 
approach Internet blocking cautiously because of its significant risks to damage “freedom 
of speech and expression,” which is strongly protected in the “First Amendment o f the 
United States Constitution.”89
For instance, in Meghalaya, a state in India, authorities noticed some records and 
postings against the local and federal government o f India in a discussion group hosted 
by Yahoo! Groups. After the access blocking decision to the discussion group by the 
authorities were ordered to more than 400 Indian Internet Service Providers (ISP: 
business that offers customers Internet access), the ISPs shut down all Yahoo Domains
87 Cormac Callanan, Marco Gercke, Estelle De Marco, and Hein Dries-Ziekenheiner, "Internet Blocking: 
Balancing Cybercrime Responses in Democratic Societies," Open S ociety  Institute, 2009 , 20.
88 Ibid.
89 Kreimer, ibid.
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and servers.90 Similarly, because of specific hate speech on YouTube about founder of 
the Turkish Republic, authorities blocked all YouTube content for a long time in Tiirkiye. 
In order to solve this problem, states can prefer a low-level blocking measure, but in this 
case they face another dilemma of “under-blocking,” which ensures partial access to 
undesired websites.
In order to present the huge size and numbers o f illegal Internet activities, the 
Intel Corporation reports that “every 60 seconds there are an estimated 135 Botnet 
infections and 20 new victims o f identity theft” globally on the Internet.91 Intel also 
believes that for every 416 attempts at hacking, 12 of those are successful.92 Despite high 
numbers o f illegal and criminal activities on the Internet, prosecution efforts and 
clearance rates in cybercrimes are relatively low. Kerr cites the following points about the 
dark side of the Internet: 1) “Although every computer connected to the Internet is 
subject to frequent attack by outsiders, the (United States) central government only brings 
criminal charges for computer hacking against about one hundred defendants per year. 2) 
About two-thirds of all email is unwanted “spam,” unsolicited commercial email. 3) 
Computer viruses and malware make up about one percent o f  all email, although criminal 
prosecutions for sending out viruses or malware remain extremely rare. 4) Sophisticated 
pedophiles can use proxy servers and anonymous chat rooms to share images of child 
pornography with little fear of being caught by police. 5) Although Internet gambling is 
illegal in every state, millions o f Americans gamble online, generating about $6 billion in 
revenues for the approximately two thousand Internet gambling sites. 6) Use o f peer-to-
90 Nishant Shah, "Subject to Technology: Internet Pornography, Cyber-Terrorism and the Indian State," 
Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 8, no. 3 (2007): 349-66.
91 Intel Corporation, "What Happens in an Internet Minute?" http://w w w .intel.com /content/ww w /us/en  
/comm unications/intemet-minute-infographic.htm l.
92 Ibid.
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peer networks remains very high despite the efforts o f copyright owners to shut them 
down. 7) It is easy to set up an anonymous blog or email account and send threats or 
make false claims that are very difficult to trace.”93
The Internet is open to any person from anywhere in the world and has a global 
structure. Thus, illegality and criminality on the Internet very often have transnational 
aspects. Legal difficulties seen at the national level become more complicated when the 
issue is transnational because of different legal structures, laws, procedures and political 
ideology in each state. Downloading a particular kind of software may violate a copyright 
law in country A. But how can authorities prosecute this kind of illegality when the 
downloader is from country B, web-servers and web hosting are located in country C, and 
the owner o f the website is from country D?
When neo-Nazi propaganda was a judicial and diplomatic problem between 
Yahoo and France, Yahoo’s Vice President Heather Killen at that time said, “We have 
many countries and many laws and just one Internet.”94 Even today, in some o f judicial 
disputes at the international level, we can see that this statement is not outdated and still 
utilized by global websites like Yahoo, Google, and YouTube when they are the subject 
of judicial proceedings in any state.
Kerr cites the following incidents to emphasize on these kinds o f transnational 
legal problems.95
In 2000, Onel de Guzman sent out the “Love Bug” virus from the Philippines; 
although the virus caused billions o f dollars in damage worldwide, de Guzman 
was never charged because the Philippines did not have a computer crime law that 
allowed extradition. (Although the United States and the Philippines have an ex­
tradition treaty, Philippine law requires that both countries legally recognize a
9’ Orin S. Kerr. "Review: Enforcing Law Online," The U niversity o f  Chicago Law R eview  74, no. 2 (Spring  
2007).
94 Goldsmith and Wu, ibid.
95 Kerr, ibid.
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given offense before a suspect can be extradited [and] there is no Philippine law 
that prevents release of a virus.)96
Even for ordinary crimes like murder, theft, drug smuggling, and embezzlement, 
when a criminal procedure involves multiple states and/or their citizens, it is very often 
difficult to identify and prosecute these traditional criminal cases and bring these 
criminal(s) before judicial courts. In addition to jurisdiction and citizenship problems, the 
Internet’s rapidly changing features complicate the situation further for officials trying to 
trace criminality and find and identify perpetrator(s) from each state.
Although there is some degree o f cooperation at the international, regional, or 
mutual level, and some collaborative international institutions like Interpol, Europol, each 
state’s different ideology, political traditions, national law, and diplomatic and political 
barriers significantly hinder criminal procedures and/or extradition of criminals to the 
victim state(s). Beside legal and political differences among states, there are significant 
technical barriers and technical capacity gaps among states to achieve such an effective 
level of international cooperation against criminality on the Internet. Goldfoot, claims 
that “it is unrealistic to believe that a global community consisting o f an estimated ninety 
million users of almost thirty million computers spread over 196 nations and many 
divergent legal cultures could reach a consensus on how to govern themselves.”97
Thus, new legal approaches should be developed while regulating the Internet and 
online activities. In his speech to the United States Senate Justice Committee, Mike 
Godwin, representing the Electronic Frontier Foundation, stated that he believes that it is 
wrong to consider the Internet in the same category as existent media and communication 
tools. He emphasized that the Internet has created new questions as well as problems for
90 Ibid.
97 Josh A. Goldfoot, "Antitrust Implications o f  Internet Administration," Virginia Law  R eview  84, no. 5 
(1998): 909-53.
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law makers.98 Likewise, Akdeniz and Altinparmak, believe that thinking o f the Internet 
as one of the previous media and communication devices is not appropriate if lawmaking 
is considered on the Internet.99 Policy makers, lawyers, and politicians should understand 
the unique structure and characteristics o f the Internet and new legal mentality and 
methods should be developed.
Also, an effective means and level o f cooperation among nation-states are vitally 
important, as criminality on the Internet is very much transnational. Considering 
cooperation as a kind of concession, Castells believes that “the more a state refuses to 
limit its sovereignty...by international cooperation, the more it becomes vulnerable to 
cyber-attack.” 100
Economic and social welfare
The effects of the Internet on the economy are also enormous. Today, the 
information technology, computing, and communication sectors can compete with the 
prominent sectors o f the previous industry era. Three of the top ten most valuable global 
companies in 2007 were the so-called tech companies Google, Microsoft, and IBM, and 
by sector ranking, the IT and technology sector comes second to the finance sector. Retail 
is in third place.101 The Internet opens national economies to the global market. Freund 
and Weinhold imply that directly or indirectly the Internet has positive effects on
98 White, ibid.
99 Yaman Akdeniz and Kerem Altiparmak, internet: G irilm esi Tehlikeli Ve Yasaktir, (Ankara: insan 
Haklari Ortak Platformu’nun (iH O P), 2008).
100 Castells, ibid., 160.
101 Millward Brown, "2014 BrandzTop 100," http://www.m illwardbrown.com/m b-global/brand- 
strategy/brand-equity/brandz/top-global-brands.
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economic productivity and growth in the United States.102
According to Kellner, the recent tendency to transition market capitalism into a 
more technology-driven model with the information superhighway, which is advocated 
by “Microsoftcapitalism” proponents, is very challenging.103 However, this new shape of 
capitalism will eventually erode the welfare state next to the liberal free market promises 
o f more jobs, wealth, prosperity, education, information, and more democracy.
Basic principles of economy, free market and capitalism are still valid. Still we 
have banks, shopping centers, retailers, malls, stocks; and we have money and cheques, 
etc. But the World Wide Web has brought different opportunities, options, and 
mentalities from marketing to production; from financing to shopping, and advertising. 
The two important values of a free market— competition and reliable “information”— are 
very much being promoted and ignited through the platform o f the Web 2.0.
Castells stresses that “the proper usage o f the Internet is a key tool for a better 
competition at home and at global level.” 104 The Internet provides easy and fast access 
both for consumers and customers to find different markets, to get information about the 
details of a product, to compare different retailers’ offers, and make their rational choice. 
Brown and Goolsbee note the Internet decreases “search costs by enabling price 
comparisons on-line.” 105 Although the Internet has created its new mediators from 
producers to consumers, Castells believes that “the Internet reduces transaction costs at
102 Caroline L. Freund and Diana W einhold, "The Internet and International Trade in Services," Am erican  
Econom ic Review  92, no. 2 (May 2002): 236-40.
I0, D. Kellner, "New Technologies, the W elfare State, and the Prospects for Democratization," The 
Q uarterly Journal o f  Econom ics 115, no. 2 (2000): 561-76.
104 Castells, ibid.
105 Jeffrey R. Brown and Austan G oolsbee, "Does the Internet Make Markets More C om petitive? Evidence 
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least by 50 percent.” 106
In a free market, it is also important both for sellers and buyers to access accurate 
information. Restricted flows o f information and asymmetry o f  information are 
considered as a “market failure” as Adam Smith phrases it. When some relevant 
information is known by some but not all the parties involved, it causes inefficiencies in 
the market.107 The Internet has many advantages and positive features to minimize these 
inefficiencies and market failures. Rhee states that “with the advent of the Internet, 
almost gone are the asymmetries of information among firms.” 108 Varieties o f alternative 
pages, links, and forums revoke many of the barriers to the flow of information or the 
asymmetry of information.
Traditionally, states tend to have quotas, customs, and tax regulations to protect 
their national economies. The borderless feature o f the Internet has brought different 
dimensions and questions to the fields o f economy, market, and commerce. For instance, 
how can Internet commerce be taxed or regulated effectively?109 Many o f the leading 
global companies directly or indirectly related to the Internet today are United States- 
based companies like Google, Microsoft, IBM, Apple, and Yahoo. Others Intemet- 
phenomena like Facebookand Twitter likewise are United States-based initiatives with 
global reach.
In the beginning o f the 1990s, in her book The Retreat o f the State, Susan Strange 
claimed that states are losing negotiation power against the growing economic as well as 
political influence of multinational corporations (MNCs) and thus, she believed that
1(16 Castells, ibid.
107 Dipak K. Gupta, Analyzing Public Policy: Concepts, Tools, an d  Techniques, (W ashington, D.C.: CQ  
Press, 2001).
108 Jay Hyuk Rhee, "The Internet Era and the International Expansion Process: The M oderating Role o f  
Absorptive Capacity," M anagement International Review  45 , no. 3 (2005): 277-306.
109 Bill Gates, "Shaping the Internet Age," Internet Policy’ Institute, 2000.
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MNCs were gradually eroding the economic and political sovereignty o f nation-states.110 
This claim is still apparent today, if  not more serious, for the IT sector dominated by the 
Internet. It is very challenging for any state to stop, eliminate, or effectively tax Internet- 
based companies providing services and making profits from their online activities.
For a long time, the Turkish government has had taxation and legal disputes with 
Google and Google-owned YouTube. The Turkish Minister in charge of transportation 
and communication strongly criticized Google in the case of YouTube blocking and 
stated that, “It is not an issue o f blocking or censorship on YouTube as Google claims but 
it is the issue of obeying local law, defending themselves in Turkish courts.” The 
Minister added, Google “should open a local representative office in Tiirkiye and pay 
local tax.”111 The Turkish government claims Google owes EUR 32 million in taxes.112 
Likewise, there is a similar debate between China and the United States about Google 
services in China.113
At this point, one of the important policies that some states prefer to implement is 
Internet blocking as a measure. Although there are political, moral, religious or health- 
related reasons behind Internet blocking, sometimes these measures can be considered as 
a non-tariff barrier against foreign companies to hinder their services within the borders 
of a country. As with these issues, concepts and theories o f economy and marketing 
should be re-interpreted and even re-organized for the Internet.
As explained in this part o f the chapter, the use o f internet has significant and
110 Susan Strange, The Retreat o f  the State: The Diffusion o f  Pow er in the World E conom y , (Cambridge 
University Press. 1996).
111 "Bakan G oogle Ve Youtube Sert Gikti," Haber, II June 2010.
112 Robin Wauters, "Turkish Government Claims G oogle O w es €32 M illion in Taxes," CrunchBase 
Information, 3 Novem ber 2009.
m  See for instance, Richard Waters, Joseph Menn, Daniel Dom bey, and Kathrin Hille, "US Makes Official 
Complaint to China over Internet Censorship," Financial Times, 22 June 2009. and Steven A. Cook and 
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50
serious effects on the basic functions o f states on ensuring national security, justice and 
public order. The following parts explain what internet blocking is, and how it is 
implemented.
CENSORSHIP AND BLOCKING ON THE INTERNET
Though sometimes used in a similar context, the terms “censorship” and 
“blocking” on the Internet have different meanings in academic and technical terms. The 
Oxford online dictionary explains “censor” as “an official who examines books, films, 
news, etc. that are about to be published and suppresses any parts that are considered 
obscene, politically unacceptable, or a threat to security.” 114 The same dictionary explains 
the word “blocking” as “the action of blocking or obstructing someone or something.” 115 
From this definition, it is important to note that “censorship” occurs before an 
unfavorable thing is disclosed or about to be disclosed. Censorship is a general term, 
which can be used in broadcasting media such as TV, radio programs, or in printed media 
like newspapers, magazines, or even in art as well as on the Internet. The term “blocking” 
for the Internet is more a technical term that includes many “policies, software, hardware, 
and services.” 116 “Internet blocking” is sometimes also called as “Internet filtering.” 
Filtering is defined as “[with an object] pass[ing] (a liquid, gas, light, or sound) through a 
device to remove unwanted material” in the same dictionary.117 Both “Internet blocking”
| I Q
and “Internet filtering” are used interchangeably in the literature.
Internet blocking can also be implemented in non-technical ways, like shutting
114 O xford Online Dictionary, Oxford University Press, 2010 .
1,5 Ibid.
ll6 Callanan et al„ ibid.
117 O xford Online D ictionary, ibid.
118 Paul Greenfield, Peter Rickwood, and Huu Cuong Tran, "Effectiveness o f  Internet Filtering Software 
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down the entire Internet services by powering off routers, central servers, or Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs). For example, during the uprising against military junta in 
Bruma (Myanmar) in 2007, authorities initially blocked social media like YouTube and 
BlogSpot, but later the Internet was totally disconnected.119 Some reports also indicated 
similar situations during the Arab Spring, for instance, in Egypt and Libya in 2011. Even 
in these situations, there are alternative methods available to access the Internet.120 Rather 
than these kinds of total Internet disconnection though non-technical methods, this study 
examines how Internet blocking technology is effective in preventing undesired web 
content.
Blocking or filtering measures can be considered for different reasons by 
authorities. While some countries have sensitivity against ethnocentrism like in some 
Western states, some states prefer blocking for political reasons, religious reasons, or to 
minimize hate speech.121 Blocking can also be seen against copyright violations, 
pornography, health hazardous contents, and gambling as seen in Turkiye.
While for instance keyword filtering is a case against “Falun Gong” in China, Iran 
is known for its extensive internet access blocking against websites for hate speech or 
jogging with political and religious leaders, immoral reasons. Some European countries 
like Germany, France have some filtering cases against websites which may have
xenophobia, Nazi contents. Many states including Canada, Denmark, the U.K., and
12">Finland have such practices against child pornography. “
119 Chowdhury, ibid.
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Where it can be implemented?
Blocking can be applied at any level, including “an individual's personal 
computer, an office local area network (LAN), an Internet cafe, an ISP, a wireless 
network, an SMS system, at the backbone or international gateway level, or some 
combination of all of these levels.”123
The target o f blocking instruments as specified by Callanan et al. are IP addresses; 
Domain name and DNS; Uniform Resource Locators (URLs); File content and File 
name; Keywords; and Content Signature (hash values).124
How to block? Blocking strategies
Greenfield et al. explain three methods for filtering Internet content: i) Inclusion 
filtering (white list), which runs based on the philosophy of “guilty until proven 
innocent.” Thus, it perceives most of the Internet websites as inappropriate except some 
well-known acceptable sites. The problem with this method is its allowance for access to 
a very small portion of the Internet, ii) Excluding filtering (black list) runs on the 
philosophy of “innocent until proven guilty.” This method is more common than the 
“inclusion” method, iii) The content filtering method dynamically analyzes the web 
content received and activates blocking when the content does not comply with the 
installed criteria. During the analysis process, the system utilizes certain keywords and/or 
checks certain parameters of the content. The fourth method is the combined filtering 
method in which all above techniques are utilized to increase the effectiveness o f
121 Ronald J. Deibert, The G eopolitics o f  Internet Control: Censorship, Sovereignty an d  C yberspace,
Routledge Handbook o f  Internet Politics. Edited by Andrew Chadwick and Philip N. Howard London:
Routledge, 2009, 325.
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blocking. However this latter method is not free o f complications either.123 
Content filtering
Greenfield et al. analyze content filtering methods including source-based 
filtering and content-based filtering.126 Similarly, Deibert subdivides content filter 
techniques into address blocking techniques and content analysis techniques.127 Source- 
based filtering (address blocking technique) is a method that utilizes IP addresses (Packet 
filtering), domain name, DNS, and URLs while filtering objectionable websites.
The following are the details o f  these technical terms. Internet Protocol (IP) 
address is a unique numeric number given to each computer or web server that is 
connected to the Internet. The Internet recognizes IP numbers as the identity and 
addresses o f the device for outgoing and incoming requests and data transfers. These 
unique numbers are regulated and allocated by an international non-profit agency based 
in the United States, The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN).
Today, IP numbers version 4 (IPv4) are widely used. An IP address can be seen as 
(x.x.x.x) where x is a number between 0 and 255. ~ However, reports indicate that the 
capacity of IPv4 is about to be exceeded, and by the year o f 2010 the next version, IPv6, 
was being allocated for each nation.129 While IPv4 is 32-bit, IPv6 is 126-bit, and specific 
IP number allocation is more possible with this latest version.
125 Greenfield et al., ibid.
126 Deibert, ibid. divides “content filter techniques” as “address blocking technique” and “content analysis 
technique” but with only one difference by using “address blocking technique” instead o f  “source based  
filtering” as Greenfield, ibid. does.
127 Deibert, ibid.
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Greenfield et al. have named IP based filtering packet filtering.130 All data on the 
Internet, no matter its type— whether video, audio, image, or text— are transferred from 
one receiver to another server as data packets with IP addresses from both parties. When 
a packet includes an IP address from an undesired website, the filter blocks the packet at 
its final destination. This filtering can be carried out by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) 
in their routers.131
The problem with IP-based packet filtering is its over-blocking risk. Since in 
general IP addresses are assigned to a computer, and a number of different websites may 
use the same computer or the same server, blocking an IP address because o f one website 
may block other innocent websites that share the same device with the same IP 
address. It is likely that IP-based filtering may cause under-blocking or even over­
blocking and thus this technique is not preferable or popular for those with such 
concerns.133
Different from a numeric IP address, which is more appropriate for computers to 
communicate, the Domain Name System (DNS) is designed to be convenient to be 
Internet users. Rather than remembering all different groups of numbers for each website, 
this system allows individuals to type the name o f the site. For instance, the IP address 
and the domain name of the ICANN website are 192.0.34.163 and www.icann.org 
respectively, and both can be used interchangeably to access the same website. However, 
instead o f remembering the code numbers for a website, typing its domain name (or its 
abbreviation) is more easy and convenient.
A typical domain name follows generic top-level domains like .com, .org, .net,
130 Greenfield et al., ibid.
Ibid.
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and may follow country codes like .ba, .ge, .il, or .md. A website may have a number o f 
separate websites and blocking based on domain names only and will be insufficient to 
cover up the entire website contents, including all other pages served by the same 
website. The same is also true when a website like www.terror.com uses different domain 
names like ww2.terror.com or ww3.terror.com and uses a number o f different servers. It 
is likely that both domain name and DNS blocking to cause under-blocking or over­
blocking, and for effective filtering, it is necessary to know and include all possible 
domain names as well as their numerical IP addresses in the lists o f filtering.134
Together with domain names, the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) address 
shows which website the content is from and exactly on which path it is accessible. URL 
filtering is more accurate than IP-based filtering. It can be effective even on a single 
specific website and causes relatively fewer complications than IP filtering as Greenfield 
et al. explains.135 By this technique, it is possible to block a particular user’s unfavorable 
website (like www.facebook.com/users/ahacker) without blocking the entire website 
(www.facebook.com). When the entire website is intended to be blocked, specification 
for these websites should be encoded in a filtering list like a date period: www.terror.com 
/June2011/centerefold.html and www.terror.com/August2011/centerefold.html. While it 
is less likely that URL filtering may cause over-blocking, it is very likely that it may 
cause under-blocking errors.136
Content-based filtering (content analysis technique)
Rather than looking at the identity and addresses o f the sources or destinations,
154 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid.
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content-filtering techniques verify the contents o f the Internet traffic and block the ones 
that include inappropriate data. Greenfiled et. al. specify four techniques as a content- 
based filtering: i) keyword filtering, ii) phrase filtering iii) profile filtering, and iv) image 
analysis filtering.137
Keyword filtering is focusing on important words and terms in their black lists. It 
is widely utilized for most o f the text-based Internet applications like search engines, 
email, URL links, and instant messaging.138 The challenge in this technique is to specify 
and include all possible variations o f phrases regarding undesired web content. “Not 
every content or type of a file on the Internet [is] named or seen as what it is or [for] what 
it has in [it].”139
Keywords in a blocking list may not cover all alternatives that human cleverness 
can invent. To avoid key word filtering, for instance in China, Internet users are trying 
other way of spelling, saying, or symbols like “Tibetan@independence” or “Ti be tan in 
dependence “instead o f “Tibetan independence” in their communications on instant 
messaging or chat rooms.140
Keyword filters are not without problems. For instance, including the word “sex” 
in a blacklist may wrongly block an academic article talking about gender, or a place like 
Essex in England. Moreover, keyword blocking can be bypassed by encrypting the 
content to make it unrecognizable by the filter and thus “a request that is blocked by a
147 Ibid.
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keyword filter as an HTTP request will not be blocked as an HTTPS request.” 141 
Phrase filtering
Keyword filters can confuse and wrongly filter scientific, educational, or daily 
context instead of undesired web content. The word “breast,” for instance, may cause 
blocking of news or an article about “breast cancer” by keyword filters.142 Thus, more 
sophisticated phrase filtering has been developed by IT vendors. This technique not only 
looks for a specific word but also looks for its context and how it is used. In this way, 
phrase filtering makes fewer mistakes than key word filters.
Both key word and phrase filters are text-based filters, and significant challenges 
and difficulties may be experienced in its adaptation and operations with different 
languages and their unique phonetic structure.143 Further, both of them can only check 
text but not images or video. In response, vendors have developed new techniques that 
can analyze some characteristics of websites and web content, such as “profile filtering” 
and “image analysis filtering.”
Profile filtering checks some technical details o f web content and blocks it when 
some similarities with undesired content are being tracked. Greenfield et al. notes one 
method, for instance, is looking at “the ratio of pictures to text” of suspected content and 
comparing the ration to the profiles of other similar web content before deciding whether 
to block.144
Image analysis filtering also aims to close the gaps o f text-based filters. It tries to 
capture and read specific features o f  unwanted images, for instance “skin tones,” which
141 Roberts et al., ibid.
142 Greenfield et al., ibid.
143 Ibid.
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may imply a naked body. But, this analysis may also wrongfully block an artistic image 
presupposing it to be a sexual image.14?
CIRCUMVENTION
Internet blocking methods do not delete or remove the undesired web content at 
its source. Instead they just prevent it being accessed by an Internet user. Circumvention 
methods try to evade these blocking barriers, commonly by hiding IP address, content 
signatures, the destination, or what is inside the trafficking packets.146
Internet search engines, like many other subjects and topics, house thousands of 
different resources, websites, forums, and online “know-how” content available on the 
Internet in different formats like a video, images, or slideshows. Not every nation-state 
that implements some form of Internet blocking domestically takes measures against 
these circumvention tools.147
Circumvention tools basically bypass blocked Internet contents by ensuring the 
privacy of the users' Internet traffic. There are a number o f customers or curious actors 
that are interested in people’s Internet habits, their preferences, and/or their connections. 
These can be governments, secret policing services, commercial companies, or 
employers.
Circumvention tools try to ensure privacy generally by utilizing encryption 
technology. However, encryption is not a secure enough method against Internet 
surveillance, which generally relies on “traffic analysis.” 148 Traffic analysis utilizes
145 ibid.
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Internet data packets which have two main parts including a data “payload” for the 
Internet content, which can be an email, video, or a website, and the header for routing. 
Focusing on the headers of Internet traffic, surveillance experts can see the parties of 
Internet communication and the details of the communication content even though the 
content is encrypted. In order to overcome this risk, beside encryption, some 
circumvention tools utilize different server nodes in a network between the Internet user 
and the resource. Further, Internet traffic is set to follow different paths randomly 
between the nodes each time.149
There are a number of different techniques for circumvention. Callanan et al. 
specify some of the main methods as: proxy-servers, tunneling, hosting or URL rotation, 
botnets, evading DNS-based filters, and other filters.130
Proxy Servers
The most common and widespread circumvention method is using “proxy” and/or 
“anonymous” foreign servers, which usually operate outside national borders.151 Proxy 
servers play crucial roles in optimizing the Internet performance. In order to maximize 
the network capacity, proxies are developed to copy Internet packets during data 
trafficking on their records. Later, without collecting the same content from its original 
server, proxies use these web contents (cache) when the same content is requested by any 
user at future times. Thus, proxies can show which websites are being visited by any 
Internet users.
Different from “proxies” set by an Internet Service Provider in Internet
149 Ibid.
150 Callanan et al., ibid.
151 Li, ibid. and Brown, ibid.
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connection, Internet users can select other proxies available on the Internet for some 
reasons, such as to increase performance, to ensure privacy, and especially to circumvent 
Internet blocking. In this situation, the proxy becomes as a demand device, generally 
outside national borders, and Internet traffic operate through these proxies.152
By using a foreign proxy server, free or paid, many o f which are available on the 
Internet, users can select another similar device abroad to fulfill access requests. The 
basic difference between proxies available on the Internet is their operating preference for 
their servers. While some proxies have their own central hosting servers for providing 
such a service, others do not prefer a central server but use “peer hosting servers.” 153 
Some proxies can hide IP addresses o f the requesting Internet users from the 
destination and/or from the Internet Service Provider through encryption. Using such 
proxy servers can circumvent IP address and DNS blockings; however, Roberts et al 
stress that public proxies especially may not be secure in terms of privacy since they 
rarely use encryption.154
Chowdhury gives the examples o f people in Burma using proxy services in 2007 
for circumvention since the military regime there blocked many websites, including 
YouTube, BlogSpot, and CNN.155 People use of proxy servers such as Glite.sayni.net, 
Your-freedom.net, and Yeehart.com to enable dissidents to break out o f the government’s 
strict censorship and feed news and multimedia to the global media from inside the 
country. Thousands of Internet users in Burma reportedly downloaded the circumvention 
software of Glite.sayni.net. Consequently some call the uprising in 2007 the “GLite
152 Callanan et al., ibid.
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Revolution.”156
Tunneling
Rather than using a public Internet connection that is open and unscripted, the
Internet protocol named Virtual Private Networks (VPN) was originally developed for
encrypting Internet communication for relatively private issues. Tunneling can be seen in
other protocols, like HTTP tunnels or ssh tunnels, but the most common type o f tunneling
is VPN-based tunnels.157
Dealing with some official tasks or sensitive issues, companies, public
institutions, or some civic associations prefer using the VPN protocol for communicating
among their agencies over the Internet. Thus, without investing and founding a separate
private line, they can use regular Internet infrastructure for such private communication.
“Tunneling works by wrapping the IP packet to be sent inside another IP packet, 
giving the wrapper the address of an appropriate gateway computer and sending it 
over the Internet. When the wrapped packet reaches the gateway, the inner packet 
is extracted and sent on for delivery within a local or private network.”158
Callanan et al. note that due to extensive lawful usage of tunneling technology in
the business and public sectors, it is not possible for internet service providers to block
these tunneling servers or websites, many available online.139
Hosting or URL rotation
This method is for website owners and content providers to bypass blocking. 
Some websites may periodically change their IP addresses, domain names, or URLs for
156 Ibid, 78.
157 Roberts et al. ibid.
158 Greenfield et al., ibid, 19
159 Callanan et al., ibid.
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providing better service, for increasing their audience numbers, and even for evading 
blocking measures against them. A filter, which blocks a website based on its previous IP 
address, URL, or domain name, will be ineffective when a website owner changes the 
domain name, IP address, or URL.160 This change is relatively easy and inexpensive for 
site owners that they may occasionally make these changes when they are blocked.
For instance, a blocking measure may rely only on the IP number to block. The 
website owner using this blocked IP number may evade this barrier by only changing the 
IP number from the same hosting company or from another. Likewise, in the case o f 
Domain Name blocking only, the change is necessary on the website’s domain name.
Website owners can also find other available, unblocked hosting servers, 
generally abroad, to utilize for circumvention. There are lots of free or paid hosting 
servers and IP numbers available on the Internet.
Botnets
The term “bof ’ is short form of “robot.” Through some malicious programs, 
criminals may compromise an innocent computer as a “bot,” which can then be directed 
to operate certain processes without the knowledge of the computer’s owner. This 
computer is also called as a “zombie computer.” Such a takeover may result in a slowing 
down of the computer function.
Callanan et al. define a “botnet” as “a collection o f computers configured to 
transmit messages to other computers on command usually for malicious reasons.” 161 
Criminals can use botnets for sending spam, spreading viruses, attacking computers or
160 Ibid.
161 Ibid., 53.
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servers; or for fraudulent purposes.
When a botnet takes a computer over, it becomes like a proxy, either as a portal or 
a deflector in the data traffic between the requester and the resource server. This will 
simply bypass IP-based blocking while ensuring anonymity. Callanan et al claim that 
traffic details that may identify the visitors will be hidden during this process, and these 
identifying details can easily be manipulated.162 They note that the “bot” would not track 
log records of the visitor.
Evading DNS based filters
It is relatively easy for a user to circumvent a DNS-based filter. In order to 
circumvent DNS-based blocked websites, users need to modify their computer settings, 
such as changing the identical number o f the DNS that blocks an undesired website with 
another configuration of DNS servers, generally outside o f  the blocking country. Like 
many other circumvention tools, free or paid, individuals can find many alternative DNS 
servers and their address details on the Internet and even learn how to make such 
modifications in their computers for circumvention.163
Following these tutorials, the steps are performed and show how DNS addresses 
are changed. In the last section, the default automatic DNS obtained is deactivated, and 
the other option “Use the following DNS server addresses” is selected. DNS change is 
okay when new DNS numbers, many which are available online, are encoded both for the 
preferred DNS server and an alternative DNS server.
162 Ibid.
163 Ibid., and Roberts et al., ibid.
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The use of “proxy” servers around the globe
Hal Roberts, Ethan Zuckerman, and John Palfrey from The Berkman Center for 
Internet & Society at Harvard University, tested how some circumvention tools are 
effective to evade Internet blocking in some countries.164 They analyzed nine 
circumvention tools that use five different methods: HTTP proxy, CGI proxy, IP 
tunneling, re-routing, and distributed hosting. They gave the details o f these pages, 
methods that they use, functions and other technical details.165
Despite some performance problems and security concerns, the study stresses that 
“all o f the circumvention and anonymity tools included in this study succeeded at the 
basic task of retrieving blocked content in a filtering country.” 166
It can be assumed that online circumvention services and/or bypassing websites 
are popular in countries where blocking policies are systematic, strict, or widespread.
And the use o f such websites and services are relatively less popular in countries where 
Internet blocking is very low or limited. In order to see the situation, this study uses data 
available from Alexa, a global web-ranking website for the most popular circumvention 
websites around the globe and from which country such websites receive visitors.
Alexa categorizes and ranks global websites based on their area o f activities. For 
instance, Alexa places its section on hosted proxy services under the topic titled 
“proxying and filtering.” That section is located under the heading “Internet” under the 
heading “Computers.” Alexa ranks websites based on their popularity under this 
classification.167 Only the five most popular website are taken into consideration based on 
their rankings on 01 April 2011. The top five website and their areas o f service are
164 Roberts et al., ibid.
165 Ibid., 22.
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reported as follows: 1) Anonymouse: Free anonymous surfing, email and usenet posting; 
2) Vtunnel: Web proxy supporting SSL via the HTTPS encryption protocol; 3) Ktunnel: 
Turkish Cgi Proxy which supports watching YouTube and other video sites; 4) Proxify 
anonymous proxy: Proxify is a web-based anonymous proxy service; 5) Proxy.org: 
Contains various lists of web based proxies, as well as a forum to discuss topics.168
For the degree of internet blocking, this study utilizes classifications from an 
independent NGO, Reporters without Borders (RSF), which monitors Internet freedom in 
the world. It has two lists in which countries are identified as “Internet enemies-strict 
censorship” or “countries under surveillance-having some kinds o f blocking and 
filtering.” While China, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Cuba were reported within the first list; 
Australia, Russia and Tiirkiye were in the second list.169 Countries in any of these two 
lists by the RSF are called RSF-classified countries. Countries that are not listed by the 
RSF are considered non-RSF countries.
Proxy usage for circumvention and bypassing is not only popular and widespread 
in countries where strict internet blocking policies are preferred (countries listed by the 
RSF) but also popular among the countries in non-RSF countries, which are known as 
relatively liberal and democratic.
Being in the list o f RSF, listed as “country under surveillance,” Tiirkiye is the first 
country in terms o f the total percentages o f visitors for the two websites above, 
ktunnel.com and vtunnel.com. Not classified by RSF, the percentage o f US visitors are 
highest for three o f the other websites, anonymouse.org, proxify.com, proxy.org. 
Likewise, the second and third countries are both from RSF or non-RSF countries like
lft8 Ibid.
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India and Russia for anonymouse.org; China and India for vtunnel.com; Azerbaijan and 
Germany for ktunnel.com; Australia and Canada for proxify.com; India and the United 
Kingdom for proxy.org.170
PROSECUTING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
Though states have taken so many legal, technical measures and though there is a 
wide international consensus against it, child pornography is still a significant problem on 
the Internet. An independent organization, Telefono Arcobaleno, which has focused on 
the issue of online pedophilia since 1996, issued a report in 2008 that presents the
17 1alarming situation. The report claims that pornographic material on European servers 
increased 406% since 2003, and there are 20 billion online transactions that include 1.7 
million records of 36,149 child-victims, 42% of whom are under seven years old and
I 7777% of whom are under nine years old. The report also stresses that either free or with 
credit cards, these kinds o f materials are easily accessible and purchasable online.
A special report, issued for the United Nations by Najat Maalla M ’jid ’in in 2009, 
notes that the number of child-victims in this crime is between 10,000 and 100,000. Turla 
and Ozkanli claim that child-victims under the age of 16 number between 300,000 and 
600,000.173 The number o f websites hosting some form of child pornography content 
increased to 480,000, between the years o f 2001 to 2004.174
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A specific child pornography site could receive a million hits in a month.175 Turla 
and Ozkanlt believe that the crime was a USD three million business in 2005.176 They 
report that 300,000 credit card transactions conducted for the purchase o f child 
pornography in the same year from 66 countries. Beside these numbers it is important to 
stress that the total amount of trade of child pornography on the Internet is unknown.
Prosecution magistrates’ courts have been low— only 113 in 1995 and 235 in 
1997 in the UK. Susan S. M. Edwards stresses the difficulties of policing, identifying, 
and detecting child pornography access on the Internet.177 Mr. Arena, president and 
founder of Telefono Arcobaleno, states that “less than 1% of victims of child sexual 
abuse images have been detected, therefore it is necessary to divert all available resources 
and energies towards identifying, recuperating, curing and socially reintegrating all
1 78abused children.” The United Nations Special Report on the Sale o f Children, Child 
Prostitution and Child Pornography from 2004 even stresses that a considerable number 
o f countries do not have legislation on this issue.179
Criminality against children
Criminality against children is argued in a broad context in the literature. 
Essentially, it is considered in two main dimensions. One track explores how children are 
involved, or induced into certain types o f crimes or as subjects of crime. The other track 
examines crimes against children, where children are victims, as is the case with child
175 Richard W ortley and Stephen Smallbone, Internet C h ild  P ornography: Causes, Investigation, an d  
Prevention, (Praeger, 2012).
176 Turla et al., ibid.
177 Susan Edwards, "Prosecuting 'Child Pornography': Possession and Taking o f  Indecent Photographs o f  
Children," Journal o f  S ocial Welfare an d  F am ily Law 22, no. 1 (2000): 1-21.
178 "Child Slavery on the Internet Is Still Growing," ibid.
179 International Resource Centre (IRC), www.internationalresourcecentre.org/.
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pornography.
As cited in Chase and Statham, the sexual exploitation of children can take many 
forms, “including: trafficking, prostitution, sex tourism, mail-order bride trade,
180involvement in pornography, stripping, battering, incest, rape and sexual harassment.” 
And the Internet can facilitate many of these types o f sexual abuse in a significant way
I ft 1including Internet child pornography.
The 2000 UN Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights o f the Child on 
the sale o f children, child prostitution, and child pornography, explains the term “child 
pornography” in Article 2(c) as “any representation, by whatever means, o f  a child 
engaged in real or simulated explicit sexual activities or any representation o f the sexual
I £2
parts o f a child, the dominant characteristics of which is depiction for sexual purpose.” 
For analytical purposes, Wortley and Smallbone accept the general definition o f child
1 0*5
pornography as “any record of sexual activity involving a prepubescent person.”
Internet child pornography
In terms of the Internet, child pornography should be understood as digital forms 
of any pornographic record involving a prepubescent person. These records can be digital 
files, photographs, videos, or audio recordings. Legal perceptions may vary, but there are 
ten different degrees of these kinds of records from non-sexualized pictures to sadistic 
records as Wortley and Smallbone cite and internet child pornography includes
180 Elaine Chase and June Statham, "Commercial and Sexual Exploitation o f  Children and Y oung People in 
the UK?" C h ild  Abuse Review  14, no. I (2005): 4-25.
181 Wortley and Smallbone, ibid.
182 "Qocuk Haklari lie ilg ili Mevzuat, Protokol V e Raporlar," w ww.cocukhizm etleri.gov.tr/tr/10535
/Cocuk-Haklari-I le-I Igili-M evzuat-Protokol-ve-Raporlar.
181 W ortley and Smallbone, ibid.
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possession, production and/or distribution of such records.184 Excluding other kinds o f 
sex crimes against minors like illegal detention, child marriage, harassment etc. this study 
covers any crime against minors committed on or through the internet and internet 
applications such as messengers with webcams, file sharing applications, or email.185
Possession and production
Many images and records o f child pornography on the Internet are old ones, 
generally reproductions o f images from older magazines and films. Relatively new ones 
are frequently made in the developing countries. Some individuals may use webcams or 
other video hardware for making amateur recordings.'86
Images of children taken from the Internet can be combined in the form o f a
187pornography slideshow. In a judicial case in the United States, Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coalition, the United States Supreme Court decided that “computer generated child 
pornography” is not illegal. It is necessary for law enforcement agencies to demonstrate 
that the victim depicted in a digital record is not digital but an actual real child.188
Once these records are created or obtained, digital versions o f such records are 
stored in different ways in personal computers, on CDs, on DVDs, and on external drives. 
In addition to digital fingerprints o f Internet activities, forensic analysis o f such tools, 
when put to use, is very important for judicial investigation. The digital forensic field is a 
new area for experts and high tech companies to develop new technological methods to 
detect or identify criminal activities, even when evidence is deleted or damaged.
185 This coverage is also compatible for the analysis conducted on Interpol files in this study.
186 Ibid.
187 "C°cuk Pomosuna Kar?i N asil Sava? Verirsiniz?" SD N , 14 April 201 I.
188 International Resource Centre, ibid.
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Distribution
The Internet is a perfect tool for child pomographers to market and disseminate 
pornography. The very complicated network structure o f the Internet enables such 
perpetrators to utilize the servers or computers o f others from any country. Perpetrators 
use websites, chat-rooms, newsgroups,189 email, email groups, instant messages, bulletin 
boards,190 and peer-to-peer (P2P) networks for different purposes in this crime. They can 
digitally hide themselves from law enforcement agencies for prosecution thanks to their 
technical skills.191
The most common application on the Internet is websites with hyperlinks. It is 
uncommon for ordinary Internets user to encounter child pornography while surfing the 
Internet. Purveyors o f child pornography use temporary websites, servers, links, and 
different techniques to avoid police detection. Sometimes they provide passwords for 
certain types of files. These passwords are shared through the other Internet applications
i Q'y
such as e-groups and bulletin boards.
Webcam compatible instant messaging programs like MSN and Yahoo 
Messenger are a significant threat to be used in this crime. Teenagers or children can be 
victims of certain types of sexual harassment while they are chatting, usually with a 
webcam. Their accounts may be hacked, and their peers may be deceived by criminals 
into providing photos or other kinds of sexual acts through webcams. Such photos and 
activities can be recorded, modified, or shared among networks. They may also be used
189 A newsgroup is the sam e as a forum, an on-line discussion group. On the Internet, there are thousands o f  
newsgroups covering every conceivable interest. A news reader program is necessary connect users to a 
news server and to view  and post m essages to a newsgroup.
190 A bulletin board is an electronic m essage center. Most bulletin boards serve specific interest groups. 
Users can review m essages left by others, and leave m essages.
191 Wortley and Smallbone, ibid.
192 Ibid.
71
as blackmail.
Pomographers use email methods, but do not directly post or attach such records 
to their messages. Instead they use email for communication or information exchange to 
share their interests. Sometimes they can use this method as a means o f blackmailing the 
victim. Most o f the time, they use pseudonyms and may use public computers to avoid 
police detection.
Bulletin Board Systems (BBS) are used for posting information or hyperlinks to 
child pornography access resources. Detecting such postings in these bulletin boards can 
be problematic and impossible for system administrators. Closed and password-protected 
chat rooms and peer-to-peer (P2P) networks are the digital platforms on the Internet 
where perpetrators share pornography and find victims.193
The recent challenge for law enforcement agencies are e-groups and Internet 
search engines. The danger is that the amount of password protected content is 
increasingly common in these groups since access to such content is only possible when a 
person shares new content with the group.194
Internet newsgroups are a common method that perpetrators in this crime utilize 
for distribution. There are some famous newsgroups that both users and officials know, 
and authorities sometimes take measures against these groups. However, computer-savvy 
perpetrators can use these groups without leaving their identity or IP number.195
In addition to the tools mentioned above, pomographers are starting to utilize new 
Internet phenomena such as social media. A recent article stresses that social media is 
one of the most critical methods utilized in this crime along with file sharing programs
193 Ibid, 10-11.
194 "Cocuk Pomosuna Kar§i N asil Sava§ Verirsiniz?", ibid.
195 Wortley and Smallbone, ibid.
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and e-groups for children. The article cites FBI data showing that child-victims are lured 
by perpetrators assuming the identities o f celebrities. Perpetrators also bribe child-victims 
with money, toys, movie tickets, or other enticements.196
Edwards specifies seven unique challenges that complicate child pornography 
investigations for law enforcement: the global structure o f the Internet, uncertainty o f its 
political borders, lack of regulation, legal differences, expertise of offenders, 
sophistication and constant change in Internet technology, and the scale, size, volume of 
the Internet and Internet activities.197
Wortley and Smallbone have some advice for the police departments on which to 
concentrate.198 First o f  all is the importance of technical knowledge and experience. Since 
the Internet is very much a technical field, law enforcement personnel dealing with these 
kinds o f crimes should be well educated and trained about the tricks o f the crime. Beyond 
these efforts, police agencies should have good contacts and cooperation with other 
related agencies, especially with internet service providers. They also advise that police 
units should prioritize their activities considering the size and dimensions o f the crime. 
For example, one area of concentration o f police efforts might be known sex offenders 
and their involvement in child pornography.'199
In the view of the literature review above, the following chapter explains how 
research questions are formalized, how they are operationalized for analytical purposes, 
and how they are measured. As well as definitions of some terms used in this study, the 
following chapter also covers explanations o f how specific circumvention tools are 
selected, how blocked websites are selected for testing, and significance of the country
196 "Cocuk Pornosuna Kar$i Nasil Sava§ Verirsiniz?”, ibid.
197 Edwards, ibid.
198 Wortley and Sm allbone, ibid.
199 Ibid, 35-36.
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for this research.
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH DESIGN
The effectiveness o f state control on the Internet has been the subject o f a number
of previous studies.1 While examining Internet policies in Singapore, Rodan finds the
following questions important to explore:
“First, can access to the Internet be effectively controlled, or will it have the sort 
o f snowballing political effects predicted by some? Second, to what extent is 
control of the Internet a technical question alone and how important are social and 
political structures in shaping the Internet's impact? Do the particular 
characteristics of authoritarianism in Singapore render it more capable than most 
authoritarian regimes of restricting the Internet's liberalizing potential? Third, has 
the Internet's potential political significance been over-estimated? Does a plurality 
o f individual political and social views on Internet necessarily translate into 
organized political and social action?”2
Wu also asks similar questions: “Is it possible for nation-states to regulate the 
Internet? Assuming that it is possible; will nation-states regulate the Internet? .. .to what 
extent will states choose to regulate cyberspace?”3 While discussing the role of the 
Internet on economic growth in China, Tan et al asks: “How can the government use the 
Internet to promote economic growth while maintaining its political and economic 
control?”4
It is not unusual for scholars, however, to exclude an uncertain area that is 
vulnerable to new questions while explaining their positive or negative arguments in this
1 Ian Brown, "Internet Filtering - Be Careful What You A sk For," In Freedom and Prejudice: A pproach es  
to  M edia an d  Culture, edited by S. Kirca and L. Hanson. 2008 . and Timothy S. Wu, "Cyberspace 
Sovereignty? The Internet and the International System," H arvard  Journal o f  Law & Technology  10, no. 3
(1997). and Jack L. Goldsmith and Tim Wu, Who C ontrols the Internet?: Illusions o f  a B orderless World, 
(New  York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006). and D. W. Drezner, "The Global G overnance o f  the 
Internet: Bringing the State Back In," P olitica l S cience Q uarterly  1 19, no. 3 (2004): 477-98.
“ Garry Rodan, "The Internet and Political Control in Singapore," P olitica l Science Q uarterly  1 13, no. 1
(1998).
J Wu, ibid.
4 Zixiang (A lex) Tan, William Foster, and Seym our E. Goodm an, "China's State-Coordinated Internet 
Infrastructure," Com m unications o f  the ACM, June 1999.
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debate. For instance, Denning indicates that “Chinese authorities block access to websites 
that are considered subversive to government objectives. This has been only partially 
effective, however, and Chinese activists have found ways o f slipping information past 
the controls.”5 The amount or size o f the term “partly” is not very clear here though.
Likewise, Goldsmith and Wu explain their position by excluding the same point 
as “our discussion of the techniques of government control over the Internet is not meant 
to suggest that the techniques always work perfectly. They do not. Nor do we mean to 
suggest that government control over Internet activities will always be as successful as 
when these activities take place outside the Internet. They will not.”6 While discussing 
legal dilemmas on the Internet, White articulates that “it is more difficult, if not
n
impossible, to trace the source of some material for the purpose of regulation.”
This study focuses on this uncertain area. To what extent is the Internet outside of 
state control? To what extent are there leaks or failures in state polices? To what extent is 
the lack state o f control over the Internet reasonable or acceptable for states? How 
effective are these controlling and regulating mechanisms? Do the aspects that states have 
difficulty controlling pose a threat for states? To what extent is this gap different from 
those caused by previous media and communication tools?
RESEARCH QUESTION FORMALIZATION
Questions in this debate can be formalized as threat/complications emphasis 
questions like: Is the Internet a threat to national governments? What kinds of
5 Dorothy E. Denning, "Activism, Hacktivism, and Cyberterrorism: The Internet as a Tool for Influencing  
Foreign Policy," In Networks an d  N etw ars: The Future o f  Terror, Crim e, and M ilitancy, edited by J. 
Arquilla and D. F. Ronfeldt. 239-88, 2001.
6 Goldsmith and Wu, ibid.
7 Amy E. White, Virtually Obscene: The C ase f o r  an U ncensored Internet, (Jefferson, NC: McFarland &  
Co., 2006).
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complications might it lead to, and how will these challenges affect nation-states? There 
are also authority emphasis questions like: How does the Internet affect authority? Will it 
empower or weaken authority? There are control emphasis questions like: To what extent 
is the Internet outside of state control? To what extent is the lack state o f control over the 
Internet reasonable or acceptable for states? There are also policy/law/ law enforcement 
emphasis questions like: How is law applicable in the online world? To what extent and 
which o f nation-states’ policies and laws to control and regulate the Internet are 
effective?
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND MEASUREMENT
For analytical purposes, the study prefers to focus on the “policy, law and law 
enforcement” emphasis question, particularly the last group phrased above. Thus, the 
main question of this study is how much policing and law enforcement is effective to 
prevent and prosecute crimes committed on/through the Internet?
Prevention and prosecution are the two essential functions o f any state authority. 
For any type of criminality, prevention is the priority for authorities. When they fail to 
prevent crime, the second state power tool, prosecution, applies. Thus, any inquiry 
questioning authority on the Internet should consider these two dimensions— the 
effectiveness of prevention through blocking measures and the effectiveness of 
prosecution when prevention fails.
Likewise, policing has two main purposes and aspects: i) prevention (to prevent 
crimes from being committed), and ii) investigation (to identify perpetrators, to collect 
evidence, and to transfer criminals to judicial authorities).
In terms of prevention, this study analyzes access blocking efforts and policies on
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the Internet in Turkiye. Although internet access blocking can sometimes also be applied 
as a result of a prosecution (punishment), it is widely used as a preventive measure in the 
country.
In terms of prosecution, this study explores how the Turkish police are effective 
in identifying, tracing and ensuring the prosecution of a cybercrime. For the previous 
prevention aspect, this study selected websites which have contents like ideology, 
political, pornography, gambling and blocked for some legal reasons. In connection with 
these tested websites, internet child pornography is the only crime content which there is 
a wide range of international consensus on. There are significant political and legal 
approach differences among states for the other crime subject materials mentioned above. 
Internet child pornography is also one o f the first crimes that make each country to 
consider internet filtering for prevention as well as accept it as a crime to be penalized.
Since the internet is a global network of networks and is transnational due to its 
structure, it is important to make analysis to an extent o f covering this transnational 
dimension. At this point a national unit o f Interpol Ankara becomes an ideal unit to 
conduct this research in. Moreover, file classification on this unit does not have a unique 
specific code that covers all kinds o f cybercrimes. Rather each crime committed 
on/through the internet are given code as the same given to offline crime, like both fraud 
and online fraud cases are given FKA. One exception o f a cybercrime is internet child 
pornography which is specifically given the code as KCC. For analytical reasons, thus, 
evaluation o f the second research question can be performed based on these specific KCC 
files.
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Effectiveness of Internet Blocking (Prevention)
One of the essential methods o f preventive measures on the Internet is the 
blocking technique. Many countries in the world legalize some degree of blocking for 
different reasons. Although its use has spread, the effectiveness of this measure is 
questionable. In this part, this question is being explored.
Research Question 1: To what extent do blocking measures on the Internet 
effectively prevent access to undesired websites and web content?
Measurement discussions in literature
Internet blocking can target either the producers or the consumers but this study is 
concerned with consumers and Internet users. Callanan et al laid out perfectly certain 
parameters to evaluate the effectiveness of blocking measures and stressed some 
important points. “It is not possible to express effectiveness as the amount of content that 
is blocked correctly in comparison to the total amount o f available illegal content since 
the total volume o f available illegal content is unknown.. .Since it is often unclear where 
hits on a website come from, figures quoting volume o f hits on an existing list are a very 
crude indicator at best.”8
Excluding limitations noted above, Callanan et al. specified the following levels 
of analysis to approach the question of effectiveness of blocking measures. This study 
makes its evaluations based on these following factors: 1) “Analysis o f over-blocking and 
under-blocking potential can be used as indicator of the effectiveness o f Internet blocking 
technologies.” 2) “Another indicator for effectiveness is the ease o f  circumvention o f  a
8 Cormac Callanan, Marco Gercke, Estelle D e Marco, and Hein Dries-Ziekenheiner, "Internet Blocking: 
Balancing Cybercrime Responses in Dem ocratic Societies," Open Society Institute, 2009 .
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block. If it is easy to circumvent or disable a block, the availability o f the blocked 
material is likely to remain unaffected.’' 3) "'The availability o f  alternative methods o f  
access to the same content, by whatever means, can be seen as a measure for 
effectiveness o f blocking in the absence o f precise data. 4) The availability o f  other 
enforcement options that offer other more effective methods of preventing access to the 
material can also be assessed - especially if they are less costly, less intrusive or more 
effective towards the availability of the material.”9
This study analyzes the effectiveness of blocking based on the first three criteria. 
The fourth criterion is a preference of the administrative authority, which needs to be 
evaluated based on a broad analysis of price, capacity, speed, complication, and other 
technological variables. Since this criterion is not o f direct interest in this study, it was 
considered for further analysis. The remaining three criteria and how they are measured 
in this study include the first criteria quoted in Callanan et al., analysis o f over-blocking 
and under-blocking potential can be used as an indicator o f the effectiveness o f Internet 
blocking technologies.10
Measurement developed in this study based on above criteria
This part is measured under the title of “Analysis o f over-blocking and under- 
blocking.” Qualitatively this section explores empirical evidence of such complications 
(over-blocking and under-blocking) from independent resources. YouTube, which was 
the subject of blocking in the country for about two and a half years, is the focus here as a 
case study.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
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The second and third criteria quoted in Callanan et al are: 2) the ease of 
circumvention of a block. If it is easy to circumvent or disable a block, the availability of 
the blocked material is likely to remain unaffected. 3) The availability o f alternative 
methods of access to the same content, by whatever means, can be seen as a measure for 
effectiveness o f blocking in the absence o f precise data."
Measurement developed in this study based on above criteria
This two criteria “b and c” are combined here as “Ease of circumvention o f a 
block and the availability o f alternative methods o f  access to the blocked websites.” For 
measuring this part, the study utilizes a previous study’s tools, particularly by Roberts et 
al.’s 2009 study for the Berkman Center at Harvard University.12 They have tested the 
effectiveness o f some types of web-based circumvention tools. Taking examples of 
circumvention tools for each method, this study checks whether circumvention tools are 
effectively retrieving a sample o f the blocking websites in Tiirkiye. How easy is it to 
circumvent websites that are blocked in the country? This section further analyzes and 
focuses on a specific issue area, terrorism and blocked terror websites, including 
circumvention tendencies in the country and legal dilemmas.
Prosecution o f Internet child pornography
Child pornography is the main undesired content on the Internet that filters target. 
However, despite all preventive policies and blocking measures against child 
pornography, it is still one of the primary problems on the Internet. While the previous
Ibid
12 Hal Roberts, Ethan Zuckerman, and John Palfrey, "2007 Circumvention Landscape Report: M ethods, 
Uses, and Tools," Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University, 2009.
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research question inquires about the effectiveness oflnternet blocking, this part questions 
how effective policing is when such blocking systems fail.
Research Question 2: How effective are the police in identifying, tracing and 
bringing criminals involved in child pornography before judicial authorities?
Measurement
The Internet is a global medium, and most o f the complications o f the Internet 
stream from its transnational structure. “Cybercrime is very much a transnational crime,”
1 Tand so is child pornography. A study exploring the challenges of investigations about 
child pornography should see the subject from international and transnational 
perspectives. This study analyzed the issue based on digital files from Interpol Ankara. 
INTERPOL is the acronym of the International Police Organization, headquartered in 
Lyon, France. The organization has 190 member states. Staffed by member states’ law 
enforcement personnel, each country has an Interpol National Bureau (National Central 
Bureau, called as NCB) within their homeland. The study conducted searches for the 
years o f 2005, 2006, and 2007. Looking at each o f these cases, this study checked how 
police investigations either in Tiirkiye, or investigations abroad are successfully 
concluded. How successful are investigations in identifying, tracing, and bringing 
suspects before judicial authorities? Considering the fact that investigations take time, 
and considering that this part o f the study was conducted in June 2011, the files opened in 
2005, 2006, and 2007 were selected. The situation is not promising, as will be described 
in the coming sections.
13 "Resources: International Cooperation against Cybercrime," Council o f  Europe, w w w .coe.int/t/dghl 
/cooperation/econom iccrim e/cybercrim e/Docum ents/Intem ationalcooperation/defaulten.asp.
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METHODOLOGY
Measuring effectiveness of Internet blocking
Research Question 1: To what extent have blocking measures on the Internet 
effectively prevented access to undesired websites and web content?
Hal Roberts, Ethan Zuckerman, and John Palfrey from the Berkman Center for 
Internet & Society at Harvard University tested how effective some circumvention tools 
are for some countries.14 They analyzed nine web-based proxy servers that use five 
different methods: HTTP proxy, CGI proxy, IP tunneling, re-routing, and distributed 
hosting. Despite some performance problems and security concerns, the study by the 
Berkman Center stresses that: “all of the circumvention and anonymity tools included in 
this study succeeded at the basic task o f  retrieving blocked content in a filtering 
country.” 15
In a lab environment, Roberts et al. evaluated above mentioned circumvention 
tools based on six criteria: 1) “Utility (Does it retrieve filtered websites? How fast is it 
compared to unmediated browsing? How well does/will performance scale?) 2) Usability 
(How easy it for novice users to leam? How easy is it to use?) 3) Security (How well 
does the tool protect the user from surveillance at various points in the network?) 4) 
Promotion and marketing of the tool (How well is knowledge of the tool pushed out to 
users in filtered countries?) 5) Fiscal sustainability o f the project (To what degree is the 
project on a path toward fiscal self sustainability?) 6) Openness (Is the code open source? 
Are the developers approachable and forthright about their techniques and future
14 Roberts et al., ibid.
15 Ibid.
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plans?)”16
Using the framework o f the study conducted by the Berkman Center, this study 
tested how these circumvention tools are effective in bypassing blocked websites in 
Tiirkiye. The center tested the following web services for circumvention: 1) Anonymizer. 
www.anonymizer.com/; 2) DynaWeb www.dit-inc.us/about_us; 3) Ultrareach 
http://ultrasurf.us/; 4) Circumventor www.circumventor.com/; 5) Pisphon 
http://psiphon.ca/?page_id=T96; 6 Jap http://anon.inf.tu-dresden.de/index_en.html; 7) Tor 
https://www.torproject.org/; 8) Hamachi www.hamachi.com/; and 9) Coral 
www.coralcdn.org/.
Selection of circumvention tools
Taking these circumvention tools from this list, this study proposes to test how 
these tools are working in Tiirkiye to bypass blocking measures. It is important to check 
if these tools are significant for Tiirkiye. Thus, I checked all o f these tools (websites) at 
alexa.com and looked for their popularity in Tiirkiye. Checks reveal that only the third 
place web tool, Ultrareach, and the seventh place web tool, Tor, have some degree of 
popularity in Tiirkiye.17 Thus I selected Ultrareach and Tor for additional analysis. While 
Ultrareach is an HTTP proxy (http://ultrasurf.us/), Tor is a re-routing proxy 
(https://www.torproject.org/).
In order to select one example for the other types o f proxy servers (CGI proxy and 
IP tunneling), I check the top list of global proxy websites and establish how popular 
these proxies are in Tiirkiye. This check reveals that among the five global proxies,
16 Ibid.
17 TUrkiye is the fifth most popular country for Ultrareach software. Ultrasurf ranked 39 ,012 . and Tiirkiye is 
the seventeenth most popular country for Tor, ranked 11.181. "Alexa Actionable A nalytics for the Web," 
Alexa Internet, Inc., A lexa.com .
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Turkish users make use o f three o f the following. Ktunnel is a Turkish CGI proxy.
Turkish visitors make up the majority o f visitors to the site, ranking at 88.4% o f total 
visitors. Anonymouse is a free anonymous surfing, email, and Usenet posting site.18 3.4% 
of visitors came from TUrkiye, coming in at eighth place among visitor source countries. 
Vtunnel is a web proxy supporting SSL via the HTTPS encryption protocol. TUrkiye 
provided a plurality of visitors, 21.6%. Because o f its popularity in TUrkiye, both in terms 
of country ranking and percentage of visitors, I chose Ktunnel as a CGI proxy. The three 
circumvention tools selected in this study are: Ultrarech, Ktunnel, and Tor Project.
Selection of blocked websites
In order to test how circumvention tools are working, the following blocked 
websites have been selected from an independent website that monitors blocked websites 
in TUrkiye. According to engelliweb.com, which monitors Internet blockings within 
TUrkiye, 15,596 websites are blocked for different reasons as of 2 March 2012.19 Among 
them, 12,772 websites are reported by the administrative authority called 
Telekomunikasyon ileti§im Ba§kanligi (TIB). 2,326 are by judicial authorities. Among 
them, 26 websites are hosted by WordPress, 48 are hosted by Blogger or Blogspot, and 
47 are IP addresses. The result of testing and its analysis are further explored in the 
following section.
Measuring effectiveness o f prosecution
Research Question 2: How effective are police in identifying, tracing, and
18 Usenet is a worldwide bulletin board system that can be accessed through the Internet or through many 
online services. The USENET contains more than 14,000 newsgroups (see definition in Chapter II). It is 
used daily by m illions o f  people around the world.
19 "Engelli Web," Engelliweb.com.
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bringing criminals involved Internet child pornography before judicial authorities?
The following measures are offered by Wortley and Smallbone to measure the 
degree o f success for law enforcement agencies while they are policing child 
pornography:20 “The followings are potentially useful measures o f the effectiveness o f 
responses to Internet child pornography: 1) reduced number o f complaints from the 
public about Internet child pornography. Initially, you might want to see an increase in 
complaints from the public if you have reason to believe the problem is underreported; 2) 
reduced number of child pornography sites and images on the Internet; 3) reduced 
number of new child pornography images on the Internet; 4) reduced level o f severity of 
the child pornography images on the Internet; 5) reduced number o f images possessed by 
offenders who are arrested for downloading child pornography; 6) reduced level o f 
severity of the images possessed by offenders who are arrested for downloading child 
pornography; and 7) reduced level o f involvement (possession, distribution, or 
production) of the offenders arrested for Internet child pornography crime.
Other measures are important for tracking official actions taken to address the 
problem. Among them are: 1) the number o f offenders arrested for Internet child 
pornography crimes; and 2) the number o f victims portrayed in Internet child 
pornography who are identified and assisted.”21
Since this study concerns more on the investigation side of the issue rather than 
complaints, images, or websites, for analytical purposes, the measurement o f 
effectiveness focuses on the offender side. Thus, effectiveness in this section is measured 
as the success o f investigations to identify, trace, or arrest the offenders involved in
20 Richard Wortley and Stephen Smallbone, Internet C h ild  Pornography: Causes, Investigation, an d  
Prevention, (Praeger, 2012).
21 Ibid., 32-33.
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reported cases. Looking at both incoming and outgoing requests to Interpol Ankara will 
give a good insight to evaluate this effectiveness in such a transnational crime.
INTERPOL plays an important role to ensure cooperation among police 
organizations o f all countries in the world. With its 190 member states, the organization 
and the INTERPOL network of National Central Bureaus (NCBs) help to communicate 
directly with each other, to share information about any transnational crime, and to 
submit requests for investigation from each other.
This part of the study was conducted in The National Central Bureau o f Interpol 
Ankara (NCB Ankara) for one week between 27 June 2011 and 1 July 2011 with official 
permission dated 21 June 2011. Because o f legal concerns and time limitations, I selected 
files from the years 2005, 2006 and 2007. A four to six-year time period is appropriate to 
anticipate that a regular police investigation will be concluded. Thus, analysis and 
evaluations are not conducted based on new cases that may be ongoing, but rather on 
cases considered to be concluded.
How does the NCB of Interpol Ankara work?
This department operates under the General Directorate of National Police in 
Ankara. The department has about 100 personnel, and its working languages are English 
and French. It coordinates policing and legal cooperation between national departments 
with their foreign counterparts. It receives requests from national police, judicial units, 
and other official departments and directs appropriate inquiries to related country’s NCB. 
It also receives requests from foreign Interpol departments (NCBs) to convey them to 
related national units.
Any criminal or legal issue, either a request from national bodies or from outside
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the country, results in a new file being opened in the department. Depending on the types 
of crimes, these files are assigned reference codes for easy archiving. FKA is the code for 
forgery cases. GPE is the code for human smuggling. ST is for drug smuggling. The code 
KCC is for cases involving child sexual abuse and child pornography. Among the six 
different sections at the Interpol department in Ankara, the Public Safety and Order 
Section handles KCC-labeled crime.
File selection and digital archive
Looking at the years 2005, 2006 and 2007, this study checks the new files opened 
as KCC. These checks and analyses are conducted in the digital archive but not in regular 
files. Paper-based files of the same digital file would be complementary and would show 
other small details of the cases. However, the digital archive includes all the significant 
writings and processes of a case saved and accessible in a closed internal network within 
the department. Only insignificant documentation about a case is excluded from the 
digital file. It is kept instead in a paper-based physical file. Examples o f such documents 
are forms requesting the status o f an investigation, requests to speed up an investigation, 
or a negative result from one o f the units that conducted the investigation. In some cases 
there is action required for these types o f documents. In other cases, it may not be helpful 
to convey these types o f requests to related national or foreign units. Thus, significant 
information and data conducted in any case is included in the digital files, and no relevant 
information is excluded.
Analysis o f files
For each year, there are digital files named 2005, 2006, and 2007 in the digital
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archive. Cases opened in each year were given a case number with corresponding crime 
code such as KCC-356 or KCC-278 and saved as a MS Word documents within the 
corresponding year file in the digital archive. Thus, the total number of MS Word 
documents in a year file represents the total number of cases subject to investigation by 
Interpol investigators.
Checks conducted of the digital archive files for the years 2005, 2006, and 2007 
reveal that there are respectively 35, 35 and 85 new cases subject to investigations by 
NCB Ankara. These numbers do not reflect the total documents received by the Bureau 
each year. The real number of documents pertaining to the same crime may be higher. 
However, this study only concerns the operational side o f police investigation of the 
crime. Thus, the informative and secondary documents held in paper-based files have 
little or no value for this analysis.
Interpol investigations can be essentially divided into two main groups, Requests 
of National units from Foreign Interpol Bureaus (outgoing requests) and Requests of 
Foreign Interpol Bureaus from national units (incoming requests)
After this classification as outgoing requests and incoming requests, all cases are 
opened for content analysis. Each case has been checked based on the following 
questions and aspects: From where did the request come? What was the request? To 
where was it conveyed? When police investigations are successful in identifying 
criminals, are possible perpetrators brought before judicial authorities? What are possible 
difficulties and barriers during these police investigations and proceedings?
WHY THE REPUBLIC OF TURKIYE?
While examining the geopolitics of blocking trends in 2009, Deibert stresses that
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although Internet filtering polices are very common around globe, information about each 
state’s experience from these policies is limited.22 There are not many reliable resources 
available on this complex issue, and the number o f empirical studies is quite limited. 
Transparency and accountability for these policies are very low for most o f the countries.
Each state has unique characteristics, with different cultural, historical, and 
political heritages and traditions. Studying how Turkish authorities manage to control and 
regulate the Internet, particularly its blocking experience, collection o f important cases, 
and empirical evidence from the country, will be helpful to enrich the literature in this 
field.
Being a democratic, secular and developing country, Tiirkiye has a rich culture 
and history. It is situated in a very strategic place between Europe to the West, Russia to 
the North, and in the Arabian Peninsula to the Southeast. Many call the country the 
bridge between Europe and Asia. It has a growing economy, ranked 17th in the world as 
measured in nominal GDP, according to the World Bank. It is the second most populated 
country in Europe with a population around 72 million. It has relatively a young 
population compared to other European countries. Tiirkiye’s diverse social, political, and 
economic characteristics create a rich profile that potentially reflects interesting evidence 
about experiences and patterns o f the effects o f the Internet.
Political debates about the Internet discuss widely the blocking policies o f 
different states. Tiirkiye’s internet access blocking policy and its implications present 
different patterns and empirical evidence worth bringing to the literature. Tiirkiye’s 
practices is interesting to explore since it is not as strict as in China, Iran, or Saudi
22 Ronald J. Deibert, The G eopolitics o f  Internet Control: Censorship, Sovereignty an d  C yberspace , 
Routledge Handbook o f  Internet Politics. Edited by Andrew Chadwick and Philip N . Howard (London: 
Routledge, 2009).
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Arabia, nor does it resemble more liberal Internet policies like those in Western Europe. 
According to an international non-profit organization. Reporters Without Borders, which 
monitors freedom of the press and the Internet, Tiirkiye is not among the countries that 
are “enemies of the Internet.” However, the organization included Tiirkiye among the 
“countries under surveillance.”23
In fact, Turkish authorities did not have many options to consider against 
undesired websites and web content that violate national laws. Authorities either close 
their eyes to these illegalities and other negative effects or they enforce the law, including 
Internet access blocking, despite some of the complications discussed in this study.
Engelliweb.com, which monitors Internet blocking in Tiirkiye, reported that 
access to 7,221 websites was blocked for different reasons on 29 August 2010. On 04 
March 2011, about six months later, and the check revealed that 9,151 sites were being 
restricted.24 As of 13 June, 2014, total number o f  blocked websites found by the same 
resource reached to 48,412 25
Internet access blocking in TUrkiye can be done based on Law No. 5651 regarding 
“Regulation o f Publications on the Internet and the Struggle against Crimes Committed 
on the Internet”26 or based on related sections o f other laws. Among those which are 
restricted based on law no. 5651, the biggest percentage o f blocking, 96.3 %, is done for 
obscenity, pornography, and child sexual abuse. The remaining websites are blocked for 
hate speech, gambling, and other health related reasons like encouraging suicide, or the 
use of narcotics.
23 Reporters Without Borders, "Internet Enemies," (2011).
24 "Engelli W eb.”, ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 The law cam e into effect on 23  Novem ber 2007.
27 "Telekomtlnikasyon ileti§im Ba§kanligi," www.ihbarweb.org.tr.
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Blocking policies in TUrkiye are also open to public denunciation by the Turkish 
administrative authority TIB.28 The TIB can directly restrict access to the website once 
they find allegations that apparently violate related law. Decisions to block access to any 
website can be handed down by the TIB and by judicial authorities, either by prosecutors 
or by courts.
Implementation of Internet blocking, however, has raised public questions about 
the effectiveness o f these measures since access may still be possible despite being 
blocked. For instance, YouTube is restricted based on different court verdicts and was 
closed for a long time. However, during the time that the websites was being blocked, 
alexa.com reports showed that the website was one of the most popular within TUrkiye.
Access to these websites, blocked for obscenity, social networking, or gambling, 
may be a secondary concern, but this gap also seems to be open for websites encouraging 
terrorism and violence. TUrkiye has been suffering from terrorism by the Marxist- 
Leninist terrorist organization PKK since the beginning of the 1980s. TUrkiye’s struggle 
against this terrorist organization faced a different challenge when a TV channel, ROJ 
TV, propagandizing PKK, started to broadcast from Denmark. Authorities were used to 
taking measures against such publications or broadcasting within national borders, but 
this transnational broadcasting to the potential audience within the country created a new 
challenge for Turkish authorities. TUrkiye urged Danish authorities to close ROJ TV, but 
the country faced legal and political barriers in Danish national legislation. Later the 
television channel moved its center to other European states and changed the satellite it
28 Turkish acronym o f  Telekom unikasyon ileti$im Bajkanligi, the Turkish telecom m unications 
headquarters.
29 YouTube was the sixth most popular website in TUrkiye as o f  21 March 2010, although the website was 
blocked based on the decision by 1st Peace Criminal Court in Ankara since 5 M ay 2008 . "Alexa Actionable  
Analytics for the W eb.”, ibid.
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was broadcasting from. It was a significant subject of legal and political dispute between 
Danish authorities and Turkiye for a long time.30
Through the Internet and its multimedia features, such kinds o f broadcastings 
have become more complicated for Turkish authorities. The Internet has increased the 
number of websites acting as the voices o f the terrorist organization PKK. In the case of 
ROJ TV, Turkiye needed to convince one or two states to close off this television 
broadcasting. But because of the Internet, Turkish authorities need to talk— and 
negotiate—with a number of states with different legal, political and economic regimes to 
stop these websites from using servers in their country.
Authorities are also taking measures to prevent domestic access to these websites. 
However, these websites still receive a significant number o f  domestic visitors despite 
being blocked domestically by authorities. There are a number of alternative ways people 
circumvent Internet blocking. People can use proxy websites, online anonymous services 
for circumvention. They can also change their modem or computer settings for the same 
purpose.
It is worth noting here that information and websites that provide circumvention 
techniques are also open access, and so far, authorities have not taken any measures 
against these kinds o f websites. People can easily find these circumvention techniques on 
the Internet. For instance, ktunnel.com, a proxy website that circumvents Internet 
blocking, is the 60th most popular website in Turkiye according to alexa.com.31 This 
shows that people in Turkiye are using these kinds o f tools and services available on the 
Internet to access blocked websites.
30 " r q j  y y  Davasinda Sona Dogru," Sabah, 7 D ecem ber2 0 1 1.
31 The popularity ranking o f  the website within the country was 3330 on 12 February 2014 . "Alexa 
Actionable Analytics for the Web.", ibid.
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In addition to these blocking dilemmas and problems, law enforcement agencies 
face different challenges while investigating criminal issues committed on or through the 
Internet, as seen in police investigations against child pornography. This crime is one o f 
the primary reasons authorities consider Internet blocking. It is such a sensitive issue that 
almost in every country, it is admitted as a serious crime. So it is in Turkiye. Authorities 
take this crime very seriously and utilize all technical and scientific capabilities to 
investigate, identify and prosecute such crime allegations.
This study has a chance to explore digital files of investigation requests of 
Interpol Ankara. These investigation requests have two sides. It can be investigation 
requests of foreign Interpol Bureaus from Interpol Ankara (incoming requests) or it can 
be investigation requests o f Interpol Ankara from other Interpol Bureaus (outgoing 
requests). Looking at investigations for three years, 2005, 2006, and 2007, this study 
checked how many cases either outside the country or inside the country successfully 
identified criminals involved in this crime and handed over to judicial authorities.
DEFINITIONS
Definitions and terminology matter in any study, especially when it is academic.
It is important to specify what this study means when talking about certain terms, like the 
Internet, Internet blocking, effectiveness, and Internet child pornography.
The Internet: In their study DiMaggio et al. define the Internet as “the electronic 
network of networks that links people and information through computers and other
• * • 32digital devices allowing person-to-person communication and information retrieval.’’
32 Paul DiM aggio, Eszter Hargittai, W. Russell Neuman, and John P. Robinson, "Social Implications o f  the 
Internet,” Annual Review o f  Socio logy  27 (2001): 307-36.
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The Internet is both a communication and a mass medium. Previously, media and
communication disciplines used to be studied and taught separately. Now the Internet has
unified these disciplines. Although there are some similarities with older media and
communication devices such as telephones, fax, television, and radio, the Internet has
many distinct characteristics. White indicates that:
“The Internet is not a tangible device, no one entity manufactures or produces 
it and it is not allowed or controlled by any government or corporation...The 
computers which form the Internet are connected by many different 
methods...fiber optic cables, twisted pair copper wire, wireless signals ... The 
information travelling on these networks is translated by a computer into a 
universal protocol called TCP/IP, which uses a common name and enables 
other computers to find and understand the information.... It is these protocols 
that really define the network. The machines that talk to one another using IP 
and their connections are the Internet.”33
Hick and McNutt describe the Internet as “a global pool of information and
services, accessible locally through individual computer stations, each o f which is part of
global system of interconnected computer networks.”34 Callanan et al. say: “The Internet
is a vast complex network of networks with a myriad of hardware systems, protocols and
services implemented.”35 While studying the effects o f the Internet in social movements,
Huang specifies the use o f Internet technology as the use o f “the World Wide Web,
websites/websites, email, real time chat, blogs, VoIP, and discussion forums.”
The Internet is a global network o f networks that enables users from all over the
world to interact and connect through the Internet applications, devices, and tools of
communication technology. Internet applications implies the use of World Wide Web
>3 White, ibid.
34 Steven Hick and John G. McNutt, eds., A dvocacy, Activism  an d  the Internet: C om m unity O rganization  
an d  S ocia l P olicy , Communities and A dvocacy on the Internet: A Conceptual Framework, (Chicago, IL: 
Lycecum Books, 2002), 6.
35 Callanan et al., ibid.
36 Bi Yun Huang, "Analyzing a Social M ovem ent’s Use o f  Internet Resource M obilization, N ew  Social 
M ovement Theories and the Case o f  Falun Gong," Indiana University, 2009.
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(Web 2.0), blogging, social networking sites, any kind o f forums, messengers, instant 
chat, email, VoIP, multimedia, peer to peer (P2P) networking, and Usenet Newsgroups. 
Devices and tools of communication technology include all kinds o f equipment necessary 
for Internet infrastructure and connection to the Internet, such as computers, modems, 
wireless capabilities, cables, mobile phones, and the like.
Blocking policies can target Internet applications such as websites/webpages, 
email, Usenet, search, and peer to peer (P2), as Callanan et al. analyzed in their study.
For analytical purposes, this study specifically focuses on one of the important 
applications o f the Internet, websites, while examining blocking measures. Callanan et al. 
also stress, “Websites are one of the foremost distribution methods o f all types o f content 
on the Internet.”38 Moreover “many filtering products are based on lists o f Websites that 
are supplied by their vendor[s].”39
Blocking on the Internet: Blocking covers “a broad range o f policies, hardware, 
software, and services, and it would be a mistake to think that all types o f Internet 
blocking are the same or equally effective, legally equivalent, or even that one system can 
easily be used in relation to more than one type o f content.”40 In this study, blocking 
essentially refers to authorities’ technical measures to prevent access to undesired 
websites and web content. This study is not a lab analysis o f blocking techniques or 
circumvention methods. It uses the words “blocking” and “filtering” interchangeably, as 
seen in the literature.
Effectiveness: In order to talk about effectiveness in a positive or negative sense,
7 Callanan et al., ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Paul Greenfield, Peter Rickwood, and Huu Cuong Tran, "Effectiveness o f  Internet Filtering Software 
Products," Sydney: CSIRO, Mathematical and Information Sciences, 2001.
40 Callanan et al., ibid.
there should be an accurate and reliable measure. While this term basically refers to the 
level o f success, how it is measured is explained for each research question based on 
criteria from the literature.
The next chapter gives information about brief political history of the country, 
and some background about media and communication sector. This chapter also includes 
historical information about how the internet was first introduced to the country and how 
it has been governed by related institutions.
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CHAPTER IV 
BRIEF ABOUT TURKIYE
Following the First World War, the six century old Ottoman Empire broke apart. 
Founded in 1923, the Republic of Turkiye chose many political, legal, and economic 
models from Western states to form a new governmental and institutional structure. 
Turkiye kept itself away from involvement in the Second World War and gave priority to 
industrialization and developing its economy. Becoming a NATO member in 1952, 
Turkiye was one of the frontlines of the Alliance and played a strategic role during the 
Cold War. Geographically, Turkiye is in an important region in the Middle East,
Caucasus, Black Sea, Europe, and the Mediterranean. It has a population o f about 76 
million,1 which makes the country the second most populous nation in Europe and among 
the most populous in the Middle East. Turkiye is the only pluralist secular democracy in 
the Muslim world.
The European Union (EU) has become one of the successful civilization projects 
in the last century. From the very beginning, Turkiye wanted to be a part o f  this project. 
The relationship between Turkiye and the EU goes back to 1963 when the Association 
Agreement signed in Ankara between the two parties (at that time the Union was called 
as the EEC). Since then, it has undertaken extensive political and economic reforms and 
has become a part of European institutions, such as the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Court of Human Rights, and the Council of 
Europe Parliamentary Assembly (PACE). Turkiye applied for full membership to the EU
1 A s o f  31 Decem ber 2012, the population is 75 ,627 ,384 . Turkish Statistical Institute, "Adrese Dayali 
Nilfus Kayit Sistem i Sonuclari, 2012," www.tuik.gov.tr/PreH aberBultenleri.do?id=13425.
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in 1987, and was recognized as a candidate state during the EU Helsinki Summit in 1999. 
After a long and hard discussion at the Copenhagen Summit in 2004, the European 
Council finally specified a date for accession talks with Turkiye to be held in 2004 but 
without guarantee o f a full membership.
Irrespective of whether full membership is ever granted, Turkiye is advancing its 
democratic standards, promoting human rights standards, and improving its economic 
development. The end of Cold War has opened up a wide hinterland for the country to 
expand economic relations and diversify its foreign policy in its region. Both for Turkish 
people and for politicians, the popularity and credibility o f the European Union seems to 
be decreasing. Thus, any response in the future will not be surprising for the country, as it 
might have been one or two decades ago.
Liberal policies in the country were intensified in the beginning o f 1980s.
Free and competitive market principles were intensified in economic policies during this 
time, and the state’s role and involvement in the economy began to be minimized 
afterward. Privatization of many of the State Economic Enterprises (abbreviated KIT in 
Turkish), liberalization of the circulation of foreign currency within the market, and 
ensuring convertibility of the Turkish Lira in the international market are some o f the 
important polices of this term. Although the country has not become a full member o f the 
EU, the country signed the Customs Union agreement with the European Union, which 
came into force at the beginning of 1996. This liberalization movement is not only seen 
in economy. The country has made significant transformations in a variety o f legal and 
political areas. The death penalty has been abolished and individual applications to the 
European Human Rights Court have been accepted under certain conditions.
Both the media and communication sectors have been very much affected by 
these liberalization policies. As seen in most o f issue areas, technology was very much 
ahead o f the law. Although there is no legal framework for broadcasting private TV and 
radio channels, a number o f private TV and radio channels have emerged and 
undermined the monopoly of the state-run, official voice o f Turkish Radio and Television 
(abbreviated TRT in Turkish). It was up until 1993 that private TV and radio 
broadcasting have been regulated based on an amendment to the constitution. Since then, 
private TV and radio channels have been very influential on the country’s progress in 
democracy, civil rights, freedom, and institutionalization. The Turkish Radio and 
Television High Commission (abbreviated RTUK in Turkish) reports that 249 Territorial 
Analog Television stations are licensed by the RTUK. Of those, 24 are national, 15 are 
regional, and 210 are local TV channels. RTUK licenses 1,062 FM radio stations. Of 
those, 35 are national, 98 are regional, and 929 are local.2
Because of serious political and legal disputes, privatization of the state owned . 
Postal, Telephone and Telegraph (abbreviated PTT in Turkish) progressed slowly and 
was realized only realized after a number o f postponements. For this purpose, 
telecommunication services have been separated from the postal service, and Turk 
Telekom A.S. was founded in 1994.3 There are 443 licensed companies operating in a 
free and competitive Turkish telecommunication market. Using three communication 
satellites, one of which is national GOKTURK, the country allocates a considerable
2 Radio and Television Supreme Council, (Radyo T elevizyon Ust Kurulu, RTUK) Annual Report (2009- 
2010)
’ Hasan Serindag, "Turk Telekom inikasyon Sektorunde Liberalizasyon V e Regulasyon Kurumlarinin 
Fonksiyonlari,” In 2008  Bilisim Konferansi. Ankara, 2008.
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amount of resources to advance its space and satellite technology.4
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE INTERNET IN TURKIYE
Having significant growth, progress, and development, the media and 
communication sectors in Turkiye have entered into a new transformation trend that was 
essentially shaped and dominated by the Internet. The Internet has changed and 
diversified previous communication habits and gained a critical place in transforming this 
balance o f the new media order. Increasing popularity, especially among younger 
generations in the country, has urged authorities and private endeavors to spread Internet 
services and advance infrastructure throughout the entire state.
The first transnational computer network in Turkiye, called TUVAKA (Turkish 
Networks of Universities and Research Institutes), was established in 1986.5 It was a 
BITNET connection that first connected the University o f Ege in Izmir, Turkiye to 
EARN (European Academic and Research Network) in Italy.6 More universities from 
other parts of the country joined the same network later, but technical and operational 
problems within the network made resulted in it being insufficient to respond to 
necessary demands at that time.7
In 1991, a well-known national research institute in Turkiye, TUBITAK (The 
Scientific and Technical Research Council o f Turkiye) and one of the leading universities
4 "Ministry o f  Transportation (TQrkiye Cumhuriyeti Ula§tirma)," www.ubak.gov.tr/.
5 Turkish Acronym o f  “TUrkiye Universiteler ve Ara§tirma Kurumlari A g i.” M iddle East Technical 
University (M ETU), "TUrkiye'de Internet," www.Internetarsivi.metu.edu.tr/tarihce.php.
6 Peter W olcott and Kursat Cagiitay, "Telecom m unications, Liberalization, and the Growth o f  the Internet 
in Turkiye," The Information Society, no. 17 (2001): 133—41.
7 Yaman A kdenizand Kerem Altiparmak, in ternet: G irilm esi Tehlikeli Ve Yasaktir, (Ankara: Insan Haklan  
Ortak Platformu’nun (iH O P), 2008).
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of the country, METU (Middle East Technical University)8 initiated a project called TR- 
NET. They were able to test connection with the Netherlands in October 1992.9 On 12 
April 1993, the first Internet connection using the TCP/IP protocol10 was made between 
METU/TUBITAK and the NSFNet (National Science Foundation Network) in the United 
States through a 64-kbps leased line.11
Since then Internet infrastructure and Internet users in the country have increased 
noticeably. In 1995, the number of individual Internet connections was about 1,300, and 
total daily Internet users numbered between 10,000 and 15,000. In 1997, about 30,000 
computers were connected to the Internet. This number was 100,000 in the beginning of 
2000.12 Mestci notes that Internet users numbered about 293,000 in 1998. That increased 
to 1.78 million in 2000 and 10 million in 2004.13
The Turkish Statistics Institution (TUIK) began conducting an address-based 
survey in 2007. A survey conducted that year reveals that 19.7% of Turkish households 
had Internet access. ADSL was the most used connection type by 78.5%.14 In 2009, the 
percentage of Internet-connected households increased to 30% of the total households. 
The same year, the total population of the country was 71,517,100 and average family 
size was around four. From these numbers, officials estimated that there were 18 million 
households in Turkiye, meaning that approximately 5.4 million households had Internet
8 In Turkish: Orta Dogu Teknik Universitesi (O D TU ).
9 "Tilrkiye'de Internet.”, ibid.
10 Bill Gates, "Shaping the Internet Age," Internet Policy’ Institute , 2000.
11 Akdenizli, ibid. and "TUrkiye'de Internet.”, ibid.
12 "Turkish Ministry o f  Education (M illi Egitim Bakanhgi)," http://www.m eb.gov.tr/.
1 ’Aytac Mest?i, "TUrkiye internet Raporu 2 0 0 5 ,” In Akadem ik Bilisim Konferansi 2006. (Denizli: 
Pamukkale Universitesi, 2006).
14 "Turkish Statistical Institute Database," http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreTabloArama.do?metod=search 
&araType=vt.
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access in 2009.15 In December 2009, Bulent Hicsonmez, Head of Google Turkiye, 
estimated that Turkish Internet users numbered about 28 million.16
In 2010 the percentage o f households with Internet access increased to 41.6% o f 
total households— 7.48 million homes.17 That increased to 47.2% in 2012. The rate for 
cities is 55.5%, and the rate in rural areas is 27.3% .18
Besides Internet access from individual homes, public Internet use, such as in 
Internet cafes, is very common around the country. For example, there are more than 800 
internet cafes in Ankara with more than five users per cafe per day and almost 2000 
internet cafes in Istanbul with more than six users per cafe per day.19
The “e-state”’ project, a government initiative to combine all official departments 
into one main gateway has encouraged officials to develop their own websites and 
provide some services on the Internet. The Ministry o f Transportation, which is in charge 
o f communication in the country, recently notes that with 40 million Internet users, 
Turkiye is 12th in the world and 5th in Europe in terms o f Internet penetration. While the 
number of broadband Internet subscribers exceeds 8 million, the number o f cable Internet 
subscribers exceeds 200,000. 3G technology makes mobile Internet access convenient 
and popular in the country, and mobile subscribers have reached 16.6 million.
comScore, Inc. (the initial “c” is not capitalized), a global Internet traffic ranking 
and measuring website, reports that in April 2009 Turkiye had the 7th largest online 
audience among Internet visitors from 17 European states. “Spending an average 32
15 GOvenli Web, "istatistik Bilgileri," http://www.guvenliweb.org.tr/istatistikler/.
16 "TUrkiye'nin Internet Niifusu 28 M ilyon,” Timeturk, 7 Decem ber 2009.
17 Giivenli Web, "internet Abone Sayilari," http://www.guvenliweb.org.tr/istatistikler/content/intemet- 
abone-say%C4%B 1 lar%C4%B 1. O f the 71 ,517,100 inhabitants, 50.2%  are male and 49.8%  are fem ale. 
There are about 18 m illion households in the country.
18 Ibid.
19 “istatistik Bilgileri,” ibid.
20 All data from "Ministry o f  Transportation (TUrkiye Cumhuriyeti Ulajtirma)," ibid.
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hours and viewing an average 3,044 pages of content per month” makes Turkiye the most 
engaged Internet visitors in Europe and the 5th most engaged in the w orld.21
Institutions and the Internet
The Internet urged politicians and bureaucrats to create a unique and special 
institution and law to regulate the Internet. The Presidency o f Telecommunication 
Communication (Telekomiinikasyon lleti§im Ba§kanhgi (TIB)) was founded based on 
amendment law number 5397, approved by the Turkish Parliament and published in the 
Official Gazette on 3 July 2005. The TIB is under the direct supervision of the President 
of the BTK (Bilgi Teknolojileri ve Ileti§im Kurumu—the Turkish Information and 
Communications Technologies Authority) both o f which operate under Ministry o f 
Transport Maritime Affairs and Communications.
The law on Regulation of Publications on the Internet and Combating Crimes 
Committed by Means of Such Publications, number 5651 published on 23 May 2007, 
directly assigns the TIB to enforce the related provisions o f the law about the Internet.
The Internet Department Directorate is founded under the TIB.
The TIB’s duties and responsibilities are stipulated in law number 5651, Article 
10, Paragraph 4. These duties are to ensure coordination between the Ministry, Law 
Enforcement Agencies, related Directorates, and NGOs to prevent illegal activities and 
publications o f content published on the Internet, as described in the law. Like at home, 
the Presidency (TIB) is to facilitate cooperation and coordination with institutions abroad. 
Establishing the level, time, and means o f monitoring Internet publications, the TIB is 
obligated to monitor Internet publications and take appropriate access-blocking measures
21 com Score, "Press Releases," w w w.com score.com /Press E vents/P ressR eleases.
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against any criminality as described in the law. It establishes systems and procedures for 
registration, filters, and other administrative requirements for commercial public Internet 
providers.
Law number 5651, article 10, paragraph 5 provides the foundation o f the Internet 
Board, made up of members from the Ministry o f Justice, Ministry o f Interior, Ministry 
o f State Responsible for Women, Children and Family, from other related Ministries and 
organizations, and members from Internet Service Providers and NGOs. The law calls for 
the TIB to ensure cooperation and coordination with this board in designating websites to 
block and with collecting suggestions, measures, and decisions from similar situations.
After presenting introductory information about internet access blocking, related 
law, blocking examples and concerns, the following chapter includes analysis o f the first 
research question which is the effectiveness of internet blocking. As a case study, 
YouTube access blocking was explained here as an example for over-blocking. Utilized 
some of the tools tested in the literature, this chapter includes testing circumvention tools 
to access some of blocked websites. This chapter also looks the effects of blocking on 
blocked websites, focusing on those with violence, ideology or terror contents.
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CHAPTER V
INTERNET BLOCKING AND EFFECTIVENESS IN THE REPUBLIC OF TURKIYE
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Technology develops faster than law.1 Law making comes after public use o f 
technology. Such is the case with Internet use in Turkiye. During the early years o f 
Internet use in Turkiye, there were no specific laws or regulation. Ina short time, legal 
disputes and cases involving the Internet started coming before judicial authorities. In this 
period, judges and prosecutors utilized previous laws and regimes to solve these legal 
problems.2
The first judicial cases can be considered as “the Internet vs. the state.” In these 
cases, the Internet was the medium where alleged crimes against the existence and 
solidarity of the state were prosecuted.3 One o f the cases in this regard was the case o f 
Emre Ersoz in 1998. Because o f his posting to a forum o f an Internet Service Provider 
(ISP), he was sentenced ten months imprisonment for “publicly insulting state security 
forces” based on Turkish Penal Code 159/1. He defended himself by explaining that the 
forum is not open to the public but only open to its users. His sentence was postponed on 
the condition that he not be charged for similar charge in five years.4
In 1999, another similar case arose known as the case of Coskun Ak. As the 
administrator o f a forum in an Internet portal belonging to an ISP named Superonline, he
1 Robert J. Klotz, The Politics o f  Internet C om m unication , Lanham, MD: Rowman &  Littlefield Publishers, 
2004.
2 SansUre SansUr, "Tiirkiye'de Internet SansuriinUn Kisa T arihL .V e MiimkUn G elecegi!"  
http://sansuresansur.blogspot.com/2009/09/turkiyede-internet-sansurunun-ksa.html.
3 Yaman A kdenizand Kerem Altiparmak, in ternet: G irilm esi Tehlikeli Ve Yasaktir, (Ankara: insan Haklari 
Ortak Platformu’nun (iHOP), 2008).
4 Ibid.
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refused to remove an anonymous comment criticizing human rights in the country after a 
user complained and asked for its removal. Since Coskun Ak refused to take down the 
comment, the complaining user took the issue to the court. Considering a parallel to the 
regulations of previous media, the prosecutor claimed that as the administrator o f  the 
forum, Coskun Ak’s responsibility was similar to that o f an editor of a published 
newspaper. Ak defended himself on the principle o f “nullum crimen nulla poena sine 
lege -  no crime, no punishment without a previous penal law.” Although he was found 
guilty, the decision was overturned by the Supreme Court. The local court upheld its first 
decision, but once again it was overturned by the Supreme Court. At the end, Ak was not 
sentenced, but only because of an amendment in the Turkish Penal Code, Article 159 at 
that time.5
Akdeniz and Altinparmak notes that some twenty websites, among them 
yolsuzluklar.org, soygun.com, turkbet.com, pkk.org, cjb.net, cunta.org, superbahis.com, 
bahismerkezi.com, hizb-ut-tahrir.org, al-ummah.org, akademya.org, ucbucuk.com, 
akparti.gen.tr, altinrehber.com, otuken.org, soyguncular.com, dindusmanlari.com, 
aloihbar.org, were blocked between 2001 and 2004.6
With the legal mentality that considers the Internet analogous to previous media 
forms, new regulations were introduced to the public at the beginning of the 2000s. After 
long discussions during the law-making process, the first regulation was prepared as 
amendment number 4676,7 which was first overturned by the president. When it was for a 
second time admitted by the Turkish Parliament, the president was left one choice to
5 "Co$kun Ak Dosyasi: Online Yayincilikta Ilk Hukuki Olay," http://www.turk- 
intem et.com /dosya/0 1 1 2 /yazilar/.
6 Akdeniz et al., ibid.
7 Law on Amendment on the Establishment and Broadcasting o f  Radio and Television, the Press Law, 
Income Tax Law and the Law A m ending the Law on Corporate Income Tax.
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ratify and bring it to the Supreme Court. Finally, the Court changed some o f its articles 
and the law number 4656 came into force in 2002.8
In the year 2005, blocking was intensely seen as an effort to protect copyrights. 
Between 2005 and 2007, based on applications o f the Turkish Phonographic Industry 
Society (MUYAP), access to some 1,500 websites was blocked.9 Blocking for copyright 
violations even reached well known global websites like myspace.com and bloger.com. 
These two sites would not be in service in Turkiye for a while. In 2008 alone, 52 
websites, including muzikhaber.bIoggum.com and mp3evin.com were blocked by the 
Beyoglu Prosecutor’s Office for violation o f copyrights based on above MUYAP’s 
application.10
During this time, increasing crimes committed through the Internet, especially 
public sensitivity on child pornography and suicide, mobilized Parliament to make a 
specific law about the Internet.11 Although two drafts prepared by NGOs and the Ministry 
of Justice could not come to the Assembly’s agenda for voting, a draft prepared by 
Ministry o f Transportation came to the Assembly and was admitted after voting.12 Law 
number 5651 on Regulation of Publications on the Internet and Combating Crimes 
Committed by Means of Such Publications, approved by Parliament on 4 May 2007, was 
published in the Official Gazette number 26030 on 23 May 2007 and came into force on 
23 May 2007.13 On 30 November 2007, its ordinance was admitted and came into force. 
The law number 5651 provides definitions o f Internet actors, such as Internet
8 Turkish Journalists Association, "Yerel M edya Egitim Seminerleri Degerlendirme Toplantisi,” 
w w w.tgc.org.tr/ybs/28-05.htm .
9 Sansttre Sansiir, ibid.
10 "Savcilik Karari He Hangi Siteler Kapatildi?” Chip O nline , 17 September 2008.
11 Akdeniz et al., ibid.
12 Sansiire SansUr, ibid.
13 TelekomOnikasyon ileti§im Bajkanligi, "Ana Sayfa > T ib  Hakkinda > Genel B ilg iler,” 
www.tib.gov.tr/tr/tr-menu-2 -genel bilgiler.html.
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Service Provider (ISP), Internet Content Provider, Hosting Provider, and Commercial
Internet Public Use Providers in Article 2, as follows:
Access provider: Those operators and real or legal entities providing the 
Internet public use providers as well their subscribers with the possibility of 
accessing to the Internet, Content provider: Real or legal entities producing, 
modifying and providing all kinds o f  information or data provided to the users 
on the Internet, Hosting provider: Real or legal entities providing and 
operating the systems hosting the services and contents on the Internet, 
Commercial Internet public use providers: Real or legal entities who provide 
the service as an Internet public use in a certain place for a certain time.
Under the obligation of Information, Article 3, the commercial or economic
purpose content providers, hosting providers, and access providers are liable to maintain
and update their identity information accurately and make them completely accessible on
their own Internet services. Responsibilities and obligations of the content providers,
hosting providers, and access providers are further explained in the following articles (4,
5, and 6). Article 4 is called, “Obligations of the content provider.” Clause 1 states, “The
content provider shall be responsible for all and any content it provides for use on the
Internet.” Clause 2 states, “The content provider shall not be responsible for the contents
of another person for whom it provides a link. However, the content provider shall be
responsible as per the general provisions if it is explicitly understood from the way o f
presentation that it adopts the content for which it provides a link and aim that the users
access such content.”
Article 5 is called “Obligations o f the hosting provider. Clause 1 states, “The
hosting provider shall not be obliged to control the content for which it hosts or to
investigate whether an unlawful action is realized there or not.” Clause 2 states, “The
hosting provider shall be obliged to remove the unlawful content from publication when
it is notified based on Article 8 and 9 o f this law and to the extent it has the technical
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possibility o f blocking the access, without prejudice to the provisions related to penal 
liability for the content it is hosting.”
Article 6 is titled “Obligations o f the access provider.” Clause 1 states, “The 
access provider shall be obliged to a) block the access to the unlawful content published 
by any o f its users provided that it is notified based on provisions in this law and to the 
extent it has the technical possibility o f blocking the access, b) save the traffic 
information of the provided service described in the ordinance, maintain the accuracy, 
integrity and privacy o f these information for a period in the ordinance, not less than 6 
months, not more than two years, c) notify the case to the Authority, content providers 
and their customers at least three months before the date when it will stop its operation 
and submit to the Authority the records regarding the traffic information based on 
provisions and procedures described in the ordinance.” Clause 2 states, “The access 
provider shall not be obliged to control whether the content o f the information accessed 
through it is unlawful or requires responsibility or not.” Clause 3 states, “Any access 
provider which violates any obligations in (b) and (c) o f this paragraph shall be fined 
between ten thousand Turkish Liras up to five thousand Turkish Liras.”
Law number 5651, article 8 specifies that “There shall be a decision on blocking 
the access regarding the publication on the Internet the content of which poses substantial 
cause for suspicion that they constitute the following crimes:” 1) inducement to suicide,
2) sexual abuse o f children, 3) access to narcotics and stimulants, 4) supplying substances 
dangerous to health, 5) obscenity, 6) prostitution, 7) supplying place and opportunity for 
gambling, and 8) crimes against Ataturk, the founder o f the Republic o f Turkiye. The 
crimes specified in this law are called as catalog crimes by the Turkish administrative 
organization, the TIB, and blocking measures can be taken against any website content
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that is criminal according to the law.14
According to the law number 5651, blocking decisions during the investigation 
stage, can be handed down by judges. During the inquiry stage they can be handed down 
by the court. In immediate cases with potential undesired results, public prosecutor can 
also adjudicate a blocking decision. In this situation, the prosecutor should present the 
decision for the judge’s approval within twenty-four hours. The judges must reach a 
verdict twenty-four hours after submission. If it is not approved by the judge, blocking 
removal needs to be requested immediately by the prosecutor. Being a measure, the 
appeal procedure against the blocking decision is open based on Turkish Penal Code 
number 5271 dated 4 December 2004.15
According to a lawyer, Atamer, access blocking is a measure against a site, not a 
penalty.16 Access blocking decisions taken based on this law can be taken by judicial 
institutions like the Prosecutor’s Office or Criminal Courts but at the same time by an 
administrative institution, the TIB. However, the TIB can directly decide blocking 
measures only when the alleged crime on the website is one of the crimes specified in the 
law, and when the website’s hosting servers or content provider are outside the country. 
When they are inside the country, the TIB can directly decide blocking only for crimes of 
sexual abuse of children and obscenity. The TIB later asks a judge for approval o f the 
decision. Blocking decisions given based on this law by courts are implemented by the 
TIB. 17
The blocking procedure is also open to public denunciation. People can report
14 Ibid.
15 Serhat K0 9  and Selva Kaynak, "Bili§im Sin^lari Baglaminda Yeni M edya Olarak internet V e Kijise! 
Glivenlik," In Akadem ik Bili^im Konferansi 2010. (M ugla, 2010).
16 Ilker Atamer, "5651 Sayili Yasa Ve Eri§im Engellem e Kararlari," In 2 0 0 8  Bilifim  Konferansi. (Ankara, 
2008).
17 Telekomiinikasyon ileti§im Ba§kanligi, ibid.
I l l
suspicious websites or contents to the TIB. These reports are evaluated based on criteria 
specified in law number 5651 and other legal frameworks, technical dimensions, the
152degree of traffic to the website from the country, and ease o f access by children. After 
evaluation, the TIB decide to block the content directly or refer it to the judicial 
authorities.
The appeal procedure is open against the blocking measure. Completing the
judicial and/or administrative procedure, the blocked websites can be reopened for
access. Article 8, paragraph 9, of law number 5652 explains the appeal procedure against
blocking decisions. Once an appeal is admitted by judicial authorities, the decision for
removal of blocking measures is sent to the TIB. Accordingly the TIB conveys the appeal
decision to all Internet Service Providers in the country. The appeal application against
blocking decisions directly handed down by the TIB can be made to the TIB or to the
judicial authorities.19
According to Akdeniz and Altinparmak, the essential problem with Internet
blockings is not those blocked based on law number 5651 but rather other blocking
examples carried out based on other laws.20 They note that especially these kinds of
blocking occur based on Civic Law (individuals’ rights, insulting etc.) and based on laws
regarding copyrights. The TIB also provides statistics for blocked websites as seven
catalog crimes specified in law number 5651 but not for those blocked based on other
laws, which are more controversial.
The number o f blocked websites in the country has reached about 31,000,
according to independent website engelliweb.com, which monitors blocking measures in
18 Ibid.
J9 Ibid.
20 Akdeniz et al., ibid.
21 Telekomilnikasyon ileti§im Ba§kanligi, ibid.
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TQrkiye.22 Among them, 26,877 websites are blocked by the TIB, 1,730 websites are 
blocked by the courts and the Prosecutor’s Offices, and 1,274 websites display no 
information.23 Further, 158 IP addresses, 69 Wordpress Blogs and 165 Blogger and 
Blogspot pages are reported as blocked. For 115 websites, blockings are known that were 
later cancelled. The same source, engelliweb.com was reporting 9,115 blocked websites 
on 15 March 2011, 39 o f which were Blogger or BlogSpot pages, 20 o f which were 
Wordpress pages, and 47 of which were IP addresses.24 In almost two years, between 
March 2011 and June 2013, the numbers o f blocked websites increased more than three 
times to some 31,000.
Internet access blocking in the country is generally performed through Turk 
Telecom which is the biggest ISP in Turkiye, with the method of IP address blocking.25 
Included among these blocked websites, there are globally well known websites like 
youtube.com, dailymotion.com, ustream.com, blogger.com, blogspot.com, myspace.com, 
tagged.com, google.groups.com, myspace.com, wordpress.com, blogger.com that host 
thousands o f separate pages, and millions of images, data, and records.26
The symbolic figure o f the blocking policies in the country is the case against 
YouTube. The YouTube case contains many empirical parameters to explain the question 
of the state vs. the Internet. Because o f a few specific video records uploaded to the 
website, YouTube was blocked different times based on different court decisions. 
Blockings were seen between March 2007 and October 2010, and the longest blocking
22 "Engelli Web," Engelliweb.com.
23 W ebsites that display no information can be considered blocked by courts. Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 5651 Yasasi, "Eri$im Engellemenin Adi: intem ete Sanstlr," http://5651-yasasi.gyazilim .com /htm ldocs  
/icerik_goster/240/Intem ete_sansur/251 .html.
26 These websites have been reported in different resources as being subjects o f  blocking on different dates 
for different periods.
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was between May 2008 and October 2010. The last YouTube blocking was because of 
hate speech and insults against Ataturk, the founder o f the Turkish Republic.
The two parties, representatives from YouTube and from the Ministry tried to 
resolve the issue. It is against YouTube policy to remove undesired video records. The 
Turkish side claimed that the issue is a judicial matter, and YouTube itself should appeal 
the blocking decisions of independent local courts. For some time, both sides maintained
77 »their positions, and YouTube was kept blocked during this period. If there is any winner 
in the YouTube case is further explained in the coming section as a case study.
In fact, the law no 5651 also confesses this situation in its texture by excluding the 
situation of incapability. While specifying one o f the three responsibilities of Internet 
Service Providers in Article 6, the law stipulates: “Shall block access to the contents that 
is published in any unlawful way by its users, when it is notified in accordance with the 
provisions of this Act and to the extent that is technically able to block." The Article 5 of 
the same law indicates that Hosting Providers are responsible to remove unlawful 
contents as technically as possible when it is notified.
Likewise the Article 10/4.g. regulate the duties o f the administrative body, the 
TIB, and says:
“The Presidency shall provide all kinds o f assistance and coordination required 
within the framework o f  its technical possibilities to the competent and assigned 
law enforcement officers and investigation authorities in order to prevent the 
promotion, entering into the country, maintaining, letting for rent or sale o f all and 
any representative images, texts or sounds with the subject o f the crimes provided 
for in the first paragraph of article 8 o f the Law.”
These articles are the essential parts o f the Law no. 5651 which regulates access 
blocking and investigation aspects which are also the subjects of this study. What is
27 |_jy ,<ye Youtube Sorunu ifin  Harekete Ge?ildi," A k lif  H aber , 13 August 2010.
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technically possible and what is not is a constantly changing matter. Depending on 
human resources, devices, software or hardware, technical capacity o f an access provider 
or a hosting provider may be different from the others. This exclusion included in the law 
better makes it change its name as: “Law on the Internet to the extent o f technically 
possible.”
Increasing numbers o f blockings on the Internet receive many criticisms both at 
home and abroad. Analyzing implementation of blocking policies, Akdeniz and 
Altinparmak believe that because the unique nature o f the Internet could not be well 
perceived by authorities, a number o f legal anomalies and dilemmas are being 
experienced because of blockings.28 Labeling the situation censorship, Tevetoglu 
emphasizes that blocking does not remove undesired content from the Internet, and thus 
“it looks like an ostrich hiding its head in sand.”29 The following chapter discusses this 
essential question in detail.
EFFECTIVENESS AND BLOCKING ON THE INTERNET IN TURKIYE
Analysis o f over-blocking and under-blocking
The Internet is a global borderless network, and it is unrealistic to consider that all 
the Internet content is equally acceptable in different parts o f the world. That is why 
Internet access or its content can be subject to restrictions for legal, ethical, cultural, 
religious, and ideological reasons. These restrictions on the Internet are widely 
implemented with filtering technology in the world. However, the size, scope, and nature
28 Akdeniz et al., ibid.
29 Kog et al., ibid.
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of the Internet create significant challenges for these kinds o f preventive restrictions.
These challenges are especially problematic for countries where liberal and 
democratic values are widely accepted and institutionalized. It is almost inevitable to 
experience mistakes when this technology is an option for restriction and prevention on 
the Internet. As Callanan et al. explain, all blocking systems may be either “negative 
errors” (not all undesired Internet content can be blocked, some undesired Internet 
content may be outside blocking capabilities), or “positive errors” (some innocuous 
Internet content may be unintentionally blocked).30
Callanan et al. tested different blocking techniques for a number o f Internet 
applications including websites, email, search engines, UseNet, and p2p.31 They found 
that the degree may vary, but these techniques are not free from errors.
Among the seven web blocking techniques, DNS, Domain, URL, IP, Dynamic, 
Signature, and Hybrid (IP, Signatures/URL), they found four very likely blocking 
complications for DNS, Domain, IP, and Dynamic blocking techniques. It is less likely 
that the remaining three blocking techniques overreach.32
There are no results considered “less likely” that cause under-blocking for any 
website blocking techniques that Callanan et al. evaluated.33 Thus, the under-blocking 
complication is almost inevitable (very likely and likely) when the web blocking 
techniques here are implemented. Over-blocking complications, on the other hand, can be 
minimized to the degree of less likely only when URL, Signature, and Hybrid (IP, 
Signatures/URL) Web blocking techniques are implemented. As for circumvention, all 
Web blocking techniques present medium-level difficulties except one. DNS blocking is
j 0  Callanan et al., ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid, 20.
33 Ib id .
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considered as easy to circumvent.
Akdeniz, a professor at the University o f Leeds, Faculty of Law, stated in a TV 
program that Internet blocking implementation methods cause disproportional results, as 
seen in the case of YouTube and Geocities. These disproportional results are 
unacceptable in a democratic country.34 He stresses that blocking in the country is 
implemented either at the level o f ISPs or at the Internet gateway o f the country. The TIB 
reports that access blocking is implemented on domain name servers (DNS) through 
domain names or IP addresses (based on submitted “access list’' to the routers). Stressing 
the implementation of IP blocking can be problematic since this blocks all other, possibly 
innocent domain names using the same IP address. The Director of the TIB stated that the 
department pays attention to these kinds o f risks in their direct blocking decisions, 
especially when some other domain names are known using the same IP, or when the 
situation is unknown.35
It is very unfortunate that a measure that can cause such serious complications is 
used at the discretion o f an administrative agency, even though conditions are limited.36 
According to Atamer, in their blocking decisions courts should also need to specify how 
blocking is implemented.37 Akdeniz and Altiparmak believe that “technical infrastructure 
for Internet access in the country is not appropriate for blocking or censorship.”38 They 
further stress that no other system is perfect. Even expensive methods currently in use for 
blocking are not free from risks and complications.
Over-blocking has side effects beyond making innocent websites are inaccessible.
34 "Herkes Kendi Giivenligini Kendi Saglamah!" NTVMSNBC, 24 June 2008.
35 Telekomunikasyon iletijim  Ba§kanligi, ibid.
’6 The TIB can directly block w ebsites when w ebsites’ servers are outside o f  the country and when their 
content is pornographic.
37 Atamer, ibid.
38 Akdeniz et al., ibid, 62.
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It also blocks innocent web content and pages hosted within the undesired and blocked 
website. Many critics in the country emphasize this situation in blocking cases on the 
Internet. Akdeniz and Altiparmak note that, among the many cases checked, they found 
blockings are enforced based on only a single file, a single website, a single blog posting, 
or a 30-second video record, like in the cases o f YouTube, Geocities, WordPress,
Blogger, and Blogspot.39 The YouTube case is a wonderful example to explain these 
kinds o f anomalies in practice. Because of a few undesired and/or illegal video records, 
the entire website hosting millions of records is vulnerable to blocking.
An over-blocking issue: case study of YouTube blocking
YouTube is one of the most popular video sharing websites on the Internet. It 
hosts millions of videos recorded and uploaded by millions o f Internet users. Although 
the website and video records were initially used for entertainment purposes, today it can 
be utilized for a variety o f reasons ranging from education to health and business to 
advertisement.
YouTube is also very popular in Tiirkiye. As o f March 2012, it was the third most 
popular website in the country according to Alexa.com.40 According to a statistical 
analysis on 12 March 2007, Tiirkiye ranks fourth for video uploading at 3.4 %, after the 
United States at 34.5%, the UK at 6.9%, and the Philippines at 3.9%.41 Looking at the 
size, capacity, and spread of use, blocking the entire website for one or a few video 
records was very controversial in the country in that it contradicts the basic principles of 
universal law and the subjectivity o f crime.
39 Akdeniz et at., ibid, 62.
40 "Alexa Actionable Analytics for the Web," A lexa Internet, Inc., A lexa.com .
41 "YouTube Statistics," Digital Ethnography @  KSU, http://ksudigg.wetpaint.com/page/YouTube 
+Statistics.
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The YouTube ban became the symbol o f blocking policies. Many public 
arguments centered on this subject. It also has symbolic importance for foreign media and 
NGOs. For instance, although the Annual Report o f RSF for 200742 does not mention any 
Internet issues for Tiirkiye, the 2009 Report mentions the YouTube blocking issue.43 This 
is evidence that the YouTube case attracts foreign attention to the country, and blocking 
practices in the country has become more internationalized with this policy.
Turan Mentes, chair o f the NGO Informatics Association of Tiirkiye, thinks that 
blocking YouTube is like banning the entire library because of a few books 44 This 
anomaly also shows how a state is incapable of implementing a law precisely when 
authorities find a specific crime agent on the Internet. Such is a video record among the 
many in YouTube case.
Since state authorities cannot punish the person(s) who uploaded such criminal 
record(s), or take the criminal record(s) out of the website’s servers, authorities prefer to 
block access to the entire website within the borders of the country, for Turkish Internet 
users, even though it is globally accessible beyond Turkish borders.
These kinds o f challenges and anomalies remind us o f the famous comments o f 
Nicholas Negroponte in his discussion about the law and the Internet: “the Internet 
cannot be regulated. It’s not that laws aren’t relevant, it’s that the nation-state is not 
relevant.”45 The YouTube case in the country shows this dilemma in an apparent way. 
Tevetoglu states that “it is not the perpetrators, who uploaded the criminal video records 
to the website, [who] are punished; the Turkish Internet users are punished in this case
42 Reporters Without Borders, "2007 Annual Report," 2008 .
43 Reporters Without Borders, "Wars and Disputed Elections: The M ost Dangerous Stories for Journalists," 
2009.
44 K. 0 9  et al., ibid.
45 D. W. Drezner, "The Global Governance o f  the Internet: Bringing the State Back In," P olitica l Science  
Q uarterly  1 19, no. 3 (2004): 477-98.
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through blocking access to the website.”46
The first blocking decision against YouTube was because o f a video consisting of 
hate speech against the founder of the Turkish Republic, Ataturk, in March 2007. When 
the video was reported in Turkish media and newspapers, the public prosecutor’s office 
in Istanbul requested legal action from the court to prevent access to this particular video, 
which is claimed to violate law number 5816 (Law on Crimes Against Ataturk, the 
founder o f Turkish Republic), and law number 5237, article 300 (Turkish Penal Code/ 
Crimes against Turkish Flag).47 Based on this application, the First Peace Criminal Court 
in Istanbul decided to block access to this video record and sent the decision to the TIB. 
Since the TIB could not remove the video record or block access to this particular record, 
it had to block the entire website by blocking domain address of the website.49 YouTube 
made a press release that such videos are also a violation of their policy, and they 
removed the video. YouTube expected that Turkish authorities would lift their decision to 
block all o f YouTube.^0 In March 2007 access to YouTube was restored by the TIB after 
they received a new judicial decision.
This first YouTube blocking was not conducted based on law number 5651 
“Regulation of Publications on the Internet and Combating Crimes Committed by Means 
of Such Publications” since this law did not exist at the time. In the second instance, 
YouTube was blocked based on law number 5651 by the Twelfth Peace Criminal Court 
in Ankara, decision number 2008/55 dated 17 January 2008, again for hate speech against
46 Ko? et al., ibid.
47 Akdeniz, ibid.
48 "Hakaret Videosu Kalkarsa, Yasak Biter," CAW, 7 March 2007.
49 Akdeniz, ibid.
50 "Youtube'a Eri$im Yasagi Getirildi," CAW, 7 March 2007.
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Ataturk and the Turkish Flag.51 Just after this blocking decision was revoked, another 
blocking decision was enforced against YouTube by the Second Peace Criminal Court in 
Sivas, decision number 2008/11 dated 16 January 2008.52
In January 2008, the Second Criminal Court in Erzurum decided to block the 
website forever for propagandizing terrorist organization PKK based on decision number 
2008/192.:’3 In March 2008, it was reported to be blocked by the First Peace Criminal 
Court in Ankara. Both IP and DNS blocking methods are implemented to prevent access 
to the website by the TIB.54 Between March 2007 to June 2008, Akdeniz and 
Altinparmak note 17 different blocking decisions against YouTube by different courts in 
Tiirkiye.55 The longest period in which the website was inaccessible started 5 May 2008 
based on a decision by the First Peace Court in Ankara for about two and a half years.
In June 2010, the YouTube blocking case had gained a new alarming dimension. 
Critics about the effectiveness o f blocking o f YouTube, as presented in this study, urged 
authorities to revise blocking measures against YouTube and realized that the website 
uses other IP numbers. They decided to block 44 new IP addresses to cover up critics o f 
the media about the effectiveness of YouTube blocking. However, the result reached to a 
point of blocking the world's most popular search engine Google. Because some of 
Google services were using the same IP addresses as YouTube, Internet users in Tiirkiye 
started having problems accessing Google websites, including Google Analytics, Google 
Maps, Google Docs, Google Translate, and Google Earth. Users also had problems with 
speed of access to Google services such as using Google tool bar and the Google search
51 "Youtube'a Eri$im Engellendi," Hurriyet, 19 January 2008.
52 G6 k?er Tahincioglu, "Ankara Kaldirdi, Sivas Yasakladi!" M illiyet, 22 January 2008 .
53 "Erzurum Da Youtube'yi Kapatti," H aber 61, 25  January 2008.
54 "‘Youtube’a Erijim Engellendi," Sabah, 13 March 2008.
55 Akdeniz et al„ ibid.
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engine.56
These over-blocking problems further disturbed Internet users and online activists 
in the country. Both Akdeniz and Altinparmak applied to the BTK with a petition that the 
process of the TIB, which negatively affected some of Google websites and services, was 
unlawful and violated freedom of speech, freedom of access to knowledge, and freedom 
o f communication protected by the constitution and international law.57 Gulin 
Yildmmkaya, editor of Internet news website haberturk.com, believes that it is shame 
that while initially the issue was limited to the problem o f YouTube blocking, is created 
another problem of Google.58 Aylin Duruoglu, director o f Vatan Internet News Website, 
stated that the TIB act as if  it is an institution which is in an open a war against the 
Internet.59
The Institution of Information and Communication Technology (Bilgi 
Teknolojileri ve ileti§im Kurumu, BTK), which is the governing institution o f the TIB, 
defended itself by claiming that the process was just updating IP addresses o f the blocked 
website, YouTube, and that the situation was not their fault but rather the preference and 
responsibility o f the company (YouTube and Google) for sharing the same IP with a 
website subject to blocking measures by the judicial authorities.60
An NGO, the Association of Internet Technology (internet Teknolojileri Demegi, 
INETD) claimed that the over-blocking problem stemmed from the decision o f the TIB to 
update IP numbers for YouTube without asking judicial authorities. According to the
56 "Bu Gidi$le Youtube Bize Haram!" Bianet B agim siz Ileti^im Agi, 5 June 2008. and "M ahkeme Youtube'u 
SansQrlemekte Israrli," Bianet Bagim siz l/eti$im A gi, 4 July 2010. and "Youtube Yasagm in Ucu G oogle'a  
Dokundu," Ak$am, 5 June 2010.
57 "Google SansflrUne Itiraz," Kanal D  H aber , 8  June 2010.
58 "Youtube Yasaginm Ucu Google'a Dokundu.", ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
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INETD. the TIB did not have authority to interpret the two-year-old court decision. The 
TIB had to get a new decision from the court if a new implementation or change on the 
previous blocking decision was necessary. The TIB later said it applied for a court 
decision for the additional 44 blocked IP address seems after they faced the over­
blocking problem. Akdeniz believes that this situation is best be explained by a Turkish 
saying: “He who steals a minaret (tower) from a mosque before knowing how to conceal 
the stolen object.”61
For a long time, there were no representatives in the country to defend YouTube 
in Turkish courts. During this time, authorities called on YouTube, and later its owner 
Google, to open a representative office in the country. The international company was not 
able to respond for a long time.62
In the end of October 2010, the Germany-based International Licensing Service 
announced that it revoked the disputed videos against Ataturk on YouTube, by 
purchasing the copyrights. Following this news on Turkish media, the prosecutor’ office 
asked the police to confirm if these illegal records were removed. Later, the office asked 
the TIB to revoke all blocking measures against YouTube since 5 May 2008. Binali 
Yildirim, Minister of Transportation, stated that this case showed how authorities were 
right to call for obedience of the law and how Tiirkiye is a country with rule o f law. 
Yildirim also added that the administrators of the company finally decided to act, and 
once everyone obeys the rules there is no problem at all.
However, a press release by Google stated that the last YouTube situation in 
Tiirkiye was not related to them but a third company, which removed the disputed video
61 Noyan Ayan, "Youtube'a Ge?it Yok!" NTVM SNBC, 17 June 2010.
62 "Ula§tirma Bakam'ndan Sert G oogle A?iklam asi,” Chip Online, 8  June 2010.
63 "Darisi Digerlerinin Ba§ina!" NTVMSNBC, 30  October 2010.
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records based on automatic copyrights complaints, and they were examining how this 
was appropriate to their policy.64
It is not clear who was the winner in this case. As cited in Akdeniz and 
Altiparmak, the TIB statistics dated 26 May 2008 show that YouTube revoked 67 video 
records among the disputed 111 records. This shows that to some degree, Internet 
companies can cooperate with states, but under what conditions is a subject for another 
study. In a workshop in Abant, Tiirkiye, Nadi Turkaslan, a press prosecutor from the 
Prosecutor’s Office in Ankara, stated that in some disputed cases, YouTube may only 
prevent accesses to a disputed video from the country, i.e. Tiirkiye, but it does not 
completely remove it from its global servers.65
Despite blocking measures, it is difficult to claim that the popularity o f YouTube 
in the country declined during the term in which access was blocked. The longest 
YouTube was closed to access within the country was between May 2008 to October 
2010. Interestingly, alexa.com, which ranks websites' popularity, reported YouTube as 
the sixth most popular website within Tiirkiye on 21 March 2010 and as third most 
popular on 22 September 2010.66
Ease of circumvention and the availability o f alternative methods
As explained in Chapter III, three circumvention tools are included in the 2009 
study by the Berkman Center: 1) Ultrareach (ultrasurf.us); 2) Ktunnel (ktunnel.com); and
3) Tor (torproject.org).671 have chosen them for this study to test whether circumvention 
is possible to access blocked websites in Tiirkiye.
64 "Youtube’dan §a?irtan AQiklama," Bilisim Live, 31 October 2010.
65 "Youtube’u Kapattiran Savci Konu§tu," H iirriyet, 18 June 2008.
66 "Alexa Actionable Analytics for the Web.", ibid.
67 Roberts et al., ibid.
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In order to see how web content matters in this test, the selection is made based 
on web contents including political and hate speech, terror, sex and pornographic, game
zo
and gambling, and other (health, copyrights, hackers).
Checks were conducted in Sanhurfa, Tiirkiye in April and May 2013. The test 
was conducted with a personal laptop running Intel Pentium CPU, 2.13GHz, 2GB RAM, 
and Windows 7 (32-bit) Ultimate operating system. The web browser was Internet 
Explorer 8 (Version 8.0.7600.16385) with 256-bit encryption. The security level o f 
Internet options was set for medium-high, and the privacy settings were also set as 
medium. Flash player is version 11.4.402.265. Java version is 6 Update 30, and Scripting 
o f java applets is enabled, as is the default for medium-high security level.
Initially, I tried to access each blocked website without using circumvention tools. 
I checked all websites and confirmed that they are blocked on the date o f testing. Each 
blocked website and its contents are different, so I checked the following criteria during 
the circumvention tool test to access the blocked website. Is the first page accessible 
(links, images, or texts are broken or clear)? Are links on the first page are working (i.e. 
opens the linked page)? Is video available and accessible? Are images on the first page 
available and visible? Is audio available and accessible (voice records, radio, songs)? Is 
downloading available and possible (PDF, video, zip)? Is membership required for any of 
above requested access?
Possible outcomes are: the answer is positive (access is possible, links are 
working, etc.); the answer is sometimes positive, sometimes negative, which means the 
tool is partly working for the criteria in question; the answer is negative; encountered 
some errors (including servers, computer or network connection), including the tool itself
68"Engelli Web.", ibid.
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gives error; and the criteria in question are not available or are irrelevant for accessing the 
blocked website.
Overall, if most criteria during the test are positive, the outcome is considered 
positive, which means access to the blocked website is possible. If some criteria are 
positive but not others, access to the blocked website is partly possible. When most 
criteria are negative during the test, access to the blocked website is not possible through 
the used circumvention tool.
However, there needs to be exception in this measurement since being able to 
playing a game in a gaming website is more important than some broken pictures or 
audio file errors. Likewise, being able to shopping is important than audio or video 
playing on the same website. In this situation, the measurement is made based on the 
importance o f the criteria for the website itself.
It is important to note that no game is tried for testing in gambling websites. Nor, 
an actual order is performed for shopping in any websites. For gambling websites, the test 
is conducted up until trying to download software but noting further. For shopping 
websites (tobacco, cigarettes marketing), the test is performed up until checking out, but 
not confirming payment.
During testing, it has seen that some websites are just for directing visitors to 
other classified websites and/or domains. Directed website can be an alternative domain 
of the same website or a totally different website. In this situation, testing criteria 
becomes misleading since the domain address is changed. Furthermore, the directed 
website can be found not blocked within the country when checked. Thus, these websites 
are excluded from the evaluation and marked as “Excluded”.
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Testing circumvention of block with Ultrasurf
Ultrasurf is a product of Ultrareach Internet Corporation. It claims to be one o f the 
world’s most popular anti-censorship, pro-privacy software, with millions o f people using 
it to bypass Internet censorship and protect their online privacy. It is for anonymous 
surfing and browsing. Ultrasurf hides IP address, clears browser history, cookies, and 
more. It uses industry standard, strong end-to-end encryption to protect data transfer from 
being seen by third parties. It allows users to Bypass Internet censorship to browse the 
Internet freely. It is portable and does not require installation. It can be run over a USB 
drive or SD card for cameras in an Internet cafe, for instance.69
Ultrasurf is selected as an example o f an HTTP proxy circumvention tool. It 
requires software download and install. It is compatible with Internet Explorer, and while 
Internet surfing, a yellow image o f a lock is visible on the bottom right o f the page. The 
version o f the software tested in this study is U13.01.
By clicking the Ultrasurf Icon on the desktop, which I created during software 
installation, an Ultrasurf Key and the Ultrasurf homepage open with Internet Explorer. 
For each access— or lack o f access— to the blocked websites using the circumvention 
tool, the study uses screen captures taken during the test. Screen captures sometimes are 
also taken for illustrating that downloading is possible, videos are playing, or pdf files are 
accessible. The evaluation o f Ultrasurf during the test to access blocked websites reveals 
the following results.
Among the 23 blocked websites, the two of which are excluded here, the test with 
Ultrasurf reveals that sixteen websites and their contents are almost entirely accessible. 
These accesses are satisfactory to an extent that almost the entire content o f  the website
69 "Ultrasurf," http://ultrasurf.us/.
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can be accessible with some missing content or services. Two of them, hizb-ut-tahrir.org 
and hpg.kk5.org give audio and video errors, i.e. audio and video on these websites could 
not be played during the test. However, the test results for these two sites are considered 
positive, since there is not much video or audio content on the websites.
Although access and checking content from the two websites ioyun.com and 
cigarexport.com are possible, playing games at ioyun.com and pre-ordering steps for 
online purchasing tobacco at cigarexport.com are not possible through the use of 
Ultrasurf. Since these are the essential services o f the websites, circumvention is 
evaluated as negative for these two websites. Ultrasurf is seen as not supporting 
pornographic websites, as seen for five websites.
The two websites, 777-online-gambling.net and cyberturk.net are excluded from the 
evaluation of this method since these domains directs to other websites which are 
different from the tested one.
Categorically, more than at least one website from all four categories, including 
hate speech and politics, terror, games and gambling, and the others like hacking, 
copyrights, etc. are accessible. No site from the category o f sexual and pornographic is 
accessible through Ultrasurf since it does not support such websites.
Testing circumvention of block with Ktunnel
The second tool Ktunnel is selected as an example o f a CGI Proxy. The website 
explains itself thus: “I run a website-based proxy on my server, and you connect to it to 
retrieve websites, generally blocked by schools, corporations, or governments.” This 
website, ktunnel.com, is a mediator between the visitor’s computer and the target web 
server. The website also claims to protect anonymity and privacy o f users. Downloads are
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possible, the site claims, unless abuse is a problem. Its owner is reported to be running a 
computer repair shop in Fairbanks, Alaska in the United States.70
Ktunnel requires no software, installation or special browser configurations. It 
runs on Internet Explorer. The website provides an address bar embedded on its home 
page. The target website, which may be blocked, is accessed by typing the website’s 
domain name on this embedded address bar within ktunnel.com. For each access to the 
blocked websites through ktunnel.com, this study produces screen captures. The 
evaluation ofktunnel.com during the test to access blocked websites reveals the 
following results.
Among the 22 blocked websites, the three o f which are excluded here, the test with 
ktunnel.com reveals that nine websites and their contents can be accessed almost entirely. 
While seven of them can partly be accessed, six websites and their contents cannot 
properly be accessed. Three websites are excluded from evaluation.
Among the ones for which circumvention is possible, sosyalistforum.org displays a 
video error and pkkonline.com displays an audio error. In other words, on these sites 
video and audio records on these websites could not be played during the test. The study 
ignores these, since video or audio content for these websites is not very significant 
within the entire message of the websites.
As for the seven websites evaluated as partly working, they sometimes give video 
and audio errors, some hyperlinks may not work, or some images are missing. The 
remaining six of the websites and their contents could not properly be accessed and 
evaluated as negative for circumvention through ktunnel.
Categorically, at least one website from all five categories including hate and
70 "About Ktunnel.Com," www.ktunnel.com /about.htm l.
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political, terror, game and gambling, sexual and pornographic, and the others like hacking 
and copyrights can be accessed through ktunnel.com.
Testing circumvention of block with Tor
The third tool Tor is selected as a re-routing proxy. It is a network o f virtual 
tunnels that allows people and groups to improve their privacy and security on the 
Internet. It hides browsing habits as well as the location o f the clients through random 
communication paths in its anonymous network. In order to use Tor, it is necessary for 
clients to download Tor software and install it on their computers. Tor has its own 
browser, which comes with software installation. This study worked with Tor browser 
2.3.25-5_en-US_2.71
The evaluation of Tor during the test to access blocked websites reveals the 
following results. Among the 22 blocked websites, the three o f which are excluded here, 
the test with the Tor test reveals that fifteen websites and their contents can be accessed 
almost entirely through the use o f Tor. Three websites and their contents cannot properly 
be accessed and they are evaluated as being partly accessible. Access test for one website 
gives the error message: “unable to connect.” Three websites are excluded from the 
evaluation here: www.red-movies.com (redirects to other websites); www.777-online- 
gambling.net (redirects to other gambling website); and http://cyberturk.net (redirects to 
another domain: www.masterhack.org which is not blocked yet in the country on testing 
date).
Among the ones for which circumvention is evaluated as possible through the use
71 For a detailed description o f  how Tor works, see "Tor: Overview," https://www.torproject.org 
/about/overview.htm l.en.
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of Tor, hizb-ut-tahrir.org displays an audio error and hpg.kk5.org displays a video error. 
The study ignores these errors because o f the insignificance o f  audio and video for the 
website itself.
The same video error is considered as significant for three pornographic websites, 
and the three websites in which videos are not working are evaluated as partly working 
through the use of Tor.
Since audio is important for music website stereomood.com, audio error is 
evaluated as circumvention not being possible, although the first page is accessible, 
photographs are visible, and links function. The other two websites which are evaluated 
as “access not possible” are the two game websites ioyun.com and cigarexport.com.
At least one website from all five categories, including hate and political, terror, 
game and gambling, sexual and pornographic, and the others like hacking and copyrights 
can be accessed through Tor. Although one shopping website cigarexport.com does not 
work through the use o f Tor, gerard-pere-et-fils.com works for ordering tobacco.
Overall analysis of three circumvention tools
As indicated in the above evaluations, blocking measures against undesired 
websites are not effective to an extent that most o f  the blocked websites can be accessed 
through circumvention methods. Access tests to the undesired blocked websites can reach 
up to 71 % through the circumvention tool Tor (15 websites could be accessed among the 
21 blocked websites excluding the one with technical error and the three specified as 
“Excluded”). If the ones which are evaluated as “partly possible” are also considered 
satisfactory, this percentage reaches 85%. In other words, among the 21 blocked 
websites, 18 of them can be accessed by Internet users with the use o f Tor.
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Access tests through the circumvention tool Ultrasurf gives similar performance. 
The percentage of access through the use o f this tool is about 69%. (16 websites could be 
accessed among the 23 blocked websites, excluding the two ones). In fact, if  the five 
websites for which the tool does not support are also excluded from the sample size, the 
percentage of access for this tool reaches 88%. In other words, among the 18 blocked 
websites, 16 of them can be accessed with the use of Ultrasurf.
Access tests with the use of Ktunnel reveals the lowest possible access to 9 
blocked websites which constitute about 40% of all the tested sites excluding the three 
excluded. The test with Ktunnel also reveals the highest score of partly accessed websites 
which is seven. If the ones which are evaluated as “access partly possible” are also 
considered satisfactory, this percentage reaches 72%.
While there is no website which is evaluated as partly accessible with the use o f 
Ultrasurf, the result with the use of Tor is seven. As for the results for inaccessibility with 
the tested tools, Ktunnel has the highest 6 websites which cannot be accessible, it is three 
for Tor and two for Ultrasurf.
This test also showed that circumvention tools are especially unsuccessful in 
playing multimedia content. Although circumvention tools can make it possible to access 
a website, to surf with hyperlinks, and to download, they can very often give multimedia 
failures and/or errors. Blocking is especially ineffective in terms of circumvention for 
text and document-intense websites, such as ideological, hate speech, pro-terrorism, and 
pro-racist websites.
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FURTHER ISSUES REGARDING THE SIDE EFFECTS OF INTERNET BLOCKING
A specific issue area: terror websites and wide-effects o f Internet blocking
This section explores how blocking policies in Tiirkiye affect the websites o f the
77pro-terrorist organization PKK and/or its sympathizers. How effective are blocking 
policies in preventing access to these websites from the country? How have these 
websites, their popularity, and audience have been affected after blocking measures? 
What does the current picture o f the interaction between a state and the Internet look like 
in terms of blocking terrorist websites?
This section utilizes data and information from open sources, well known global 
websites like alexa.com, websitetrafficspy.com (which provides traffic rates o f websites 
from different sources like alexa.com, compete.com, and Google Trends,), and 
ipaddress.com (which gives available information about hosting, ownership, and 
addresses as well as other hostnames for the same IP number that a website is using).
For blocked pages in Tiirkiye, the study uses a Turkish website, engelliweb.com, 
which monitors blocked websites in the country. This analysis was conducted both in 
Tiirkiye and in the United States. The blocked websites, their blocking details as well as 
some methods to circumvent blocking, were checked and tested in Ankara, Tiirkiye. 
Other analysis about these websites was checked and concluded in the United States. 
Testing dates for each check are mentioned in the foot notes.
Sample size and selecting a representative sample are vitally important for any 
academic study, which is also the case for this section. In order to establish which
72 Not all the websites here have direct and organic links with the organization. Som e w ebsites here are 
even registered and giving service within TUrkiye and may be blocked because o f  a few  specific illegal 
contents.
133
websites support, encourage, or sympathize with the Marxist-Leninist separatist terrorist 
organization PKK, this part o f the study utilizes Alexa records. A search for the name of 
terrorist organizations within Alexa found the website pkk-online.net, which was ranked 
by Alexa. Using the features of alexa.com (related links, click stream, and sites link in) 
reveals a network of websites, shown below. Since Alexa ranks websites from most 
popular (a combination of average daily visitors and page views on a particular website) 
to least popular, this network o f websites does/should significantly represent all active 
and popular websites within the context explored here.
Later, the study checked if access to each of these websites was being blocked in 
Tiirkiye, and if so, when and by whom they were being blocked. All o f the websites 
specified above were found blocked by different courts in Tiirkiye at different times. 
Blocking details below are noted from the first page of these websites when access
-j-s
attempts were made in Tiirkiye. The rankings o f  the each website within Tiirkiye and 
the percentage o f visitors for each page from within Tiirkiye have been taken from 
alexa.com.
In order to see how blocking affects these websites over time, the study conducts 
a longitudinal analysis. Ranking of the specified websites, particularly for Tiirkiye, have 
been taken on three different dates: February 2010, September 2010, and March 2011. 
This approximate one-year time frame is assumed to minimize possible data fluctuations 
in alexa.com and can give more reliable results. During this time, it was also possible to 
observe and analyze which websites were closed, which domain names have changed,
7j Although there are some exceptions, the blocked authority, date, and reference number appear on the 
page at the time o f  access to the blocked site in Tiirkiye. This information appears on the screen also g ives  
two references: Telekomiinikasyon lleti§im Ba§kanligi, w w w .tib.gov.tr/. and Turkish Information and 
Communication Technologies Authority, Telecom m unications Presidency, Internet Regulations 
Department, "ihbar Web: Telecom m unications Presidency Internet Hotline," Telekom iinikasyon ileti§im  
Ba$kanligi, www.ihbarweb.org.tr.
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and how blocking measures by Turkish authorities have shaped these kinds o f websites.
In this way, the following 11 popular but blocked websites in Tiirkiye have been 
specified. They are: gerila.tv, rojaciwan.com, roj.tv, ygk-info.com, 
yeniozgurpolitika.com, pkk-online.net, hpg-online.net, atilim.org, firatnews.com, 
gunlukgazetesi.com, and pdk-xoybun.com.
Gerila.tv
The decision number 2008/5517 dated 07 October 2008, handed down for 
gerila.tv within the context of protection measure o f Ankara 11. Agir Ceza Mahkemesi 
was implemented by Telekomiinikasyon ileti§im Ba§kanhgi.
At the time of the first check on 28 February 2010, Gerila.tv was ranked 18,734 in 
Tiirkiye.74 62.4% of users visiting Gerila.tv came from Tiirkiye.
No rank data or visitors profile is available on alexa.com for the Gerila.tv check 
on 01 September 2010. However, the study found that with its original address name, an 
error message appears in Tiirkiye (Domain name is not active anymore).
The Gerila.tv check on 01 September 2010 revealed that no rank data or visitors 
profile was available on Alexa.com. The domain name was not active anymore. 
Rojaciwan.com
Testing for Rojaciwan.com showed that the blocking date and authority were 
unknown.75 The following message appears: “Access to this website is restricted based
74 Ranking o f  a website in a country is a combination o f  average daily visitors and page view s on a 
particular website for the past three months. "Alexa Actionable A nalytics for the Web.", ibid.
5 Percentage o f  visitors from Tiirkiye to the website decreased to som e degree from 34.8%  to 31.1% . This 
may suggest that regular Internet users from the country could  not access the w ebsite and percentage o f  
visitors from Tiirkiye gradually declined. H owever popularity ranking (combination o f  average daily  
visitors and page view s) in Tiirkiye increased som e from 13,642 to 13,208 (lower is better popularity than
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on a court decision.”
At the check on 28 February 2010, Rojaciwan.com was ranked 8,074 
in Switzerland, 13,642 in Tiirkiye, 54,692 in Germany, 114,977 in France, and 247,926 
in United Kingdom. Rojaciwan.com users came from these countries: 34.8% from 
Tiirkiye, 25.4% from Germany, 25.1% from Switzerland, 3.9% from France, 3.3% from 
the United Kingdom, and 7.5% from other countries.
At the test on 1 September 2010, Rojaciwan.com was ranked 5,422 in 
Switzerland, 9,767 in Tiirkiye, 11,201 in Finland, 14,780 in Denmark, 28,953 in 
Germany, 108,806 in the United Kingdom. Rojaciwan.com users come from these 
countries: 26.3% from Germany, 25.3% from Tiirkiye, 21.7% from Switzerland, 7.5% 
from Finland, 5.6% from Denmark, 5.1% from the United Kingdom, and 8.5% from 
other countries.
At the test on 25 March 2011, popularity ofRojaciwan.com was tabulated as 
6,303 in Finland, 12,601 in Belgium, 13,208 in Tiirkiye, and 150,829 in Germany. 
Visitors by country for Rojaciwan.com as a percent of site traffic included Tiirkiye 
(31.1%), Finland (25.7%), Belgium (16.1%), Germany (13.3%), and other countries 
(13.8%).
Roj.tv
Access to this website was blocked based on the decision number 2008/4687 
dated 21 August 2008, which was handed down for roj.tv within the context o f the 
protection measure of Ankara 11. Agir Ceza Mahkemesi was implemented by
higher). This may suggest that persons able to access to the blocked w ebsite increased their visits to the 
website and visited more webpages within the website.
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“Telekomiinikasyon ileti§im Ba§kanhgt.”76
At the test on 28 February 2010, Roj.tv’s popularity rankings were 22,414 
in Tiirkiye, 27,412 in Switzerland, 31,525 in the United Kingdom, 38,389 in Germany, 
65,164 in France, 89,466 in China, and 89,842 in the Netherlands. Roj.tv users come 
from these countries: 31% from Germany, 22.8% from the United Kingdom, 16.1% from 
China, 22.4% from Tiirkiye, 3.8% from France, 3.6% from Switzerland, 2.4% from the 
Netherlands, and 7.2% from other states.
At the test on 1 September 2010, Roj.tv was ranked 20,980 in Tiirkiye, 74,249 in 
Germany, 117,399 in France, and 203,617 from the United Kingdom. Roj.tv users come 
from these countries: Germany (40.2%), Tiirkiye (27.1%), the United Kingdom (8.7%), 
France (7.2%), and other countries 16.7%
At the test on 25 March 2011 Roj.tv’s popularity ranking were given as 3,366 in 
Finland, 10,686 in Belgium, 28,668 in Tiirkiye, 51,034 in Germany, and 63,980 in the 
United Kingdom. The percentage of visitors by country for Roj.tv include Finland at 
27.5%, Germany at 19.2%, the United Kingdom at 12.7%, Belgium at 9.3%, Tiirkiye at 
6.3%, and other countries at 24.8%.
Ygk-info.com
The block was based on the decision number 2008/531 dated 2 April 2008, which 
was handed down for ygk-info.com within the context o f protection measure o f Eskisehir 
3. Sulh Ceza Mahkemesi was implemented by “Telekomiinikasyon ileti§im Ba§kanligi.” 
At the test on 28 February 2010, Ygk-info.com ranked 104,124 in Tiirkiye, with
76 Decline is seen in popularity ranking in Tiirkiye (from 22 ,414  to 28 ,668) and percentage o f  visitors from
the country (13.1%  to 6.3%).
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100% of users coming from Tiirkiye.
At the test on 1 September 2010, only a global ranking was available which was 
7,327,170, but there was no regional ranking or visitors profile available.
The study accessed the website through a proxy (ktunnel.com) in Tiirkiye, on 1 
September 2010. The domain name was active.
At the test on 25 March 2011 Alexa ranked Ygk-info.com globally at 17,500,453. There 
was no regional rank or visitors profile available. The domain name was still active.
Yeniozgurpolitika.com
Blocked based on decision number 2008/2815 dated 9 May 2008, which was 
handed down for yeniozgurpolitika.com within the context o f  the protection measure of 
Ankara l l . 77 Agir Ceza Mahkemesi was implemented by “Telekomiinikasyon ileti§im 
Ba§kanligi.”
At the test on 28 February 2010, Yeniozgurpolitika.com ranked 31,340 
in Tiirkiye, 39,517 in Switzerland, 51,107 in Sweden, 67,963 in Germany, and 74,858 
in France. Yeniozgurpolitika.com users come from Germany (42.8%), Tiirkiye (29.6%), 
France (10.8%), Switzerland (8.1%), Sweden (7.0%), and 1.8% from other countries.
At the test on 1 September 2010 Yeniozgurpolitika.com ranked 3,874 in Sweden, 
8,520 in Switzerland, and 111,556 in Tiirkiye. Yeniozgurpolitika.com users come from 
Sweden (57.8%), Switzerland (33.2%), Tiirkiye (4.7%), and other countries (4.2%).
At the test on 25 March 2011, Yeniozgurpolitika.com’s Regional Traffic Rank 
was 101,432 for Tiirkiye. 10.8% o f visitors to Yeniozgurpolitika.com were from Tiirkiye
77 D ecline is seen in popularity ranking in Tiirkiye (from 31 ,340  to 111,556) and percentage o f  visitors
from the country (29.6%  to 10.8%).
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and 88.9% were from other countries.
Pkk-online.net
This site was blocked based on two court decisions. One decision was number 
2009/6163-1 dated 19 October 2009, handed down for pkk-online.net within the context 
o f the protection measure of Ankara 11. Agir Ceza Mahkemesi was implemented by 
“Telekomiinikasyon lleti§im Ba§kanligi.” The other was decision number 2009/7088 
dated 04 November 2009, handed down for pkk-online.net within the context o f the 
protection measure o f Ankara 11. Agir Ceza Mahkemesi was implemented by 
“Telekomiinikasyon ileti§im Ba§kanligi.”
At the test on 28 February 2010, Pkk-online.net ranked 22,536 in Tiirkiye. Pkk- 
online.net users come from Tiirkiye (76.3%) and 23.3% from other countries.
At the test on 1 September 2010, only a global rank was available. The Alexa 
Traffic Rank was 11,694,421. There was no regional rank or visitors profile is available.
The test on 25 March 2011 indicated that there was not enough data to display the 
traffic metrics for pkk-online.net. With its original address name, the “Domain name is 
not active anymore” message appears in the United States.
Hpg-online.net
The blocking date and authority are unknown. The following message appears: 
Access to this website is restricted based on a court decision.
The test on 28 February 2010 showed that Hpg-online.net ranked 9,321 
in Tiirkiye, 308,486 in the United Kingdom, and 337,111 in Germany. Hpg-online.net 
users come from Tiirkiye (84.5%), Germany (7.5%), and the United Kingdom (4.2%).
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The test on 1 September 2010 revealed a global Alexa Traffic Rank of 1,567,794. 
There was no regional rank or visitors profile available.
At the test on 25 March 2011, Hpg-online.net’s three-month global Alexa traffic 
rank is 4,215,954. The site is located in Germany. With its original address name the 
“Domain name is not active anymore message” appears in the United States.
Atilim.org
The blocked is based on decision number 2009/632 dated 04 April 2009, handed 
down for atilim.org within the context o f the protection measure o f Istanbul 9. Agir Ceza 
Mahkemesi was implemented by “Telekomiinikasyon ileti§im Ba§kanligi.”78
At the test on 28 February 2010, Atilim.org ranked 3,404 in Tiirkiye, 54,895 
in Belgium, and 292,212 in France. Atilim.org users came from Tiirkiye (94%), Belgium 
(1.4%), France (0.8%), and 3.8% from other countries.
At the test on 1 September 2010, the Alexa Traffic Rank was 354,930.
Atilim.org’s worldwide traffic ranked 5,151 for Tiirkiye and 350,160 for Germany. 
Visitors for Atilim.org include 85.9% from Tiirkiye, 5.4% from Germany, and 8.6% from 
other countries.
At the test on 25 March 2011, Atilim.org’s Regional Traffic Rank was 10,914 for 
Tiirkiye. Visitors by country for Atilim.org include 81.9% for Tiirkiye and 8.1% from 
other countries.
78 Decline is seen in popularity ranking in Tiirkiye (from 3,404 to 10,914) and percentage o f  visitors from
the country (94% to 81.9% ).
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Firatnews.com
This site was blocked based on decision number 2008/2815 dated 9 May 2008, 
handed down to firatnews.com within the context of the protection measure o f Ankara 
11. Agir Ceza Mahkemesi was implemented by “Telekomiinikasyon ileti§im 
Ba§kanligi.”79
At the test on 28 February 2010, Firatnews.com was ranked 1,070 in Tiirkiye, 
3,878 in Tunisia, 10,225 in Switzerland, 10,478 in Sweden, 28,785 in the United 
Kingdom, 34,301 in China, 34,403 in Germany, 50,551 in Russia, 71,737 in France, and 
594,465 in the United States. Firatnews.com users come from Tiirkiye (60.6%), China 
(10.7%), Germany (8.7%), the United Kingdom (5.3%), Sweden (3.2%), Russia (2.6%), 
Switzerland (2.1%), the United States (1.0%), France (1.0%), Tunisia (1.0%), and 3.6% 
from other countries.
At the test on 1 September 2010, the Firatnews.com’s Worldwide Traffic Rank 
was 1,048 from Azerbaijan, 1,214 from Albania, 1,254 from Tiirkiye, 2,508 from Iraq, 
2,825 from Sweden, 3,687 from Switzerland, 4,256 from Austria, 13,722 from Germany, 
32,136 from France, 55,065 from Canada, 174,467 from the United Kingdom, 
and 483,168 from the United States. Visitors by Country for Firatnews.com as a percent 
of site traffic were Tiirkiye (41.1%), Azerbaijan (13.9%), Germany (12.8%), Sweden 
(9.8%), Switzerland (5.3%), Austria (5.3%), France (2.9%), Iraq (2.7%), Albania (1.3%), 
Canada (1.1%), Austria (5.3%), France (2.9%), Iraq (2.7%), Albania (1.3%), Canada 
(1.1%), the United States (1.1%), the United Kingdom (0.9%), and other countries 
( 1.8%).
79 Decline is seen in popularity ranking in Tiirkiye (1 ,070  to 1,705) and percentage o f  visitors form the
country (60.6  % to 38.3% ).
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For the test on 25 March 2011, Firatnews.com's Regional Traffic Ranks 
are Tiirkiye at 1,705, Belgium at 2,213, Sweden at 3,403, Germany at 12,982, the 
Netherlands at 26,600, France at 29,466, Greece at 32,440, and the United Kingdom at 
187,374. Visitors by country for Firatnews.com were 38.3% from Tiirkiye, 23.9% from 
Germany, 11.4% from Sweden, 10.1% from Belgium, 5.7% from France, 2.8% from the 
Netherlands, 1.1% from the United Kingdom, 0.9% from Greece, and 5.8% from other 
countries.
Gunlukgazetesi. com
The block is based on decision number 2009/7088 dated 4 November 2009, 
handed down to gunlukgazetesi.com within the context o f the protection measure o f 
Ankara 11. Agir Ceza Mahkemesi was implemented by “Telekomiinikasyon ileti§im 
Ba§kanhgi.”
At the test on 28 February 2010, Gunlukgazetesi.com was ranked 12,318 
in Tiirkiye, 67,068 in France, 85,672 in China, and 234,780 in Germany. 
Gunlukgazetesi.com users came from Tiirkiye (49.1%), China (29.0%), France (8.6%), 
Germany (8.3%), and 4.9% from other countries.
At the test on 1 September 2010 no regional or other data was available.
At the test on 25 March 2011 Gunlukgazetesi.corn’s three-month global Alexa 
traffic rank was 18,088,952. No regional or other data was available. With its original 
address name, the “Domain name is not active anymore” page appears when accessed in 
the United States.
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Pdk-xoybun.com
The block was based on decision number 2008/6731 dated 28 November 2008, 
handed down to pdk-xoybun.com within the context o f the protection measure o f Ankara 
11. Agir Ceza Mahkemesi was implemented by “Telekomunikasyon lleti§im Ba§kanligi.” 
In the test on 28 February 2010, pdk-xoybun.com ranked 74,643 in Turkiye. 
42.5% o f visitors to the site came from Turkiye, and 57.5% came from other countries.
In the test on 1 September 2010, no regional or other data was available.
In the test on 25 March 2011, pdk-xoybun.com’s three-month global Alexa traffic 
rank was 3,585,233. This site’s content placed it in the “Parti” category o f websites. The 
site has been online for at least eight years. The domain name is active.
Overall analysis of the websites
The six websites experienced dramatic decline in their popularity rankings, which 
is a combination of average daily visitors and page views on a particular website for the 
past three months (Gerila.tv; Ygk-info.com; Pkk-online.net; Hpg-online.net; 
Gunlukgazetesi.com; and Pdk-xoybun.com). Five websites were suffering some kind of 
decline both in their popularity ranking and percentage o f visitors from the country. 
(Rojaciwan.com; Roj.tv; Yeniozgurpolitika.com; Atilim.org; and Firatnews.com; 
although popularity ranking o f the second website, rojaciwan.com was seen as some 
increase in the country, this website is also considered as suffering some decline since the 
percentage of visitors from the country declined slightly).
The test also checked on its final check in March 2011, whether the domain 
addresses were affected from these access-blocking measures. It showed that despite 
some decline in their popularity, the domain addresses o f five websites were still active
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(Rojaciwan.com; Roj.tv; Yeniozgurpolitika.com; Atilim.org; and Firatnews.com).
Among the six websites which were having dramatic declines in their popularity, four 
domain addresses were seen as deactivated (Gerila.tv; Pkk-online.net; Hpg-online.net; 
and Gunlukgazetesi.com). Despite dramatic declines in their popularity, the domain 
addresses o f two websites were still active on the date o f final check (Ygk-info.com and 
Pdk-xoybun.com).
These checks however, do not provide the entire picture about the results o f 
blocking access to these websites. Further checks reveal that these websites have other 
alternative domain addresses attached their IP number(s). The following part o f this 
dissertation explores this issue in detail.
Blocked websites and alternative domain addresses
This section is an analysis of alternative domain names for the same websites. For 
this analysis, ipaddress.com was utilized as a source that gives all technical, registration, 
and administrative details. Ipaddress.com also gives other hostnames for a website by 
looking at the registered IP addresses of the same website. Checks on ipaddress.com 
reveal that most of these websites analyzed above have other (alternative) sub-domain 
names and addresses. During this analysis, five websites were found using only one 
domain name, but the other seven websites have at least one other alternative domain 
name. Rankings and percentage of visitors for each domain name are checked again three 
different times on alexa.com. Gerila.tv was blocked on 7 October 2008. Gerillatv.com 
was blocked on 3 April 2008.
Verification revealed that in addition to gerila.tv, the website had two other 
domain addresses, gerillatv.com and gerillatv.net. Also, it was established that both
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domain names, gerila.tv and gerillatv.com, are not active anymore but the (same) site was 
still online under a third domain name, gerillatv.net on the final check in March 2011.
No court decision was known against this domain name at that time, and the 
website was accessible from Turkiye. The website was still online at that time although 
two of its domains were blocked and not active anymore.
Verification revealed that beside rojaciwan.com, there was another domain 
address o f the same website, hezaciwanan.com (blocked on 28 January 2009). The 
website rojaciwan.com is blocked in Turkiye, but this domain address was still active and 
online outside Turkiye. Blocking details were unknown.
The same website also uses the domain name hezaciwanan.com, which seems to 
be blocked as of 28 January 2009 within the country. Overall, the website was still active 
in March 2011.
Despite some decline in terms of popularity and ranking within Turkiye, the 
website Roj.tv was still active with this domain (blocked 21 August 2008) and had no 
alternative domain addresses on the date of the final verification.
Despite dramatic decrease in terms of popularity and ranking within Turkiye, the 
website Ygk-info.com was still active with this domain and had no alternative domain 
addresses at that time (blocked on 2 April 2008.
The website with yeniozgurpolitika.com had another domain extension with (.org) 
in March 2011. Although both domains were blocked on 9 May 2008, the website was 
still online at that time.
Pkk-online.net was blocked in Turkiye (19 October 2009 to 4 November 2009) 
and this domain address was not active anymore in March 2011. Alternative domain 
addresses (pkkonline.net, blocked on 18 June 2010 and pkkonline.com, details are not
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known) were also blocked within the country. The website was still online then with 
these two alternative domain addresses.
In addition to Hpg-online.net (blocked but details are not known), an alternative 
domain hpg-online.com (blocked but details are not known) was inactive in March 2011. 
However, the same website was still online with a third domain address hpg.kk5.org at 
that time (blocked 28 November 2008).
Despite some decline in its ranking within Turkiye, the website Atilim.org 
(blocked 4 April 2009) was still active with this domain and had no alternative domain 
addresses on the date of verification.
It was established that besides firatnews.com (blocked 9 May 2008), the website 
was using Firatnews.eu (blocked 10 January 2008) as another domain address. Access to 
either domain address was blocked in Turkiye but both domains were active and the 
website was online on the date o f verification.
Blocked on 4 November 2009, the domain gunlukgazetesi.com was inactive on 
the date o f verification. The website has another domain name gunlukgazetesi.net. No 
court decision blocking this site was known to be in effect against this domain name and 
the website was accessible from Turkiye. The website was still online at that time.
Despite a dramatic decrease in terms of popularity and ranking within Turkiye, 
the website Pdk-xoybun.com was still active with this domain despite being blocked on 
28 November 2008 and had no alternative domain addresses at that time.
Evaluation of data
All of the terror websites specified in this study are experiencing decrease in their 
rankings and popularity according to alexa.com. Decreases for six o f them are dramatic
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enough that alexa.com does not provide regional rankings or global rankings.80 Ranking 
and popularity decreases for the other five websites are not as dramatic, but there is 
nonetheless some degree o f decrease in popularity and ranking between February 2010 
and March 2011.
Among 11 websites, only four of them had declines in popularity enough to 
deactivate their domain names. The other seven sites (among them 2 sites experiencing 
severe decline, five experiencing some decline) have not yet deactivated their domain 
names as of March 2011. The four which deactivated their domain names have at least 
one alternative domain name, according to ipaddress.com. However, none o f the websites 
checked here have shut down their servers.
Either making changes in their domain addresses, servers, or IP numbers, these 
websites were able to pursue a range o f technological alternatives to remain accessible. 
Access blocking measures against the websites date back to 2008 and 2009. Despite these 
measures, however, the sites continued to receive some o f its audience and remained 
online at least for the period between February 2010 and March 2011.
Circumvention tendency, particularly in Turkiye
As explored in already in this study, for each blocking technique, there are 
bypassing methods which allow users to access blocked websites and web content. The 
Internet provides access to information about these circumvention methods and 
instructions for how to use them. Ordinary Internet users familiar with search engines can 
find information about these methods and access these resources.
For instance, a Google search revealed 94,600 results in 0.17 seconds for how to
80 "Aiexa Actionable Analytics for the Web.", ibid.
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circumvent blocked websites (without quotation marks). Google Turkish (Google.tr) 
revealed 16,400 results in .22 seconds for a similar search in Turkish (Intemette sansur 
nasil a§ihr). Yahoo found 1,330,000 resources for the same English phrase and 53 results 
for the same Turkish phrase. A Turkish search engine, Arabul, found 210 results with the 
English language search string how to circumvent blocked websites and 570 results for
Q  I
the Turkish search string Intemette sansur nasil a§ihr (without quotation marks).
These results provide hundreds or thousands o f different resources for Internet 
users. These resources sometimes include video, photos or step-by-step instructions for 
how to circumvent Internet blocking. Because of this, some countries also try to prevent 
access to these kinds o f online resources, either by blocking them directly or using key 
word search blocking at search engines. So far, these measures against circumvention 
websites or online resources are unknown in Turkiye.
The most widespread method for circumvention seems to be using online proxy 
servers, which can also be located through search engines. Google.com found 126 million 
results in 0.12 seconds for the term proxy. Google.com.tr suggested ten alternative search 
phrases as the user typed the word proxy (in English): proxy, proxy list, proxygizlen 
(proxyhide), proxy nedir (what is proxy?), proxy server, proxy ayarlari (proxy settings), 
proxy switcher, proxy site, proxy sites, and proxyhideout.com. While google.com.tr 
found 124 million results in 0.05 seconds for proxy (in English), it found 361 thousand
O'}
results in 0.34 seconds for proksi (In Turkish).
As seen in Appendix-2, Turkish visitors were accustomed to using three o f the top 
five proxy servers, ktunnel, vtunnel, and anonymous. The proxy server ktunnel received
81 I checked the sites in the United States on 4 April 2 0 1 1 without quotation marks.
821 conducted the searches in the United States on 1 April 2011 without using quotation marks in the search 
string.
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88.4 % o f its visitors from Turkiye. This is also observable in alexa.com website rankings 
for each country. While ktunnel is one of the top 100 most popular websites, vtunnel.com 
ranked 294th in popularity in Turkiye.
The effects in the case of YouTube cannot be ignored when considering the 
spread of proxy usage in Turkiye. The YouTube case, which became a symbol o f 
blockings in Turkiye, was often a subject o f discussion and news in the media as well as 
on the Internet in blogs, forums, and other Internet sites. Most of these resources 
discussed the dilemmas in YouTube’s blocking as explained in this study and provided
g-j
alternative ways to access the website. While some of them suggest proxy servers for 
circumvention, others explain methods like changing DNS settings and adjusting 
computer settings. These resources are also available for pro-terrorism websites.
As explained in this chapter access blocking to undesired websites are not 
effective to an extent that many o f the blocked websites can be accessible through 
different tools and technics. Access blocking to undesired websites within a national 
border do not necessarily lead the website to totally shut down their services and servers. 
It is not effective to use access blocking as a measure since it is open to possible errors 
like over-blocking or under-blocking. If it does not cause an error, access blocking can be 
un-proportional and unacceptable since it seriously violates fundamental rights and 
freedom as explained in the case o f YouTube blocking. Thus, the effectiveness o f 
prevention aspects of internet policing is open to significant questions and doubts.
The following chapter examines how much prosecution is effective in identifying,
8j "Youtube Yasak A m a...” Aktifhaber, 17 June 2008. In addition, there are six m ethods to access blocked  
YouTube, "Ankara Kaldirdi, Sivas Yasakladi!" M illiyet H aber , 22 January 2008. and "853 S iteye Yasakla 
Ligimiz Belli: QIN, (RAN, ARABlSTAN!" Turktime, 22  August 2008. and "Yasakli Youtube N asil 
Girilir?" Internethaber, 7  March 2007. and Engin Ardi9 , "Yasakfiligin Sonu N ecilik ?” Sabah, 3 Novem ber  
2010. and "internet SanstlrfinU Ajm a Kilavuzu," Bianet (Bagim siz Heti$im Agi), 7 March 2011.
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tracing or detaining suspects/perpetrators of a cybercrime, particularly internet child 
pornography. After giving introductive information about the crime, legal framework, 
national institutions and international regimes this part o f the study explores how much 
policing is successful in child pornography investigations.
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CHAPTER VI 
POLICING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY IN TURKIYE
INTRODUCTION
Compared to most of the EU member countries, Turkiye has a young population. 
O f the 75.6 million inhabitants in 2012, 18.8 million were under 14 years old, about 25% 
o f the population.1
Culturally, family is very important in Turkish society, and families give much 
importance to their children and their children’s health, wellbeing, and upbringing in 
accordance with socio-cultural values. The Ministry o f Families and Social Policies is the 
highest bureaucratic institution in the country that deals with policies regarding the 
family, children, the disabled, and the aged.2
Occasionally there are news stories involving child victims. These stories rarely 
involve child sexual abuse. For instance, in connection with investigations conducted by 
German Interpol, a suspect downloading child pornography from the Internet was 
identified based on IP numbers and found to be located in Turkiye. Police investigation 
o f the address found files containing child pornography. A 65-year old man was 
imprisoned after prosecution in Trabzon in 2012.3
According to news reports, a 31-year old man identified himself as a child in chat 
rooms where he engaged with children and obtained recordings from them containing 
images o f the children undressing. The man used MSN and Facebook to access files o f
1 "Turkiye istatistik Kurumu Web. Temel istatistikler," w w w .tuik.gov.tr/UstM enu.do?m etod=tem elist.
2 "Aile Ve Sosyal Politikalar Bakanligi," w w w .aile.gov.tr/tr.
3 Osman §i$ko, "Docente Pom o C ezasi,” G azete  Vatan, 17 February 2012.
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children undressing. He was transferred to judicial authorities for prosecution in Bursa.4
Recently an adult using the pseudonym “Begum 10” identified himself as a 10- 
year old girl in a chat room and received approximately a hundred messages in half an 
hour, some of which included sexuality.5
Related departments and NGOs
Children’s rights and protection from victimization should not be solely the 
responsibility of authorities, and solutions should include society and civic actors. In 
recent years, universities, civil-society organizations, and non-governmental 
organizations have started to play roles in this sensitive issue.
The Bar Associations o f Istanbul and Ankara have founded the Center o f Children 
Rights.6 Other groups include the Organization of Child Abuse and Neglect;7 the 
Organization of Children and Information Security;8 and the Organization o f Protecting 
Children from Abuse and Rehabilitation (0K O RED ).
Operating since 2001 under a different name, the Research, Practice and 
Protection Center for Children was officially opened in 2006 at the University o f Gazi in 
Ankara.9 Likewise, the Ankara Children Protection Institution (A£OK) was founded in 
2005 at the University of Ankara. It deals with children, who are subjects o f  abuse in 
different ways. Unveren cites that the center received 164 victims between 2005 and May
4 Budakoglu, Selahattin, and Bursa - Dogan Haber Ajansi (Dogan N ew s Agency), "Bilgi I§lem 
Sorumlusundan Cocuklara Tuzak," M illiyet, 4  February 2011 .
5 "10 Ya§indaki £ocu ga  Seks T eklif Edenler..." haber365.com , 28 March 2011.
6 "Istanbul Barosu £ocu k  Haklan Merkezi," http://www.istanbulbarosu.org.tr/Docum ent.asp?Konu=404  
&Documentlndex=merkez!er/chm.htm.
7 "Qocuk istismarini Ve ihmalini Onleme Dem egi," http://www.cocukistism ari.org/.
8 "Qocuk Ve Bilgi GUvenligi D em egi," cbgd.org.
9 Gazi Hastanesi, "(^ocuk Koruma Arajtirma V e Uygulama M erkezi,”
http://hastane.gazi.edu.tr/posts/view/title/cocuk-koruma-arastirma-ve-uygulam a-merkezi-8970.
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2009.10 Among them, 53% were male and 46% were female. Ages vary from infant to 16 
years old, while the average age was seven. Among the victims, 33% of them were 
sexually abused, 33% were physically abused, 3% were mentally abused, and 30% of 
cases featured other kinds o f abuse.11
The University of Erciyes founded the Prevention o f Children Neglect and Abuse, 
Research and Practice Center ((^ITEM) in 2009. The center hires specialists and 
experts.12
National legal framework
Turkish Criminal Code, No.5237 dated 26 September 2004, Official Gazette 
No.25611 dated 12 October 2004 defines child as a person under the age o f eighteen in 
Article 6 and regulates criminality specifically in terms o f child involvement in different 
articles. The term child pornography is not used by the code. Instead the code uses the 
term child sexual abuse as penalized in Article 103. The code also uses the term 
indecency, which includes production, advertisement, selling, storing, or broadcasting of 
obscene materials of children in Article 226: Obscenity ARTICLE 226-(l) Any person 
who involves in an unlawful act; a) By allowing a child to watch an indecent scene or a 
product, or to or hear shameful words, b) By displaying these products in places easy to 
reach by children, or reading the contents o f these products, or letting other to speak 
about them, c) By selling or leasing these product in such a way open for public review, 
d) By selling, offering, or leasing these products at places other than the markets 
nominated for sale o f these product, e) By gratuitously supplying or distributing these
10 Unal Onveren, "Turkiye’de Cocuk Pom ografisi Sorunu V e QOziim Yollari," Polis A kadem isi, 2010.
' ! ,bid-
12 "Erciyes Universitesi Cocuk ihmali V e Istismarini Engellem e Uygulam a Ve Ara§tirma Merkezi 
Yonetm eligi,” http://bilgiedinm e.erciyes.edu.tr/cocuk_ihmal_istism ari_engellem e m erkezi.asp.
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products along with other goods or services, f) By making advertisement o f these 
products, is punished with imprisonment from six months to two years.
Section two states: The persons who publicize indecent scenes, words, or articles 
through press and broadcast organs or act as intermediary in publication o f the same is 
punished with imprisonment from six months to three years. Section three states: Any 
person who uses children in production of indecent scenes, words or articles is punished 
with imprisonment from five years to ten years, and also imposed punitive fine up to five 
thousand days. Any person who engage in import, duplication, transportation, storage, 
export o f these products, or presents the same to other’s use, is punished with 
imprisonment from two years to five years, and also imposed punitive fine up to five 
thousand days.
Section four states: Any person who produces products containing audio-visual or 
written material demonstrating abnormal sexual intercourse by using sex, or with 
animals, or body o f a death person , and engages in import sale, transportation storage of 
the same and presents such material to other’s use, is punished with imprisonment from 
one year to four years. Section five states: Any person who publicizes the contents o f  the 
products mentioned in third and fourth subsections through press and broadcast organs, 
or acts as intermediary in publication o f the same, or lets children to read, hear, or see this 
material is punished with imprisonment from six months to ten years, and also imposed 
punitive fine up to five thousand days.
Neither Turkish law no. 5651 on Regulation of Publications on the Internet nor 
the law on Combating Crimes Committed by Means o f Such Publications dated 23 May 
2007 specifically define child pornography. Both laws refer to the Turkish Criminal 
Code, No.5237, which penalizes child sexual abuse in Article 103 and obscenity in
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Article 226 as shown above.
Law no. 5651 regarding the Internet regulates access blocking measures on some 
conditions, such as specific crimes committed or whether addresses o f content and 
hosting servers are within Turkiye or located outside o f the country. Under limited 
conditions, this measure can directly and immediately be implemented by the 
administrative institution, the TIB, and later the issue details are submitted to the judicial 
authorities for further investigation and a verdict. Tracing a record of child pornography 
on the Internet is among the conditions under which the TIB can immediately block a 
website, irrespective o f whether its content provider or hosting server is within Turkiye or 
abroad. TIB detections of these types o f web contents are performed through routine 
checks and on the basis o f  tips submitted by individuals.
National police institutions
Judicial authorities may receive reports o f cases including child pornography from 
individuals, victims, through administrative departments, or police or gendarmerie units 
for prosecution. The Department o f Interpol Ankara is the gateway in Turkiye for such 
judicial investigations when the alleged crime has transnational aspects, for example 
when IP numbers, victims, suspects, email addresses, or servers originate outside of 
Turkiye. The Department of Interpol Ankara operates under the General Headquarter of 
Turkish National Police. The official name is “Interpol Europol Sirene Department 
Directorate.” These cases are dealt with by the Section o f Public Security.13
Recent developments in information and telecommunication technologies and the 
concomitant shift in criminality toward cyberspace resulted in the Turkish National
13 "Tttrkiye-Europol ili§kileri Birimlerimiz," www.interpol.pol.tr/Sayfalar/birim leriiriiz.aspx.
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Police establishing the Department of Struggling against Information System Crimes in 
2011. It was renamed the Department o f Struggling against Cybercrimes in 2013. The 
department has a center under the MHQ o f Turkish National Police in Ankara and has 
established sections in 82 Turkish cities as City Police Directorates.14
In the past, operational child pornography investigation requests in Turkiye by 
foreign Interpol departments tended to be directed toward the Department o f Public 
Security, and in urgent cases, to the Police Directorates in cities as well. The reverse for 
operational investigation requests from foreign Interpol departments were received by 
Interpol Ankara from the Department o f Public Security, Police Directorates in cities, and 
the prosecutor’s office.15 Currently, this process includes the new Department o f 
Struggling against Cyber-crimes and its subsections in cities.
International regimes and Turkiye’s participation
The Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual 
Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, CETS No. 201, opened for signatures on 25 October 
2007 in Lanzarote and came into force in Turkiye on 1 April 2012, after ratification on 7 
December 2011. The convention advises signatory countries to develop preventive 
policies and programs and criminal and legal frameworks against various forms of 
children sexual abuse, children prostitution, and pornography.
Instead of limiting scope to the Internet, the Convention extends to information 
and communication technologies writ large. Article 20 of the Convention, under the title 
“Offences concerning child pornography’’ advises parties to “take the necessary
14 "Siber Su^larla MQcadele Daire Bajkanligi Hakkimizda," www.siber.pol.tr/Sayfalar/hakkim izda.aspx.
15 Unveren, ibid.
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legislative or other measures to ensure that the following intentional conduct, when 
committed without right, is criminalised: a) producing child pornography; b) offering or 
making available child pornography; c) distributing or transmitting child pornography; d) 
procuring child pornography for oneself or for another person; e) possessing child 
pornography; [and] f) knowingly obtaining access, through information and 
communication technologies, to child pornography.” The same article also has an 
exemption for the final paragraph (f) that “Each Party may reserve the right not to apply, 
in whole or in part, paragraph 1 .f.” 16
On 10 November 2010, Turkiye signed the Council o f Europe Convention of 
Cyber Crimes, CETS No. 185, and opened for signatures in Budapest on 23 November 
2001 but has not yet ratified the Convention as of 17 July 2013. The convention is 
considered to be the first international treaty regarding crimes committed through the 
Internet and other computer networks and focuses on violations of copyrights, computer- 
related fraud and forgery, child pornography, and interception of computer networks and 
information systems. Convention CETS No. 185 also specifies criminalized actions for 
the above crimes in Convention CETS No. 201, except paragraph f  (further are 
exceptions stipulated in Article 9/4).
The term child pornography, the Convention notes, shall include pornographic 
material that visually depicts a) a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct; b) a person 
appearing to be a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct; or c) realistic images 
representing a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct. According to the Convention, 
minor means all persons less than 18 years o f age (or less than 16 years old, if  a signatory
16 "Council o f  Europe Convention on the Protection o f  Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual 
Abuse Cets N o.: 2 0 1 http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Com m un/Q ueVoulezVous.asp?NT=201& CM =8  
& DF=17 /0 7 /2 0 1&CL=ENG.
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party requires a lower age limit).17
Turkiye is also a signatory of United Nations Convention on the Rights Children 
20 November 1989. Turkiye signed the convention on 14 September 1990 and ratified it
1 fion 4 April 1995 with reservations. Formerly known as SHCEK, CHGM is the 
coordinating department in Turkiye assigned to follow up on issues relevant to the 
Convention. Together with other related departments and institutes, the first report issued 
by the department was submitted to the UN Children’s Rights Committee in 1999, and 
the Committee issued its evaluations o f the report based on Article 44 o f the 
Convention.19
Turkiye is also a signatory o f the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights o f the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography 
dated 25 May 2000 and ratified on 19 August 2002.20 Turkiye submitted a report based 
on this Optional Protocol to the Committee on 17 May 2006 in Geneva.
In their evaluation based on the submitted report, the Committee expresses its 
contentment with the amendments in the Turkish Criminal Code in terms of new 
effective provisions that specify child trade, prostitution, and pornography. But the 
Committee emphasizes some missing items and gaps in the national legal framework 
regarding Internet child pornography, and suggests new legal provisions that specify the 
crime in order to empower the legal system in combating these crimes. It also stresses the 
importance o f Tiirkiye's submitting to the Council o f Europe Convention o f Cyber
17 "Convention on Cybercrime Cets No.: 185." http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Com m un  
/Q ueVoulezVous.asp?NT= 185& CM =8& DF=19 /07 /2013& CL=ENG.
18 United N ations Treaty Collection, "Chapter IV. Human Rights, 11. Convention on the Rights o f  the 
Child," http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY& m tdsg_no=IV-1 l& chapter=4  
&lang=en. For country reservations in signature, also see Selahattin Giiven, "Medyada Ku^iiklerin 
Korunmasina fli§kin DUzenlemeler,” Universiteler M ahallesi, 2011.
19 £ocu k  Hizmetleri Genel MudOrliigii, "Cocuk Haklari He ilgili M evzuat, Protokol V e Raporlar," 
www.cocukhizm etleri.gov.tr/tr/10535/Cocuk-Haklari-He-Ilgili-M evzuat-Protokol-ve-RaporIar.
20 United N ations Treaty Collection, ibid.
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Crimes, which opened for signatures in Budapest on 23 November 2001 and the Council 
of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, which opened for 
signature in Warsaw on 16 May 2005,21 Turkiye signed both Conventions; however, as o f 
17 July 2013 neither have been ratified.
EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
Beside the complications involved with blocking Internet content, which is 
essentially a preventive measure o f policing, Internet content presents significant 
challenges to prosecution efforts. Rather than looking at all kinds o f crimes and their 
prosecution, this study focuses on child pornography on the Internet and its prosecution.
Different from most of the other types o f crimes and their punishment, there is a 
broad international consensus on defining child pornography as a crime and having legal 
punishment against offenders. This study has analyzed digital files, each o f which is 
opened as a specific file for different child pornography cases in Interpol Ankara.
Interpol is the second biggest international organization after the United Nations 
in terms of members. Each country has its own National Central Bureau or NCB to 
coordinate cooperation between national units with foreign units in criminal and policing 
issues.
Unveren conducted a descriptive study about child pornography in his Master’s 
dissertation. Based on records from the Interpol Department in Ankara, Unveren notes 
that there are a total o f 136 cases between 1999 and 2006 and 85 files in 2007,22 128 files 
in 2008, 51 files in 2009, and 5 files in 2010 (up until January 22, 2010). The average
21 Unveren, ibid.
22 Ibid., 31. (This study has found two duplicate files that means totally 83 new files opened in the year 
2007)
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number o f cases opened in each year for the past ten years (between 1999 and 2009) is 
about 40 files.
According to Aydin, the first known arrest resulting from an Interpol request was 
conducted in Konya, Turkiye in 2000, but the suspect was released on bail.23 Unveren’s 
study was important to understand the transnational aspects of the crime. However, 
Unveren did not go in depth to explore the details of the investigations, their results, 
problems, or other barriers in these files. Focusing on the files of specific cases initiated 
in 2005, 2006 and 2007, this study presents readers with more details o f these 
investigations. Rather than looking at specific successful cases, it analyzes all cases to see 
the overall picture regarding these investigations.
Internet child pornography here covers any crime against minors committed on or 
through the internet and internet applications such as messengers with webcams, file 
sharing applications, or email. The study excludes files that include other kinds o f sex 
crimes against minors such as illegal detention, child marriage, rape, harassment, or 
peeping. These non-Internet crimes are specified below for each year. This study likewise 
does not include non-operational messages sent only for information, fingerprint or 
criminal record checks, or address or language errors.
Analysis of 2005
Records in the digital archive show that 31 new Internet-based child pornography 
files were opened in 2005. Not all these cases are operational, i.e. resulting in a request of 
police and legal action. This study excludes those cases which are non-operational and 
thus irrelevant for this study. In 2005, 13 cases were considered non-operational since
23 Ibid.
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these files may include criminal background check for a person, general information 
inquiries from Interpol departments, or wrong addresses.
As for operational cases, among the 31 case files, five cases were the result o f 
requests for police and legal action from foreign Interpol Bureaus (outgoing requests). 
Thirteen cases were incoming requests from different national Interpol Bureaus for police 
and legal action.
Most of the requests, both outgoing and incoming, involve websites established to 
host child pornography on their servers, or have links to pornographic images. Each case 
may concern a single website or more. Besides police departments, these requests may 
came from the legal units o f any Interpol member country. Interpol uses its secure 
communication system for transmitting these kinds o f messages. Requests include all 
available details from the websites, their domain names, web address, IP numbers, crime- 
related photos, videos, and other technical details about the servers. Investigation requests 
for legal or police action may only be addressed to one or more NCB as well as to the 
General Secretariat in Lyon, France.
Outgoing requests
Outgoing requests have been addressed to a number o f NCBs, including 
Germany, Australia, the United States (three times), Russia (twice), Portugal, France, and 
in one case to all Interpol NCBs. These requests include some web pages determined to 
be hosting or distributing child pornography and have servers registered abroad, such as 
in the country where the NCB is located. Cases were initiated by two units in Turkiye, the 
local police o f Ankara, and the Police Department o f Public Order. Checks made o f text 
documents reveal that no results could be achieved in five cases.
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A complicated procedure o f “rogatory commission”
In one case, Interpol Washington requested a rogatory commission (a detailed 
judicial file and documents about the case and requests sent through a diplomatic 
channel) for the investigation in Turkiye. Preparing a rogatory commission for a 
transnational case is a complex task that is both a time- and resource-consuming 
procedure. Political and diplomatic tensions among countries involved in such cases may 
prevent these procedures from proceeding further. Time is very much a concern for any 
judicial investigation, but more so for crimes committed on and through the Internet. By 
the time the judicial file is prepared and translated into the language o f the address 
country, the subject website or records could be deleted, moved, or changed.
Different legal systems among the countries are another barrier for initiating such 
a procedure. Even when a judicial file is prepared and translated into the language of the 
target country, it is not always guaranteed that all requests in these files will be admitted 
by the judicial authorities o f the addressed country.
In some cases, a rogatory commission is requested after the first immediate police 
action is conducted, but it is not a prerequisite for police or legal action. In such a 
situation, as seen in successful cases from 2005, suspects may be identified and evidence 
could be collected before they disappear or are deleted.
While in some cases, investigations were about a single website, in some others a 
number o f websites were subject to inquiry. For instance in one case, investigations for 
five websites were addressed to three Interpol NCBs (Portugal, Russia, and the United 
States). Another case regarded a website sent only to Interpol United States. 
Unfortunately, there were no results established in digital files for these cases. Paper- 
based files o f these digital files may include insignificant replies from Interpol NCBs. But
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the absence of these writings in the digital archive implies no legal or police action could 
be achieved based on the requests of Interpol Ankara.
Incoming requests
There were 13 operational incoming requests (cases) received in 2005. That year 
incoming requests exceeded outgoing. Among them, only three of the investigations 
conducted in Turkiye resulted suspects being identified and transferred to the judicial 
authorities.
For the other ten cases, no results could be achieved. In four o f them, the 
information submitted was insufficient to conduct investigations in Turkiye. In this 
situation, further information was requested back from the original Interpol Bureaus. 
However, no messages were recorded back from these countries to further the 
investigation in the country. The other six files were notified related units. Non 
availability o f further information in these ten files imply no significant result could be 
achieved in none of them.
Successful cases
Three cases in 2005 were investigated successfully, and suspects involved in these 
reported cases were identified or brought before judicial authorities. The first case 
regarded a message from Interpol Madrid about a suspicious IP address distributing child 
pornography. This request was sent to local police in Izmir, Turkiye, and all details and 
investigations conducted in Izmir established the user and owner o f the IP number. After 
receiving court permission, local police in Izmir conducted a search o f the suspect’s
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home and computer. He was transferred to court but released afterwards when no 
evidence found.
In the second case, the initiator of the investigation was in the UK and concerned 
emails sent to an underage adolescent from an email address in Turkiye. One or more 
individuals was suspected of sending explicit sexual images and photos to teenagers in 
the UK. The request from Interpol London was sent to local police o f Zonguldak, Turkiye 
with copies of images from emails and the details of IP numbers and emails attached. 
Local police identified two suspects and transferred them to the Prosecutor’s Office in 
Zonguldak, Turkiye. The file shows that the Prosecutor’s Office requested a rogatory 
commission from competent authorities o f the UK for the case.
The third case was from German Interpol and involved two teenagers aged 14 and 
15. Some pornographic images and photos were sent to these teenagers from a person 
they while they were chatting on the Internet. Based on available email addresses and IP 
numbers submitted to Interpol Ankara by German Interpol, local police in Aksaray were 
notified, and the suspect was identified. The file shows that the Prosecutor’s Office 
requested further details o f the investigation with a rogatory commission from German 
authorities through diplomatic channels.
Unsuccessful cases
All o f these ten cases concerned websites containing photos and videos o f child 
pornography or have links to other websites with similar content. These requests were 
from Ireland, Germany (five cases), Spain, Finland (two cases), and Portugal. These 
requests received from outside Interpol Bureaus were sent to competent bodies in Turkiye 
along with images and records o f the crime with other technical details.
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Many IP numbers from different countries involved
In one case, Finland Interpol had a request in which 78 different countries were 
involved. Based on an investigation conducted for child pornography in this country, 
about 2,200 IP numbers were established to have some kind of connections with a 
suspect being prosecuted in that country. Since some IP numbers notified by Finland 
Interpol were from Ankara, Turkiye, local police in Ankara were provided with all the 
details o f the case accordingly. So far the result is unknown. Likewise the result for 
Finland is not in its file.
Lack of necessary information, date and time problems, internet cafe involvement 
Among the ten cases in this situation, it is apparent that for some cases, 
ambiguities about the time and date o f the investigation conducted by the initiator o f the 
investigation abroad was the main reason to launch further investigations in Turkiye 
because Internet cafes were involved in the commission o f the alleged crime. For four 
cases o f the ten, competent bodies in Turkiye informed the Interpol Bureau in Ankara 
that further information was needed to conduct investigations in Turkiye. In these four 
cases, Interpol Ankara requested additional information (IP numbers, further crime 
details, and available material) from the Interpol office originating the investigation. No 
response from foreign Interpol departments is available for these four cases, nor is a 
result known in their file.
For the remaining six operational cases, no necessity or reason is reported and 
available in their files. Overall, no positive results could be achieved for ten operational 
cases.
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Analysis of 2006
The number of cases in 2006 was 33. Among the cases in that year, five were 
initiated from Interpol Bureaus outside o f Turkiye (outgoing requests) for police and 
legal action. Incoming requests, on the other hand, were 28— more than in the previous 
year. Among them, 21 cases were operational, resulting in a request for police and legal 
action. The other seven include non-operational files and other kinds o f sexual crimes 
against minors, as explained above.
As with cases in the previous year, most o f the requests (both outgoing and 
incoming) in 2006 concerned websites determined to be hosting pornographic records, 
images, or photos involving children, or have links to such websites. Cases may concern 
one or more websites. Requests may come from legal units, courts or prosecutor’s office 
in any Interpol country, as well as police departments.
Outgoing requests
Outgoing requests in 2006 were addressed to Interpol Bureaus o f the United 
States (three), Germany, Canada, the UK, Slovakia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Australia, Sweden, Denmark, Uruguay, Russia, and Czech Republic in five different 
cases. All the cases requested to be investigated in these countries concerned websites 
registered in or connected to servers located in these countries. Sometimes servers, 
registration, or other contact details o f a website may refer to one country or more 
countries. Cases from 2006 were initiated by two local police departments, in Ankara 
(four) and in Istanbul (one).
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Many countries involvement
Like cases in the previous year 2005 for outgoing requests, no significant results 
could be achieved in these cases either. Among them, one case was interesting to note 
here since twelve different countries were involved. The case was about a web-site which 
was hosting child pornography on two domain addresses registered or has servers abroad. 
The request was to conduct simultaneous police operations against the registered 
addresses o f these websites in different states. Based on legal and technical reasons, no 
country responded to Interpol Ankara expressing willingness to join a police operation. 
While US Interpol responded that material submitted to them was not enough to initiate 
such an action, Polish Interpol mentioned technical barriers for such an operation. 
Uruguay Interpol responded that they will join such an operation after their initial 
investigations. Digital files of this case also show that language barriers (especially in the 
attached documents which include technical, registration, and log details), time zone and 
date differences, as well as address errors, were the subject o f message trafficking in the 
case. Only UK Interpol responded, stating that based on a request from Interpol Ankara, 
they had conducted investigations in the UK of related IP numbers but could not find 
individuals who accessed or downloaded records from the websites in question.
For the other four outgoing cases, a number of websites have been reported to the 
related Interpol Bureaus by Interpol Ankara. However, no success could be achieved in 
these cases.
Incoming requests
There were 21 operational requests (cases) received in 2006. In six o f them, 
investigations conducted in Turkiye were successful in identifying suspects or in bringing
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them before the judicial authorities. However, for fifteen cases, no significant result could 
be achieved according to the digital archive.
Lack of necessary information
Out of fifteen cases, four contained files that seemed to hinder further 
investigations in Turkiye. In three of those four cases, crime subject records such as 
videos, photos, and chat and email records were missing. For one case, technical and 
registration details o f the website and IP number were missing. In all four cases, 
requesting NCBs were notified by Interpol Ankara requesting further documents and 
necessary information. In some cases, related NCBs responded back to Interpol Ankara 
that they had no further information or records. In others, no response was provided for 
the requests for additional information.
For the other eleven operational cases, information as well as all available records 
and documents were sent to competent bodies and local police in Turkiye. However, no 
replies in these files show significant results. Regardless o f whether there were reported 
reasons or no replies available, no significant results could be achieved in these cases 
according to their files.
Successful cases
Half of the six successful cases in 2007 were related to investigations in the 
Netherlands. On behalf o f Interpol The Hague, Interpol General Secretariat (IP SG) in 
Lyon, France notified all NCBs in a diffusion message to all member countries that 
monitoring of some websites hosting child pornography revealed that approximately 
2,800 IP numbers were detected accessing these sites and downloading child
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pornographic records from these sites. IP SG requested all related NCBs to make 
appropriate investigations of these Internet users from several countries. The operation 
was called Operation Balendo.
Interpol Ankara checked the IP numbers and found that 387 IP numbers came 
from Turkiye. Interpol Ankara informed the Department o f Public Peace and Order, the 
competent body in Turkiye, about the case and submitted to them all available 
documents, a CD, passwords, and details of IP numbers received. Following 
investigations in Turkiye, users and owners of eight IP numbers were identified and 
transferred to the judicial authorities in Istanbul, Ankara, and Antalya.
In an operation called Operation Lancer, investigators revealed that the case 
prosecuted in the Netherlands had connections to Turkiye. Interpol The Hague informed 
Interpol Ankara about these suspicious IP addresses and submitted all available 
documents for appropriate legal action. Based on this request, competent bodies in 
Turkiye conducted investigations in seven different cities. In the end, four persons were 
arrested in four different cities, Hatay, Burdur, Mugla, and Canakkale. Some evidence 
was detected in the computers of the other persons in Istanbul, Kriklareli and Mersin, but 
they were released on bail.
Again in another operation in the Netherlands, IP addresses and copied records 
and images submitted by Interpol The Hague were checked and investigations initiated in 
Turkiye. At the end of the investigations, the users and registered owners o f the IP 
numbers were identified in Usak and Denizli in Turkiye. While no evidence could be 
detected in the investigations in Denizli, the perpetrator was identified in Usak and he or 
she was arrested by judicial authorities.
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In another case, Interpol Vienna informed Interpol Ankara that 22 IP numbers 
from Turkiye were detected while they were purchasing pornographic records from a 
website. Since some information and documents were missing, Interpol Ankara requested 
additional documents and information from Interpol Vienna. Later Interpol Ankara 
received all available information to initiate an investigation in Turkiye. The case was 
called Operation Flo, and it was transferred to the Department of Public Peace and Order 
for investigation and action. For eleven IP users, no evidence could be found to charge 
them before court. For the other eleven IP numbers, investigations revealed some child 
pornographic images and other kinds o f evidence to bring them before judicial 
authorities. Although the prosecutions regarding the case were reported to be ongoing, 
the suspects were released on bail.
In an operation called Smasher, Interpol Wiesbaden requested appropriate 
investigations against some IP numbers from Interpol Ankara that were suspected of 
dealing in child pornography. The Department o f Public Peace and Order received the 
case with all CD and documents from Interpol Ankara, and they identified 53 Internet 
users o f the IP numbers in 21 different cities in Turkiye. For 25 users, no evidence could 
be detected to bring charges against them. Sixteen other users from different cities were 
arrested. In computers of ten of the users, illegal content was detected. The accused were 
released on bail by judicial authorities. Because two IP addresses were used in internet 
cafes, users o f these two IPs could not be identified.
Interpol Canberra informed Interpol Ankara that while using a chat program, a 
minor female received inappropriate sexual images from a person whose email address 
and IP numbers were originating from Turkiye. The case was transferred to competent
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bodies in Turkiye. The perpetrator was identified in Denizli, and a judicial proceeding 
was initiated against the person, who was arrested.
Unsuccessful cases
These cases were basically about websites hosting photos, videos o f child 
pornography, or have links to other websites with similar content. While German Interpol 
had four investigation requests, Spanish Interpol had three requests from Interpol Ankara. 
All of these investigations concerned websites and IP numbers linked to marketing, 
distributing, or otherwise involved in downloading child pornography. Italy sent a 
message about a website registered in Turkiye. Likewise Swiss, Dutch, and Polish 
Interpol Bureaus sent requests about IP numbers in Turkiye to be investigated. In only 
one case, which was from Germany, the investigation was concerned with the use o f a 
chat program. Checks on these files found no significant information, which implies 
negative results for these cases.
Analysis of 2007
The highest number o f cases opened was 83 in 2007— more than in 2005 and in 
2006. Among the 83 documents from 2007, fifteen cases were operational requests from 
foreign Interpol Bureaus (Outgoing requests) for police and legal action.
Incoming Requests totaled 69. Among these incoming requests, 52 cases were 
operational, involving requests for police and legal action. Among the incoming cases, 
eight cases were considered non-operational, and nine cases concern other kinds o f 
sexual crimes against minors.
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Outgoing requests
Total outgoing requests in 2007 numbered 14. These file requests were sent to 
Interpol Bureaus in the United States (five times), Germany (three times), Panama (three 
times), Russia (two times), the UK, Holland, Canada, Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam, and 
copied to the Interpol headquarters in Geneva (seven times only for information). Most of 
these requests called for investigation o f websites determined to be hosting child 
pornography. In addition, two cases involved a video sharing web application, 
rapidshare.com, through which child pornography was claimed to be uploaded or 
downloaded. In one case, an email account was used for the same crime. Cases in 2007 
were initiated by local police in Ankara (four cases), and Istanbul (six cases), by the 
Department o f Public Peace and Order (two cases), and by judicial authorities in Ttirkiye 
(two cases). In two cases, Interpol Ankara received responses requesting that 
investigations not continue. National units dealing with these two cases were notified 
about these messages and any additional details requested by foreign Interpol Bureaus. In 
the other twelve files there are no responses.
Time and date barrier
One o f the cases concerns a file-sharing website. The Prosecutor’s Office in 
Ankara established that a link for a child pornography file was uploaded and shared on 
this file-sharing website. The administration of the website had noticed the file and 
removed it from their servers. Submitting all available information including date and 
time of the uploaded file, Interpol Ankara requested that German Interpol identify the 
user who uploaded the file by submitting all technical details of the uploading including 
IP number, user name, and sign-up email address. However, since the file was removed
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and deleted by the website administration, Interpol Wiesbaden informed Interpol Ankara 
that it was not possible to have the file again.
Transnational involvement and rogatory commission
The other unsuccessful case involved marketing a sex video of a child victim on 
the Internet. Based on inquiry by judicial authorities in Turkiye, Interpol Ankara 
requested from a number o f NCBs and IP SG to assist in identifying the victim in the 
photo. Interpol Ankara also requested that Interpol France identify the IP number of a 
suspect whose email address was known. German and Dutch Interpol Bureaus and IP SG 
were not able to identify the child in the photo. Canadian and US Interpol replied they 
could not compare and check the video in their records. Interpol France responded that 
the IP number belongs to an Internet Service Provider (ISP) in their country, and a 
rogatory commission about the request for the case was necessary to further 
investigations in France.
In the other twelve cases, a number o f websites were subject to inquiries from 
foreign Interpol Bureaus. All of these cases were reported to the related foreign Interpol 
Bureaus with all available information and documents, including recorded photos, videos, 
or other kinds of digital files on CD or DVD, domain addresses, IP numbers, the original 
Internet Service Provider (ISP), and other contact information (postal addresses, phone 
numbers, and email addresses). These Interpol Bureaus were asked to make appropriate 
investigations and notify Interpol Ankara o f their results. However, no significant 
response or result has been received or achieved so far in these cases.
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Incoming Requests
Total incoming requests in 2007 were 69. Among them, 52 cases concerning child 
pornography on the Internet were operational and resulted in requests for appropriate 
police or judicial action. While eight cases were non-operational requests, nine cases in 
2007 involved other kinds o f sexual crimes against children.
Among the 52 operational cases, only nine cases resulted in significant success in 
identifying suspects and transferring them to judicial authorities. For the remaining 43 
operational cases, no significant results could be achieved. Among the 43 cases, in six 
cases, there were reasons and barriers mentioned in the digital archive that investigations 
could not be furthered. For the remaining 37 cases, no result or a reason was recorded in 
the files.
Successful cases
Interpol London notified Interpol Ankara that an email address and phone number 
from Turkiye were found to be related to an investigation against child pornography in 
the UK and submitted eight pages of details of the investigation to Interpol Ankara. It 
was easy to identify the subscriber of the phone number in a province o f Turkiye, but the 
person was not the user of the email. Based on information supplied by the subscriber o f 
the phone number, the user o f the email account was identified. Checks by local police 
revealed such photos and records in the person’s computer. He was transferred to the 
public prosecutor’s office, and released afterwards.
A nine page message attached with a CD sent by German Interpol stated that one 
IP number from Turkiye was downloading crime related records from the video sharing 
websites FrostWire and BearShare. The department o f Interpol Ankara conveyed the
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message to the related department and local police. The user of the IP number was 
identified and traced to Karabuk. The person was interrogated by the police and stated 
that he was just storing these records but not distributing them. He was transferred to the 
public prosecutor’s office and released afterwards.
In a message from Interpol Canada, it was stated that an 11-year-old child was 
chatting with a person from Nevsehir, Turkiye. The person gave the victim his phone 
number and wanted to take a photo and recording of her while chatting. Local police in 
Nevsehir established that the phone number belonged to another person who denied 
knowing either the perpetrator or the incident. No judicial action is known in this case, 
although the alleged persons were identified.
Another criminal investigation of a chat program was reported by Interpol 
London to Interpol Ankara. Identifying himself as the teenaged victim’s cousin, an 
individual requested photos from the victim. Later the individual began blackmailing the 
victim and requested more naked photos. Interpol London submitted all available 
information about the case, the blackmailer’s IP number and other available details. The 
offender involved in this case was identified and traced to Kocaeli, Turkiye. Checks of 
the person’s computer found inappropriate photos and recordings. For further judicial 
proceedings against the person, Interpol Ankara requested judicial documents from 
Interpol London through diplomatic channels.
Providing a CD, protected with a password, Interpol London identified criminal 
proceedings in their country to Interpol Ankara against child pornography. Based on 
information and records submitted by Interpol London, Ankara police investigated and 
identified seven persons. They were transferred to judicial authorities and released 
afterwards.
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In a similar case, reported by German Interpol, a person was arrested by judicial 
authorities but released afterwards.
Another similar case was reported by Interpol Austria. Investigations were 
conducted based on submitted IP numbers, CD, and other available information in 
Turkiye. Thirteen suspects were identified and transferred to judicial authorities. While 
two of them were arrested, the others were released.
In a message from Interpol London, it was reported that on a website, a person 
whose nickname and email account is known was trying to incite underage girls to pose 
on a webcam and provide their email addresses. Interpol London submitted all available 
records, dates, and times of the incidents, as well as the IP numbers o f the user. Interpol 
Ankara conveyed this information to related departments. The user was later identified, 
and a lawsuit was initiated against the person. He was released, but prosecution was 
ongoing without arrest.
Interpol Canada notified Turkish authorities that from an email account, naked 
photos and video recordings of an underage girl o f 15 were sent to an individual’s email 
address in Canada. After the given information was submitted to competent bodies in 
Turkiye by Interpol Ankara, the user of the email account was identified. He was 
transferred to the prosecutor’s office. He was released, but the prosecution against him 
was on-going at the time.
No results cases
As stated above, except from nine cases (out o f total 52), in 43 operational cases, 
no significant result could be achieved. Among these 43 cases, in six cases, some reasons 
are reported and known which may hinder investigations. For the other 37 operational
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cases, investigations by competent bodies in the country revealed no significant result. If 
we look at negative cases resulted because of some barriers, we see the following cases:
Problem of Internet cafe and date-time o f the crime
Interpol Hong Kong reported to Interpol Ankara that a person on a web-cam 
showed some sexual behaviors to a girl and sent some sexual pictures to her email 
account. Based on given IP number by Interpol Hong Kong, investigations conducted in 
Turkiye established that the IP number belongs to an internet cafe. Since the date and 
time of the crime is not clear it was impossible to check all the visitors o f the internet cafe 
and establish the perpetrators) in this case.
Corporation barriers (email account)
According to information received from Interpol London, a person showed some 
inappropriate sexual behaviors on MSN while chatting with a teenager, aged 12. 
Investigations in Ttirkiye checked the person’s email account and IP number but no 
useful information could be received from Microsoft Corporation. Because of that, no 
further proceedings could be carried out by authorities.
Problem of dynamic IP numbers and date-time o f  the crime
Interpol Poland submitted a DVD and all available information in their hand 
regarding an investigation in their country against child pornography on the web. They 
submitted a number o f IP numbers as well as all documents o f all technical details o f web 
pages. Investigations by competent bodies in Turkiye found that submitted IP numbers 
are dynamic which can be used by different persons on different date and time. Thus,
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missing information such as the accurate connection time period of IP numbers, 
connection date and time details hindered investigations to proceed in TUrkiye.
Moreover, the attached document’s language received from Interpol Poland was another 
problem since they were in the Polish language.24
Likewise, Interpol Belgium sent an investigation request to Interpol Ankara about 
an email that included child pornography. Because of lack o f information about date and 
time of the crime reported, no investigations could be carried out in Turkiye.
Lack of information
Canadian Interpol notified a number of other Interpol National Bureaus that 
investigations in their country established that one person was distributing and sharing 
images of child pom with 56 users within Canada and 576 other user/person(s) from 42 
different countries. It was reported that three were from Turkiye. Investigations could not 
be furthered because of lack o f information such as IP numbers, online time(s), and the 
number o f downloaded files.
The complicated procedure of rogatory commission
Interpol London notified a criminal investigation in their country about hacking 
email accounts of nineteen females, some of whom were teenagers. Attracting them on 
MSN, an unidentified person insisted victims visit a web-site of his where he hacks MSN 
user names and passwords. He was blackmailing them to make a 20-minutes show before 
a web-cam. Otherwise, he would give these accounts to terrorists or other sexual
24 Each Interpol member declares which official language o f  the General Secretariat is/are accepted in its 
national bureau. Interpol Ankara accepts English and French.
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criminals. Some of victims accepted the person's demands. In this way, the person could 
also access other friends o f victims as if  he is her and asked similar demands from them. 
Interpol London also submitted two pages o f IP numbers and log details o f these 
connections. Because this case was very broad and required an extensive investigation, 
Interpol Ankara requested from Interpol London to send a rogatory commission through 
diplomatic channels. The result o f investigation is unknown (not reported) in its digital 
file.
Analysis of cases between 2005-2007
As seen in content analysis of digital files o f 2005, 2006 and 2007 opened in 
Interpol Ankara, investigations o f internet child pornography are significantly 
problematic for law enforcement agencies. Among the operational incoming messages of 
86 cases in these years, only 18 of them could be considered as successfully solved, i.e. 
suspects are identified and/or brought before judicial authorities in Turkiye. This is about 
20% of all the operational incoming messages.
In about 80% of all operational incoming messages, which is 14+54=68, 
investigations could not reach a significant end. While in fourteen files there were some 
kinds of technical, legal reasons known for not furthering investigations, 54 files are seen 
not be able to reach a significant end with no known reason given in the files.
As for outgoing investigations, among the 24 operational investigation requests 
from foreign Interpol departments, none of them shows that investigations abroad reveal 
a significant end, i.e. suspects are identified and/or are brought before judicial authorities. 
While four cases among them have some reasons for not being able to conduct
investigation in related countries, the other 20 files do not contain any information about 
the conclusion or progress in the countries requested.
This unpleasant situation for outgoing investigation request is also seen in 
Unveren’s study. Although he gives examples of some successful cases and 
investigations in Ttirkiye based on requests received from foreign Interpol Bureaus, no 
successful investigation is known abroad based on information and request by Interpol 
Ankara. Thus, prosecution efforts o f authorities particularly in internet child pornography 
are not promising either as seen in this chapter.
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CHAPTER VII 
RESULTS, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND WEAKNESSES
RESULT OF EACH ANALYSIS
Research Question 1: To what extent do blocking measures on the Internet 
effectively prevent access to undesired websites and web content? As seen in previous 
sections, internet access blocking efforts by authorities are not very effective at 
preventing people access to undesired websites or web contents in Turkiye. The first 
pages o f the all tested blocked websites are accessed by using one o f three circumvention 
technics tested in this study, i.e. Tor, Ultrasurf and Ktunnel.1 Most o f the blocked 
websites can be accessible through the circumvention methods tested here. The 
percentage of successful access to the blocked websites with the use o f Tor is some 71% 
and this can reach up to 85%, if  the results with “partly possible” are also considered as 
successful access. The percentage with the use of Ultrasurf is 69%. If the five websites 
for which the tool does not support are also excluded from the sample size for Ultrasurf, 
the percentage o f successful access for this tool reaches 88%. The percentage o f possible 
access with the use o f Ktunnel is the lowest as 40%. If the ones which are evaluated as 
“access partly possible” are also considered satisfactory, this percentage reaches 72%. 
The numbers o f websites which could not be accessed through each method are 2 sites 
for Ultrasurf, 6 webs for Ktunnel, and 3 for Ktunnel.
Second, there is always a risk of over blocking or under blocking error as 
explained in related sections. YouTube case shows both examples o f over blocking as
1 If one circumvention tool tested in this study is not successful, any o f  the other is able to access for all 
blocked websites except from the three ones which are specified as excluded in the text.
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seen in the errors of access blocking to some Google services like Google Translate, 
Google Analytic. This case also shows how this measure can be un-proportional by 
blocking access to the entire website because o f a few undesired records although the 
website is hosting millions of video records and has millions of users for different 
purposes all over the world.
Finally, access blocking is not effective because o f the fact that it does not remove 
the undesired website or web content from the internet. Blocked websites which have 
audience within the borders of blocking country can still be online outside national 
borders by changing their domain addresses with different extensions, suffixes, and/or by 
using different servers abroad.
Research Question 2: How effective are the police in identifying, tracing and 
bringing criminals involved in child pornography before judicial authorities? Like 
complications and gaps seen in blocking measures, significant problems are seen in 
investigations o f child pornography on the Internet. Since Internet child pornography is 
very much a transnational crime,2 analyzing investigation files opened in an Interpol 
department, i.e. Interpol Ankara presents a good picture o f transnational aspect of 
investigations regarding child pornography. The analysis o f these files presents a clear 
picture about the research question since just focusing on data of a national unit for any 
cybercrime will give only one dimension o f such a research question regarding 
prosecution. Analysis of transnational data as utilized in this study however covers both 
the efforts o f national units in prosecution as well as those o f foreign units. This coverage 
should be an ideal analysis since the internet is global and transnational in structure.
2 European Com m ission, International cooperation against cybercrim e Council o f  Europe. "Resources: 
International Cooperation against Cybercrime," w w w.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/econom iccrim e/cybercrim e 
/Docum ents/Intem ationalcooperation/defaulten.asp.
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From this view, this study is unique to analyze a cybercrime like internet child 
pornography based on data of Interpol Ankara.
A number of international conventions by the United Nations and European 
Commission condemn different forms o f  child abuse along with child pornography, and 
recognize them as crime to be punished.3 Moreover, people’s awareness and sensitivity 
on crimes against children is very high all over the world and authorities give special 
importance when a minor is the victim o f such a crime. Thus, to enlighten this nasty 
crime and identify perpetrator, it is expected that each policing unit dealing with such 
kinds o f investigations is more elaborative and cooperative with the investigating units, 
either at home or abroad.
However, as seen in section VI.B, most o f  the operational investigation requests 
about child pornography on the Internet end up without a significant result. Among the 
86 operational incoming investigation requests came to Interpol Ankara in-between years 
of 2005 and 2007, in only 18 cases perpetrators are identified and/or transferred to the 
judicial authorities. In 68 cases, investigations reach no significant ends. This implies that 
among the reported operational incoming cases about child pornography, only 20% of 
them could be solved, whereas in 80% o f the cases investigations reach no result.
Worse is seen for outgoing requests. Interpol Ankara conveyed 24 operational 
investigation requests to foreign Interpol Bureaus between 2005 and 2007. However, 
significant result could be achieved in none of them. Although in four cases, there are 
some extra message traffics between Interpol Ankara and other related Bureaus, these 
cases could not be solved either.
One of the important contributions o f this study is the access and the analysis o f
’ EuroISPA, "Faq Internet Blocking," www.euroispa.org/new s/70-faq-Intem et-blocking.
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the files in Interpol Ankara. Examining the crime based on data of such an institution 
presents a broader perspective and covers all possible failures or incapability either at 
home or abroad. The result of this analysis confirms that the structure and characteristics 
of the internet complicates criminality in a significant way.
OVERALL ANALYSIS AND CONTRIBUTION
These findings, at least observed in two issue area are in parallel to the supporters 
of the independence claims of cyberspace, i.e. the internet is a new wine in a new bottle. 
Thus, traditional legal approaches and measures can become ineffective, and sometimes 
meaningless as seen in this study for Turkiye. There are a number o f reasons which 
support such assumptions including the size and types o f internet use and internet 
applications, the unique structure of the internet, the anonymity of the actor acting within 
the virtual platform and availability o f variety methods to protect anonymity thorough 
covering, changing or manipulating.
The volume of the internet, the size and types o f internet applications and internet 
activities cannot be compared with those of the previous media and communication 
devices. According to netcraft.com, the registered web-sites numbers in the most popular 
servers like Apache, Microsoft is 312,693,296 between August 1995- April 2011; and 
among them about 110,000,000 are considered active.4 Web-page numbers are more than 
billions. According to worldwidewebsize.com, at least 14.42 billion pages are known by 
The Indexed Web. While Google has indexed about 35 billion pages, 10.7 billion pages
4 Netcraft, "April 2 0 1 1 Web Server Survey," http://news.netcraft.com /archives/20l l/04 /06/april-2011-w eb-  
server-survey.html#more-4l 87.
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are indexed by Yahoo.5 In some open resources, the number of webpages is estimated to 
exceed exceeds 600 billion.6
In their diagram, The Intel Corporation shows that while 30 hours of video 
uploaded on YouTube, 1,3 million videos are being viewed in one minute on the same 
site. Over two million of search performed on Google and 204 million e-mails sent on the 
internet in sixty seconds. While 277,000 users are logins on Facebook, 6 million views 
are realized on the website. About 320 new accounts open on Twitter in one minute and 
users send about 100,000 tweeter messages. The number o f networked devices is equal to 
the world population now (as o f 2012) and will be double o f the global population by 
2015.7
A website further notes that “60 new Blog account, 1500 new Blog post; 70 
domain name registered in one minute.” 8 A news indicate that “6150 hours o f Skype 
conversation, 11 million having online chat, 2 million watch pornography, 12 website 
hacked am ong416 attempt in 60 seconds.” 9 Thus, it is very much complicated, difficult 
for nation states to control this huge size o f image, data, record, link etc., though not all 
o f them may concern them.
Looking at the blocking practices o f TUrkiye in the view of this enormous size of 
the internet, it can be seen that there is huge gaps between the number o f available 
undesired websites on the internet and the number of similar websites blocked by Turkish 
authorities, particularly the TIB. The most internet blocking cases in the country based on
5 Maurice Kunder, "The S ize o f  the World W ide W eb (the Internet)," w w w .w orldw idew ebsize.com /.
6 Kevin Kelly, "We Are the Web," Wired, August 2005.
7 Intel Corporation, "What Happens in an Internet Minute?" http://www.intel.com /content/www/us/en  
/communications/internet-minute-infographic.html.
8 GO-Globe, "60 Seconds -  Things That Happen on Internet Every S ixty Seconds [Infographic],” 
http://w w w .go-gulf.com /blog/60-seconds/.
9 "intemette 60 Saniyede Neler Oluyor?" Timeturk, 24 March 2012.
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the law no: 5651 are seen against pornographic and obscenity. As cited in Atamer, 
pornographic and obscene websites on the Internet was estimated about 4-5 million 
which constituted 12% of the total websites of the internet.10 In 2003, it was estimated 
that such kinds of websites were about 1.3 million and web pages were about 260
• • I I  | ^million. However, as o f March 2012, total blocked websites were about 16 thousands. 
Considering the size of these kinds of websites on the internet with the ones that are 
blocked by the TIB shows a lot about ineffectiveness of internet access blocking. Nor the 
size of the internet activities makes impossible to trace or prosecute every perpetrator 
involved cybercrime, as for an example stressed by Edwards in child pornography 
incidents on the internet.13
The unique structure of the internet is another challenge either for regulation or 
prosecution. The internet is a global network of networks which make it naturally 
transnational. It exceeds national borders and does not belong to any authority. An online 
internet user is a citizen o f cyberspace and can share whatever she wants with anyone 
online from anywhere on this platform. Having an internet access makes an individual to 
have a chance to amplify his voice to the world, to access foreign agents or institutions 
without travelling and a valid passport, or to have shopping in a foreign retailer.
The innovation mentality o f the internet was essentially founded on a risk o f a 
nuclear attack and ensuring communication when one or more central nodes are targeted. 
This idea created the medium on a network structure in a mesh typology and this
10 llker Atamer, "5651 Sayili Yasa Ve Eri$im Engellem e Kararlari," In 2008  Bilifim  Konferansi. Ankara, 
2008.
11 Safe Families, "Statistics on Pornography, Sexual Addiction and O nline Perpetrators," http://www  
.safefam i 1 ies.org/sfStats. php.
12 "Engelli Web," Engelliweb.com. Checked in March 2012, it reports the total blocked websites as 15,596.
13 Susan Edwards, "Prosecuting 'Child Pornography': Possession and Taking o f  Indecent Photographs o f  
Children," Journal o f  S ocial W elfare an d  Fam ily Law  22, no. 1 (2000): 1-21.
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structure force itself to ensure communication in a shortest and efficient way within the 
available links of the network. “The Internet was originally designed based on a 
decentralized network architecture, resilient to failure and disruption, the Internet is 
resistant to external attempts at control.” 14 Thus, this unique structure is not very well 
appropriate for filtering or internet access blocking. And through any node which is weak 
and appropriate for misuse, it is open to criminality and manipulation.
Another important challenge for traditional approach and state policing is the 
constantly changing nature of the internet and internet technology. The internet today is 
totally different from the internet in the 1990s. While the internet was only World Wide 
Web, and email was the primary option in those years, today we have many other internet 
applications like VoIP, Instant Messengers, Blogging, TV, radio, and we have many 
other innovations today running over the internet like smart phones, 3G/4G 
technologies.15
The technologic developments and changes occur very often before authorities to 
respond and before it is widely being used by people. Law comes after technology and 
the diffusion of the technology use. Once authorities decide to act, they may become late 
or it becomes very much expensive for them to control, regulate and prosecute the 
problems with the use of internet or new internet applications.
Rather than authorities try to force the internet to be bordered, regulated, 
nationalized, or territorialized, they need to adapt their traditional state mechanisms and 
tools in accordance with the realities of the internet. The Internet requires a different legal 
mentally, administrative approach, political perspective.
14 Cormac Callanan, Marco Gercke, Estelle De Marco, and Hein Dries-Ziekenheiner, "Internet Blocking: 
Balancing Cybercrime Responses in Democratic Societies," Open Society Institute, 2009.
15 Timothy S. Wu, "Cyberspace Sovereignty? The Internet and the International System," H arvard  Journal 
o f  Law & Technology  10, no. 3 (1997).
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WEAKNESS OF THE STUDY: LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE PROJECTIONS
The internet has both negative and positive sides for users as well as for national 
authorities. This study focuses on negative sides and problematic dimensions o f internet 
use for authorities. Referring the negative situations in the two issue areas explored here, 
it is not possible to come a conclusion that authorities are powerless in controlling the 
internet. Still, many dimensions from user side as well as authority side need to be 
explored to see the complete picture about many questions arisen with the use o f internet.
The test o f internet blocking and pay-passing methods conducted for this study is 
not performed in a lab environment by technical experts. It is performed by the author of 
this study who had no professional training or education on blocking or fileting 
technology on the internet. This fact, however, is considered not a major issue to change 
the results o f findings in this section in a significant degree. Even, this fact can be 
considered as positive effect on the results since the study aims to see the real situation 
for ordinary internet users who are using the internet in their daily life with medium level 
computer knowledge and skills.
This section o f the study does not cover people perceptions about the internet 
blocking and their reactions to such measures. It is important for future studies to 
research sociological aspects o f internet blocking, their tendency to use bypass methods, 
and reasons for using such methods. Making similar studies in other countries with 
different regime type and technical capacity will make significant contribution to 
understand the questions explored in this study.
New terms emerged with the internet like social media, citizen journalism have 
become very influential terms today. The uses o f specific internet applications like 
Facebook, Twitter have significant socio political consequences around the globe. With
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the use o f smart phones and 3G technology, people access to the internet becomes easier 
and questions emerged with the internet use has gained new dimensions to be explored in 
future studies.
For the second dimension of the study, it is an advantage o f the author to have 
worked before in an official department which was also dealing with child pornography 
investigation in the national Interpol department. This section is not a unit which is 
directly conducting such investigations but an intermediary unit between foreign and 
national expert units. This may have no or little effects on findings and conclusions o f 
this section. However, making such a study based on data and files o f a first unit which is 
directly conducting such investigations will better explain the reasons behind the 
unsolved investigations.
The internet is relatively a new technologic phenomenon. It is very often a 
surprise both for people as well as authorities to see a new innovation compatible with 
the internet. Law and preventive measures by authorities comes after the uses o f such 
innovations are diffused among people, and after having face to their problems in legal 
and socio-political realm. Looking at the spread, type, and effective use o f the internet in 
the past two decades and considering the capacity of this new phenomenon, show that the 
internet will have a bold signature in a variety o f fields in this century and bears a huge 
area o f immature research potential for future studies.
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CHAPTER VIII
POLICY IMPLICATIONS, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND CONCLUSION
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Despite such kinds of technical ineffectiveness, states tend to try to control this 
global network o f networks with its traditional power tools, and they should do so. 
However, while these traditional tools are being considered for use in administering and 
legalizing, authorities should be aware o f the unique structure of this medium. For 
instance, a court order called for termination of all the activities of the offending website. 
This is not possible, as Minister Binali Yildirim explains, because Turkish law is valid 
within Turkish borders not in other countries.
Having shifting from the industry age to the information age, the Internet seems to 
be the engine of the new century. It has merged communication, media and information 
on the same platform, which are the essential constituents o f the modem life. As a nation­
state, Turkiye should understand this new medium well and try to develop policies to 
maximize its benefit from. Rather than blocking, filtering, monitoring or the like, the 
country should focus on developing a better Internet infrastructure and service standards, 
promoting enrichment of national Internet contents, encouraging the use o f Internet in 
better serving to its people, and finding alternative ways to ensure its contribution to the 
economic development.
On the other hand, if  regulation and law making is necessary in this field, 
applicability o f the law should be prioritized. Ignoring enforcement aspects o f  the each 
provision will have negative impacts on the effectiveness o f the law as seen in the case of
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Turkiye.1 At this point, adaptation of technocracy into all levels of public administration 
seems to be inevitable.
The Internet itself, its infrastructure, and all kinds o f hardware, and software that 
runs the Internet, are very much technical and require technical expertise. Bringing and 
adapting technical perspective to these fields will minimize unforeseen complications, 
possible gaps, failures and maximize the effectiveness o f public services. While for some 
managerial, administrative and auditing departments and positions in this filed should 
handed over to technocracy; investigating units like police and even prosecutors should 
be specialized. Proficient police units and prosecutors who have expertise should deal 
with cybercrime investigations. Like the technocracy in these executive departments and 
specialization in investigative bodies, technical expertise should be invited to the law 
making committees and their hearings.
A special institution regarding cybercrime was finally founded in 2011 under the 
National Police Organization, General Directorate o f Police. Separated from “Department 
o f Struggling against Smuggling and Organized Crimes” under “General Directorate o f 
Police”, a new department was established as “Department o f Struggling against 
Information System Crimes.” The same department has changed its name as “Department 
of Struggling against Cyber-crimes” in 20013.2 The department is relatively a new 
department and should immediately develop its personnel regime, their training, and if 
necessary, should open hiring civilian experts in computer science and information 
systems. It should establish national standards for sections in cities and should 
immediately support these sections to achieve national standards in terms o f technical and
1 For applicability challenges o f  criminal laws on cybercrim es, see D eb Shinder, "What M akes Cybercrime 
Laws So Difficult to Enforce," TechRepublic, 26  January 2 0 1 1.
2 "Siber Su?Iarla MQcadele Daire Ba§kanligi Hakkimizda," www.siber.pol.tr/Sayfalar/hakkim izda.aspx.
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personnel capacity.
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
The main functions of a state are ensuring security, safety and justice within the 
country. For ensuring security and safety, state officials first implement preventive 
measures, tactics and policies in order to stop criminality. If a crime is already 
committed, the primary duty of state policing and prosecuting units is to identify 
perpetrator(s), collect forensic evidences against them, bring them before judicial 
authorities, and ensure they are being prosecuted and charged if found guilty. In a broader 
context, this is the policing functions o f any governing state.
As Murray notes, “It is extremely difficult and costly to enforce traditional legal 
and regulatory control systems within cyberspace, due to a variety o f  factors including a 
relative degree o f anonymity, lack of physicality, digitalization of content, environmental 
plasticity, and international or cross border nature o f the network.” 3 The example o f 
Turkiye in this study confirms this perspective that traditional response tools o f the 
government to control the Internet suffer significant gaps, complications, and 
insufficiency. These situations can be observed in the two main functions o f the country, 
both in preventing and in prosecution aspects.
In terms of blocking, for instance, the operation and network structure o f the 
Internet make blocking and filtering attempts problematic, and enable users to bypass 
these barriers through variety o f methods and ways. At this point, it is better to remember 
the famous saying of John Gilmore: “The net interprets censorship as damage, and routes
3 Andrew D. Murray, The Regulation o f  C yberspace: C on tro l in the Online Environm ent, (Oxon: Routledge 
and Cavendish, 2007), 205.
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around it.”4
In terms of prosecution, for instance, uncertainty o f  identity and location 
complicate law enforcement.5 Most of the time, criminals use different tactics, methods 
to hide their IP,6 manipulate their location, or “manipulate the bits and bytes, making it 
harder for law enforcement to trace.”7 As seen in this study, many investigations o f 
Internet child pornography reached no results either by Turkish authorities or by foreign 
authorities. In some cases, IP numbers were not enough for Turkish authorities to identify 
and find the location(s) of perpetrator(s).
Beside these technical challenges at home, the global and transnational network 
structure o f the Internet make the situation further complicated with political challenges. 
For instance, a blocked website and its content can easily find a server and hosting 
abroad. Criminals may shift or direct their illegal activities to the countries where 
technical and legal capacity are relatively low.8 Keeping in mind that cybercrimes are 
very much transnational and that law enforcement agencies are having serious challenges 
at home, they will face more challenges when these crimes are committed abroad.
Callanan et al. stress that formal requirements and slow responses for legal 
assistance among states very often block investigations. This is one of the important 
reasons for states to develop their own controlling instruments, like Internet blocking.9 
The Internet Service Providers Association in Europe also notes that Internet blocking is
4 Jack L. Goldsmith and Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet?: Illusions o f  a B orderless W orld , (N ew  York, 
NY: Oxford University Press, 2006), 3.
5 Shinder, ibid.
6 Marcia Hoffman, "Why IP A ddresses Atone D o n ’t Identify C rim inals," Electronic Frontier Foundation, 24  
August 2011.
7 John Douglas, Ann W. Burgess, Allen G. Burgess, and Robert K. Ressler, eds, C rim e C lassification  
Manual: A S tandard  System  for Investigating a n d  C lassifying Violent Crim e, (H oboken, N ew  Jersey: John 
W iley & Sons Inc., 2013), 409.
8 Linda Reid, "Expert Opinion," Journal o f  Inform ation P rivacy & Security  I, no. 4  (2005): 53-59.
9 Cormac Callanan, Marco Gercke, Estelle D e Marco, and Hein Dries-Ziekenheiner, "Internet Blocking: 
Balancing Cybercrime Responses in Democratic Societies," Open Society Institute, 2009.
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claimed to decrease “political pressure" within the state to seek for international 
cooperation.10
As seen in section VI.B regarding investigations o f Interpol cases on child 
pornography, many cases reached no results because o f formal requirements among 
states. Judicial authorities tend not to prefer this non-routine way since preparing a formal 
letter, called a “Rogatory Commission”, its translation, and sending through diplomatic 
channels are very time consuming, also require further expertise. Even after these are 
fulfilled, it is no guarantee that the case will be admitted to be prosecuted by judicial 
authorities of the requested country. Last but not least, whether the case will be 
developed, criminals will be identified or arrested is not clear, very often not likely.
Comparing to other issue areas in international relations, which the literature very 
often compares to maritime and airspace to evaluate international cooperation, 
cyberspace is a new and immature issue area in terms of international law and 
international conventions. A quick search on the UN Convention database for the key 
words of each area as maritime, aviation and cyber reveals that while there are 357 
international conventions about maritime and 392 conventions about aviation, only two 
conventions came into force about cyberspace. 11
States need to change this situation and develop effective ways o f international 
cooperation since many issues on the Internet are transnational. Beside technological
10 EurolSPA, "Faq Internet Blocking," w w w.euroispa.org/new s/70-faq-lntem et-blocking.
11 United Nations Treaty Collection, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/UNTSO nline.aspx?id=2. Separate checks 
for each word (maritime, aviation, and cyber) reveals the follow ing: Maritime: Title search (options for 
match any o f  these words and for any treaty type -bilateral, open multilateral etc.), record count 357 (the 
oldest multinational convention’s conclusion date seen on database 12 Sseptem berl923; Aviation: Title  
search (options for match any o f  these words and for any treaty type -bilateral, open multilateral etc.), 
record count 392 (the oldest multinational -o p en - convention is Interim Agreement on International C ivil 
Aviation, entry force date 06 June 1945; Cyber: Title search (options for match any o f  these words and for 
any treaty type -bilateral, open multilateral etc.), record count 2 (both multilateral; one entry into force on 
07 January 2004, the other on 3 January 2006. A search for the word “cyberspace” reveals no results. A 
search for the word “cyber” reveals 2 results. A search for the word “airspace” reveals 8 results.
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barriers, inability and complications either seen during the administrative stage or during 
the judicial stage, states should not exacerbate problems with physical borders. Despite 
different political and legal approaches to administering and controlling the Internet 
among states, they should try to find issue areas to have consensus on.
Especially for judicial prosecution of cybercrimes, as seen in this study for child 
pornography investigations, states need to minimize and standardize formalities in legal 
assistance requests among each other. And they should take measures to accelerate 
procedures in these investigation requests. The Interpol General Secretariat should 
explore alternative ways to increase effectiveness o f international investigations about 
cybercrimes and child pornography, either at police level or judicial level, and should 
strongly recommend member states to follow these advices.
The General Secretariat should develop standard form(s) for cybercrimes e.g. that 
can be used for child pornography investigations. Well organized, comprehensible and 
standard form(s) should include what technical details are necessary, in which format as 
well as other important information and requirements for an effective investigation that 
can be conducted in any country. States requesting legal assistance, their competent 
authorities can fill this standard form with available information and can send it to the 
related country through Interpol Bureaus.
Another important issue regarding criminal investigations about cybercrimes is 
the anonymous feature of Internet use. Users can hide who they are and often where they 
are in their Internet activities in a number o f different ways. The IP number is the primary 
clue that investigators utilize to reach the Internet subscriber, if the user did not use 
alternative ways to manipulate its IP number. Very often, as seen in child pornography 
investigations in this study, an IP number belongs to a public network, like a commercial
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Internet cafe which is open to public for their temporary use.
As seen in section IV of this study about the numbers of Internet cafes, there are 
thousands of cafes (excluding other places open to commercial public use) spread all 
cities and provinces o f the country. Although these places have positive effects in 
spreading the Internet use to every part o f the country, increasing the Internet use and 
minimizing the effects of the digital divide within the country; these places should not be 
a center for criminal activities. Therefore, the regulations of Internet commercial use in 
public places should be revised and tightened. Likewise, their supervision and controlling 
should be more systematic and effective in order to prevent these places from being 
misused by criminals.
In order to increase effective controlling functions on the Internet to some degree, 
nation-states should explore more the ways of international cooperation on the subject of 
the Internet which has started to erode their sovereignty, and has become an inducing 
center for criminals. They should take measures to ensure that cooperation is faster and 
operating effectively since it is relatively more difficult to have traces o f Internet 
activities and criminals when authorities do not react in time. Other than cooperation, 
states will be alone to handle all the transnational externalities of the Internet along with 
other technical barriers either for prevention or prosecution.
CONCLUSION
One of the fundamental values o f democratic states is the rule o f law and this 
value is also a must for a Turkish Republic that defines itself in its Constitution as 
democratic, secular and social state of law. The country's political, economic and legal 
transformation, partly thanks to the influence o f  European Union, has developed the
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standards o f democracy and human rights, and further institutionalized the law in recent 
years.
However, Internet blocking has negatively affected these positive developments 
and progress in these fields, and received serious critics both from home and abroad 
against the country. Despite significant questions about the technical gaps and apparent 
doubts about the effectiveness o f blocking, insisting on such policies; receiving such 
critics at home or abroad and being classified within the countries o f censorship by 
independent unions and NGOs, all harm these democratic developments and the 
country’s image outside the world.
The issue of Internet blocking was not a subject of criticism in annual reports of 
EU access negotiations with Turkiye, for instance for the years of 2007 and 2008. 
However, it was later started to be criticized in the report o f 2009 under the title o f 
“freedom of expression”, and in the report of 2010 under the title o f “civil and political 
rights”. 12
The country accepts its citizens to apply the European Court o f Human Rights 
(ECHR) under certain conditions and some individuals applied to the court against such 
kinds of blocking verdicts by different authorities for certain websites like LastFm.com. 
and some Google sites.13 Likewise, an international NGO that monitors press and Internet 
freedom in the world, the RSF, classified Turkiye within the second category as 
“countries under surveillance” along with 16 countries like Russia and Australia. 14 Thus,
12 See European Comm ission Progress Reports (W orking Docum ents) for TOrkiye, for 2 0 0 7 ,2 0 0 8 , 2009, 
2010), "European Comm ission > Enlargement > Countries > Strategy and Progress Reports," http://ec 
.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/strategy-and-progress-report/index_en.htm.
' ’ European Court o f  Human Rights, "Bianet: Turkey Inquired About Internet Censorship," C yber- 
Rights. Org. TR. 10 March 2 0 11.
14 Reporters without Borders, "Countries under Surveillance. Turkey," http://en.rsf.org/surveillance- 
TQrkiye,39758.htm l.
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the issue o f internet blocking has opened up a new issue area for critics aboard, either in
the EU or other international NGOs.
Reports prepared for The OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe) by Akdeniz indicates that the number o f  blocked websites are increasing
dramatically and blockings which were rationalized with moral, cultural reasons are now
seen with other reasons such as political, and religious. Moreover, he claimed that the
transparency of judicial and administrative decisions tends to be weakening.15
The examples o f internet access blocking and how such policies are implemented
clearly violates a fundamental democratic value o f “freedom of speech” in the country,16
and endangers other important freedoms like freedom o f communication and freedom of
press.17 Today, even some countries including Estonia, Finland and Spain have admitted
•  •  18that access to the Internet is a fundamental human right for their citizens. Thus, 
maintaining such policies bears significant political risks for the country to be misused by 
any national or international actor.
Being a lawyer specialized on Constitution, Gedik admits that it is necessary to 
take legal measures against crimes on the Internet like child pornography, violence and 
inducing crimes on the Internet, but he insists that there needs to be principles o f limits 
and proportionality while taking these measures. Once these measures exceed the purpose
15 "OSCE Representative on Freedom o f  the M edia Report on the Turkish Internet Law," Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe, w w w .osce .org /fom /41091.
16 Batu Kinikoglu, "Evaluating the Regulation o f  A ccess to Online Content in Turkey in the Context o f  
Freedom o f  Speech," Journal o f  International C om m ercial Law an d  Technology 9, no. 1 (January 2014).
17 5651 Yasasi, "Eri$im Engeilem enin Adi: intem ete Sanstir," http://5651-yasasi.gyazilim .com /htm ldocs 
/icerik_goster/240/Internete_sansur/251 .html.
18 International Telecom m unication Union (ITU), "World Telecom m unication/ICT Developm ent Report 
2010. Monitoring the W SIS Targets. A Mid-Term Review," 2010.
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o f  these principles, then blocking measures become censorship, which is unacceptable. 19
The situation reminds us what Callanan et al. stress in their study:
“The inevitable circumvention possibilities, under-blocking, over-blocking, 
mission creep, conflicts o f laws and the problem that blocking leaves material 
online all mean that the issue at stake is not simply ‘to block or not to block’ but 
rather what blocking measures can be introduced that are proportionate and 
acceptable in a democratic society. As a result, it is crucial to review the legal and 
democratic challenges that Internet blocking raises.” 20
Showing examples o f YouTube and Geocities.com, Yaman Akdeniz notes that in 
some of blocking practices, particularly the ones which are taken directly and
independently (ex-officio) by prosecutors, judges, courts or Telekomunikasyon ileti§im
. •  21 Ba§kanhgi (the TIB), it is not always possible to understand the reason for blocking.
Google Transparency Report indicates global statistics of content removal
requests from national governments and Turkiye is the first country both with 9,610 items
requested for removal by court orders and with 2,552 items by executive, police
authorities between January and June 2013. While the second country in terms o f items
removal requests by court orders is the United States with 3,415, it is India for item
22removal requests by executive, police authorities with 672 in the same period.
Criticizing the law no. 5651 on the Internet, Gedik notes that “this law does not 
struggle against crimes but struggle against the Internet.” 23 Likewise, TUSIAD, the 
Turkish Industry and Business Association, one o f the most influential associations in the 
country, criticizes blocking policies as legal but not legitimate (i.e. applicable under
19 Omer Gedik, "Kitle Ileti§im Ozgurlugunun Yeni Boyutu “ Internet Ozgurliigii” V e 5 6 5 1 Sayili “ Internet 
Ortaminda Yapilan Yayinlarin Duzenienm esi V e Bu Yayinlar Y oluyla I§lenen S i^larla M licadele Edilmesi 
Hakkinda Kanun'a Bir Ele§tiri," In XII. "Turkiye 'de in te rn e t" Konferansi. Ankara, 2007.
20 Callanan et al., ibid.
21 "Herkes Kendi Gtlvenligini Kendi Saglamali!" NTVM SNBC , 24 June 2008.
22 Google, "Transparency Report," 2014.
23 Gedik, ibid., 123.
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current law but not appropriate under ideals o f  universal law ).24
Koc and Kaynak also indicates the dilemma in the law that, Article 4 finds 
content providers as responsible under some conditions for the links given within the 
websites. However, they believe that it is very much difficult always to follow up and 
monitor whether all these links are addressing a legal websites due to fast and constantly 
changing nature o f the Internet. They believe that this is because that the Internet is not 
exactly understood by policy makers. Likewise, lawyer Atamer stresses a similar 
difficulty that the second generation websites are open to instant messages and posts 
which puts content providers in a difficult situation constantly to detect each o f these 
inputs. This difficult situation can be misused by bad intendant users. It can cause one 
website to close for the purpose of unfair competition.
The law no. 5651 proposes to ensure a safe and secure Internet, and to protect 
physical and moral healthiness o f children. Because of filtering and blocking policies 
known by the public can lead families to leave children unattended with computer online 
or lead families not to use any personal filtering program. As Assoc. Prof. Leyla Keser 
stresses, the most effective prevention on the Internet is the user herself, “No public 
institution or organization can protect persons’ rights and benefits better than 
themselves.”25
Analyzing filtering software like AOL Parental Controls, Cyber Patrol, Cyber 
Sentinel etc.; children's ISPs like Planet Kids and Kidz.Net.; filtered search engines Alta 
Vista, UK Plus, Yahoo; and filter functions of Internet browsers Internet Explorer, and 
Netscape Navigator, a web based research by which.net reveals that although these kinds
24 "tQ sIA D : TQrkiye'deki internet Yasagi Hukuk'a Aykiridir," HaberlOOO, 4 March 2011.
25 "Herkes Kendi Gtlvenligini Kendi Saglamali!", ibid.
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of filtering system are effective to some degree, parental guidance and supervision should 
not be ignored to protect children from “the net nasties.”26
Moreover, measures such as blocking and censorship are believed to be increasing 
individuals interests in such censored objects. Karaca and Beyaznar give an example o f 
two social networking websites used by gays and lesbians. Being hosted abroad, these 
websites were directly blocked by the TIB. The owners o f websites opened a lawsuit 
against the TIB and were able to revoke the blocking measure. The number o f members 
of the websites increased significantly just after they were online again .27
The TIB is generally on the public agenda with its polemical filtering, and 
blocking policies. Rather, the organization should give priority on how the Internet and 
Internet contents within the country can be enriched and developed further, how the 
numbers o f Internet use can further be increased. A study shows that the number of 
websites registered within the country is just above the half of the ones in Greece with a 
population five times less than Turkiye. The TIB should organize meetings, and 
community-based workings to enlighten public. It should initiate projects and programs 
to develop contributions o f the Internet within the economic development and the like.
Dealing with blocking and filtering should not be the issue or policy o f a 
democratic state like Turkiye. Such measures can be an “exception” within democratic 
principles, but should not become a systematic, un-proportional “policy”. These issues 
can be left to the preference o f individuals, the private sector and o f course judicial 
authorities. State organizations can give priority more on other kinds o f education and
26 Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK ), "Internet Filters Don't Safeguard Children against Pornography 
and Other N et Nasties," http://www.cyber-rights.org/news/2000.htm .
27 Ay§e Karaca and Bahar Beyaznar, "intemette Mustehcenlik: N erede Ba§lar V e N erede Biter?” In 
Akademik Bilitjim K on feram i 2 0 / 0 , (M ugla, 2010).
28 Ramazan Acun, "Bilim, Bilgi Teknolojisi V e Turkiye," M illi K ultiirler ve  Kureselle$m e , (1998): 83-92.
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preventive activities and supervision. The default legal and political mentality should be 
liberty and freedom on the Internet rather than blocking, restriction or censorship.
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